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TUCKER'S POLITICAL FLY-SHEETS.

To be published by Subscription.

Post 8vo, price 5s.

THE
POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF
LORD PALMERSTON.
BY DR. C. MARX.

“The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
So help me God!”

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TUCKER'S

POLITICAL FLY-SHEETS

CONTAINING

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|--|--------------------------------------|
| 1 Palmerston and Poland. | 6 Urquhart for Premier. |
| 2 Palmerston, what has he done? | 7 The Invasion of the Crimea. |
| 3 England's Part in Turkey's Fall. | 8 The Words of Palmerston. |
| 4 War <i>for</i> Russia—not <i>against</i> Russia. | 9 Spider and Fly. |
| 5 Louis Napoleon—Russia—Circassia. | 10 The Home Face of the Four Points. |

TO WHICH IS APPENDED, BY PERMISSION,

REPORTS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

OF THE

NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE ASSOCIATION FOR WATCHING THE WAR.

LONDON:

TRÜBNER & CO., 12, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1855.

TUCKER, PRINTER, PERRY'S PLACE, OXFORD STREET.

INTRODUCTION.

A SALE of several editions—a marked influence on all who have read them—a translation into several languages—have induced the Printer to issue a collected edition of the Political Fly-Sheets. A few words on the first volume may prove acceptable.

For many, many years had I doubted the only man the People looked upon as essential to the welfare and glory of England, especially in Foreign Affairs. For many, many years had I asked the admirers of that man to point out any one act, any one speech, any one effort, that entitled him to that high position in their estimation. In vain. No one ever attempted it; and still the cry was for that man. I became sick and weary of the inquiry, and dejected that such a false god should be worshipped. An article in the *Glasgow Sentinel*, from the *New York Tribune*, appeared so appropriate to save me a world of speech, that I at once reprinted it, and distributed it bountifully. Shortly afterwards I became acquainted with the Author (Dr. Charles Marx), who kindly supplied various omissions, and furnished materials for a second pamphlet, No. II. This was the starting point of the Political Fly-Sheets.

I was at that time engaged in printing Mr. URQUHART'S *Progress of Russia*. I could not help following with interest the events which were to justify or to disprove what I had been composing or printing. I found that he understood the matter and that no one else did, except perhaps Lord PALMERSTON, so I continued the Fly-Sheets principally with selections from his Letters which appeared in the daily Press, but of which the value I thought would be found hereafter.

The explanation I have given will show that the publication has not been undertaken with a view to profit; indeed, in the first instance, it was a little contribution of my own towards the public sense. But I am now resolved to follow up the opening which has been made, taking it as a rule to insert nothing but what is of paramount value, and taking that wherever I can find it.

This opportunity I cannot forego without tendering my grateful and sincere acknowledgments to the "Association for Watching the War" of Newcastle-upon-Tyne for the insertion in these Fly-Sheets of their two Reports, which mark a new era in the History of England.

The first reprint of letters of Mr. URQUHART, as a Fly-Sheet, was in April 1854, from which time they form a contemporary record of his views, being in fact the history of the events told beforehand when taken in connection with a reprint of letters in the preceding year in a small volume entitled *Recent Events in the East*. I now, in an introductory chapter, add a Letter to the Circassians, and a selection of Resolutions at Public Meetings, specimens of some fifty or sixty that were then held throughout the land which we are now told was then zealous for this war.

I have also included the Political Testament of Lord PONSONBY, the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and the Ambassador of the Reform and Whig Government at Brussels, Naples, Constantinople, and Vienna. It exhibits for sixty years the acts of England towards Turkey and nothing more. It was intended for a Memorial to the Queen, but his intention was frustrated by his last illness. "Constitutional Difficulties" have prevented its being presented to the Queen, but these do not, as yet at least, exist to prevent its being read by the English People.

E. TUCKER.

LORD PONSONBY'S TESTAMENT.

Heads for a Memorial to the Queen, on the Consecutive Perfidies of the English Government to Turkey.

In 1791, the English Cabinet had resolved to resist the encroachments of Russia in the Black Sea, and fitted out an armament to attack Russia in the Baltic. Mr. Fox encouraged the Empress in her schemes, and Mr. Pitt abandoned the course which he had considered it his duty to adopt.

In 1806, every difference between England and France having been adjusted, Russia required the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to herself. England did make the demand, and in consequence of its rejection by France, the two countries and Europe were again plung'd in war.

In consequence of this understanding, Russia entered the Principalities, under pretence of saving them *from France*, and England being at peace with Turkey sent a squadron to force the Dardanelles and bombard Constantinople, with the view of forcing Turkey to the above-specified cession to Russia, the Dardanelles to herself, and a declaration of war against France.

In 1812, on the occasion of the invasion of Russia by France, when Turkey might have resumed the provinces already wrested from her, a treaty was signed, under the mediation of England, by which Russia got Bessarabia.

In 1814-15, at the Congress of Vienna, to restore the territories that had been abstracted during the war, Bessarabia was not restored, and Turkey was deliberately excluded from the "reparatory stipulations" and the general guarantee of that act.

In 1821, on the occasion of the Greek insurrection, and the rupture between Turkey and Russia, by reason of the perfidy of the latter, England undertook to be the mouthpiece of Russia at Constantinople.

In 1826, on the occasion of the Convention of Ackerman, obtained by Russia under the promise of not interfering further in the Greek affairs, a secret protocol was signed between England and Russia for that interference, but without contemplating coercive measures.

The following year, the English squadron, supported by the Russian and the French, destroyed the Turkish marine force at Navarino.

In 1828, the English Government called upon the Pacha of Egypt to make himself independent.

In 1829, Lord Aberdeen expressed to the Russian Ambassadors his desires for the success of the Russian arms, and acted accordingly.

The same year the Treaty of Adrianople was forced upon the Porte by the English Ambassador, when a few weeks would have brought the annihilation of the remnants of the Russian forces. That treaty contained cessions of influence and of territory, in violation of the original compact with England.

In 1831, on the occasion of the Polish insurrection, Turkey, moved by a common feeling with Persia, Sweden, France, and Austria, sought and prepared to maintain that country. In common with that of the rest, the action of Turkey was restrained by England.

In 1833, when Mehemet Ali invaded the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan appealed to England for protection, which was refused, Russia being invited by her to afford it. The following year, England menaced Turkey, on account of the treaty which she had been forced to sign with Russia, as the price of this assistance.

In 1838, a treaty of commerce was imposed on the Porte, which carried a high export duty on all those articles of Turkish growth which competed with the produce of Russia.

In 1840, again, on the occasion of an invasion by Mehemet Ali, England signed a treaty with Russia, stipulating for the defence of Constantinople and the Sultan by Russian arms.

In 1841, she signed a treaty for the exclusion of her own vessels from the Black Sea, and depriving the Sultan of the sovereignty of those waters.

In 1843, on the occasion of a revolution in Servia, the English Government admitted the Treaty of Adrianople as valid, and declared that Russia might interpret it as she pleased.

In 1844, the English minister accepted a memorandum from Count Nesselrode, of verbal communications, having reference to the ultimate disposal of Turkey, and kept it secret.

In 1849, England refused its support to the Porte against a treaty imposed upon it by Russia for a joint occupation of the Danubian Principalities for eight years.

In 1853, England refused its support to Turkey against the outrage of forcing the displacement of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Servia.

In the same year, it refused its support against the invasion of the Danubian Principalities by Russia.

In the same year, it endeavoured to make the Porte acquiesce in the invasion of its territory by Russia, and the claims she put forth to justify that invasion.

In the same year, she obtained a passage into the close waters of Turkey, for a naval force so powerful as to place in peril the independence of the Ottoman Empire.

During this whole course of time, the English Government professed the deepest anxiety for the well-being of the Ottoman Empire, holding its independence to be the gravest of the interests of England beyond her shores.

TO THE CHIEFS AND CLANS OF CIRCASSIA.

You may have been surprised at not having received a letter from me in reference to the great events now pending. I have been daily for a year intending to write to you, but I have been restrained by the impossibility of putting in a few words what I have to say. I can now delay no longer; it is necessary that I should warn you at least against the new danger with which you are threatened.

In the letter which I wrote to you some years ago, I explained my reason for not being amongst you, thus: I told you that the enemy whom you oppose by arms, held in his hands the counsels of England, and that therefore my first duty was to strive to open the eyes of the English Nation to the treachery of its Government. It is for this reason that at the present hour, I am writing to you a letter, not addressing you by word of mouth.

What I have to tell you is this: there is no war between Russia and England. The pretence of a war is got up to deceive the English Nation and the Ottoman Empire, in order that a treacherous Government may use the forces of England to coerce the Turks whilst the Turks are induced to admit them under the belief that they come as Allies. This diabolical scheme has been successful as regards Turkey—it will be tried with you.

You have before pledged yourselves to me, to admit no Europeans into your country, and you well know yourselves what have been the consequences in all the countries around you, of admitting the Franks. You are no longer exposed to the chance introduction of a few adventurers, troops and men of authority will be offered and sent to you. If *once* you admit them you are lost.

What has happened in these days and before your own eyes to Turkey? She admits the Anglo-French squadron through the Dardanelles. Seven

months have since elapsed—the Russians are still in the Principalities, and the Sultan is a prisoner in the Seraglio.

The squadron that was admitted was not *intended* for acting against Russia; it was far too powerful: it was *intended* to coerce Turkey. The English and French have now got Constantinople in their hands; they cannot expect to keep it themselves. Their ministers have it to dispose of. The only purchaser is Russia, and she will buy it without money, after leaving it for a while to prompt the rapacity of the two courts, to envenom them against each other, and thereby to involve all Europe in bloodshed.

Russia is holding out to the Governments of Europe a partition of Turkey, and having engaged them in this plot they become hired assassins against the master of the house, whose inheritance they hope to divide; but they are not to get the share that has been promised, for the people of Europe are no less stupid than covetous, and Russia knows how to make use alike of their baseness and their imbecility. You alone of all the people on the earth have hitherto understood Russia, and therefore you alone have stood against her. It requires now that you should understand Europe. Your safety against Russia has been your knowledge of her weakness; your safety against Europe will consist in your knowledge of its perfidy.

A new era has opened for the world. In the course of our lives four great contests have taken place almost within our hearing: that between Russia and Persia in 1826-27—between Russia and Turkey in 1828-29—between Russia and Poland in 1830-31—between Russia and Hungary in 1848-49. In all these the powers of Europe either abandoned the state which Russia attacked, or helped Russia to attack it, while at the same time their Governments were telling their people that they were doing everything to oppose Russia; but the people of Europe are kept in the dark respecting everything that concerns their real interests. This was the era of acquiescence with Russia and of secret aid. We are now advanced a step farther. We now support her by Armies and by Fleets, which Armies and Fleets are used for her advantage, just as heretofore agents and ambassadors were used—*then* it was ink, *now* it is gunpowder. This is the state of the world, the like of which has never been known before, and it arises out of this—that in Russia there are men; in Europe there are only legs and arms—in Russia there is a system, in Europe there is only chaos—in Russia the Government and the people are one, in Europe the Governments and the people are different orders of animals. So that a contest between Europe and Russia is like a contest between a man and a necromancer.

But the plan of serving Russia by sending armies to fight her, did not commence with Turkey. The experiment was made sixteen years ago in

Afghanistan, and I call your attention to this fact, as being all sufficient for your present guidance, if indeed you have eyes that can see, and ears that can ear.

Dost Mahomed of Cabul, whom you know to be a true Mussulman and a resolute enemy of Russia, knowing nothing of Europe and its Governments, and alarmed at the design of Russia in his Country invited an English Agent to Cabul and offered to place Afghanistan under British protection. The consequence was, that fifteen thousand British Soldiers were marched from India to dethrone him, and he was carried away a prisoner into the British Territory. The Afghans, after they had been subdued, rose upon their perfidious invaders and destroyed them all, and then England sent another expedition to punish the Afghans for their rebellion. The English Government attacked Dost Mahomed and the Afghans, because it knew they were enemies to Russia, but the English Nation furnished them with the means for doing so, and sacrificed their treasure and their blood, because they believed they were attacking friends of Russia. They believed this because the Government forged letters from their own Ambassador, in which forged letters, they made him say the reverse of what he had said, and whilst the British troops were slaughtering the Afghans, because they were said to be friendly to Russia, there was a Russian Ambassador at London, and a British Ambassador at St. Petersburg. See here the fate that is prepared for you. It is not only the same Russia and the same England as in 1838, but it is the very same man who planned the Afghan War, who is now the Real Minister of England. What I have told you is true and certain, and what has happened then, will happen now, unless you, enlightened by the experience of Dost Mahomed refuse to admit agents, and so afford a pretext to the English Government to misrepresent you to its own people. For whatever at any moment the English Government is doing in the East, it would be impossible for it to do, if its own people knew it at the time.

The alarm of the English people in reference, to Dost Mahomed was connected with India—they feared the Russians would get at India. But if Afghanistan was a barrier for India, how much more Persia, which covers Afghanistan? If the English Government had been acting honestly, though even mistakenly, in Afghanistan, must it not have supported Persia, when positively assailed by the arms of Russia, and when bound to do so by a defensive Treaty?

But if Persia is a barrier for India, how much more Circassia, which protects Persia as Persia does Afghanistan, and which protects Turkey as well as Persia. You were not beyond Russia's reach like the Afghans, You had not, like the Persians, been broken by her arms and bound by Treaty. You were, during the whole of this period, at war with her, and on the maintenance of that struggle depended the security of all Asia and

the peace of Europe. How was it then that England could send into Central Asia her armies from India, and yet afford you no support? How was it that at the very moment that she was making war upon Russia in the persons of the Afghans her foes, she submitted to and sanctioned the capture and confiscation by Russia of one of her own vessels in your harbour of Soujouk-Kaleh?

Ponder upon these things—your liberty and your lives depend upon the reflections they suggest. Your heroic deeds have been a crown of stars around your country's brow. The eyes of the world are fixed upon it, on Circassia now rests the safety of that world. You must be above what you undertake to protect. It is a duel now between you and Russia. You have fought her single-handed whilst she had no other foes. If you, like Europe or like Turkey, fancy you need aid or protection, then indeed it is all lost. Trust to yourselves, preserve yourselves, as you have done; then even let the Ottoman Empire go, and, please God, we shall yet restore the combat which is in our day to decide whether the world is to be Muscovite or not.

May, 8, 1854.

DAVID URQUHART.

*Petition to the House of Parliament, from a Meeting
held in Store Street, in March, 1854.*

That your Petitioners are deeply impressed with the necessity of maintaining good faith in all transactions with foreign nations.

That your Petitioners have observed that the conduct of the Foreign Office abroad has been frequently at variance with its contemporaneous professions in Parliament, particularly in the cases of Poland, Cracow, Sicily, Rome, and Hungary.

That your Petitioners attribute this bad faith of England in its foreign relations to the secrecy by means of which the Foreign Office has ceased to be responsible to the Nation, to the Parliament, and even to the Crown.

That your Petitioners have seen by the lately published Correspondence between England and Russia, that the British Government have for at least twelve months been cognizant of the Czar's design to dismember the Turkish empire: that they have suffered such disclosures to be made to them, have responded to them, kept them secret, acted according to the plans so laid down, and by so acting have produced the present convulsion.

That your Petitioners also believe that the facts, that part of the secret correspondence dates back to 1844, and that of the subsequent correspondence a portion has been suppressed, prove that Ministers have

discussed, on their own responsibility, matters which they had no right to discuss without reference to Parliament; and that your Petitioners protest against diplomacy being allowed thus to imperil the honour and interests of the people of this nation.

That your Petitioners, moreover, view with alarm the project of garrisoning the interior of Turkey with British troops; believing that, except by attacking Russian territory, both Her Majesty's armies and the Ottoman Empire will be exposed to hazard.

Your Petitioners, therefore, pray that your Honourable House will appoint a Committee to inquire into the conduct of the Foreign Office, with full power to read and publish all papers contained therein; and that you will, further, recommend that all foreign operations be suspended till that Committee shall have given its Report.

And your Petitioners will ever pray, &c.

Deputation to Lord Clarendon.

In pursuance of a resolution, the Committee convening the meeting, consisting of Messrs. Nicholay, Coningham, Wilson, Collet, and Wilks, waited upon the Earl of Clarendon, when Mr. Collet read the following Address:—

“My Lord,—We have been desired, by a crowded meeting of our fellow-countrymen, held in the Music Hall, Store Street, on Thursday, the 30th of March last, to present to your lordship a copy of the following resolutions, then agreed to:—

“‘I. That this meeting having considered the recently-published ‘secret and confidential’ correspondence between England and Russia, on the Turkish question, perceives, with shame and regret, that the British Government has, for at least 12 months past, been cognizant of the Czar’s designs upon the Turkish empire—risked our amity with France, by corresponding on so grave a question of European Policy to the exclusion of the French Government—and permitted the Czar to conclude the correspondence with the record of his satisfaction at the good understanding established between himself and the British Government, as to the disposal of the Ottoman dominions.’

“‘II. That this meeting views with alarm the project of garrisoning Turkey with British troops, and is of opinion that there can be no defence of Turkey, save by attacking the territory of Russia, and that

by taking the defensive, both the British troops and the Ottoman Empire are exposed to hazard.'

"In presenting these resolutions, we naturally revert to the interview we had with your lordship on the 21st of October last. On that occasion, your lordship promised to protect the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire, but declined to give us any assurance that *the British fleet should not be used against the Turks*.

"My lord, in a matter involving to a most serious extent the honour of our country, the lives of our fellow-subjects, and an amount of taxation which can be cheerfully supported only under a sense of its being efficiently applied, we cannot rest upon such grounds as these.

"We have watched the progress of events with deep anxiety. We have observed that the forces of Turkey are strong in the exact ratio of their distance from the seat of British diplomacy; that the Turkish army on the Danube has alone been able to cope with that of Russia; while the presence of the allied fleets has only had the effect of paralysing that of Turkey. Nor have we witnessed without alarm the choice of the present moment for interfering with the religious questions, the improper interference of Russia with which is the ostensible ground of all your proceedings. Such an interference, at such a time, appears to us likely to produce the worst possible results. What,—we ask ourselves,—would have been the condition of England, if Roman Catholic emancipation had been granted, not to the demands of the Irish people, but to the threats of a foreign Government? The Ministerial Reform Bill,—a very moderate measure, not at all calculated to convulse the nation,—is postponed on the ground of our being in a state of war; what, then, must be the effects of a change in the religious laws of a divided people, when forced upon them by a foreign power?

"Our fears are further aggravated by the statement that the army now being sent out is to be concentrated in the interior of Turkey, where it can be of no use except to assist the fleet in coercing the inhabitants. We think, therefore, that we shall not be deemed guilty of intrusion or unreasonable distrust, if we call upon your lordship to inform us *whether the troops now sent to Turkey are intended to make war upon Russia*."

His LORDSHIP replied—Really, Gentlemen, I do not know what reply I can make to such an Address. I hesitate to receive at all resolutions so offensive to the Government, both in matter and manner; so offensively reflecting even on the honesty and good sense of the Government. I have made repeated explanations of these matters in the place where the British people expect to receive such explanations—that is in Parliament.

Mr. COLLET said it seemed to them that to have listened at all to the proposals of Russia was to accede to them.

His LORDSHIP rejoined, the country had evidently come to a different conclusion, and was quite satisfied.

Mr. WILKS remarked that the fact of these resolutions having been adopted by so large a meeting, indicated some amount of dissatisfaction, and entitled them to some regard.

Lord CLARENDON said the resolutions of public Meetings were not usually couched in language so offensive. He had no reply to make. He must be considered to have made his reply.

At this intimation, the Committee, prevented from defending the terms of their resolutions, bowed, and retired.

*Resolutions adopted at a Public Meeting at St. Martin's Hall,
May 11th, 1854.*

1. That the neglect by the English nation of their material interests has rendered the Cabinet, on all matters transcending internal organisation, irresponsible, arbitrary, and despotic.

That those matters consist of the great concerns of the empire, involving trade and employment, the price of food, the supply of foreign markets and of our own, taxation for defences, war itself, its necessary accompaniments, taxation and debt, and its possible accidents, dishonour and ruin.

That the absolute power over these matters, usurped by the Cabinet from the Crown and the nation, has, after a long period of mismanagement, been finally betrayed to a Foreign Government, and used for its ends.

That in the course of the last year, and of the present, the means at the disposal of the English Cabinet have been used by that of St. Petersburg, first, to repress the Ottoman Empire in its purpose and power of resistance, and then to seduce and coerce it into internal revolution, whilst at the same time the whole of Europe has been filled with convulsion and prepared for war.

That the nation finds no protection in the integrity of its Parliament against the treachery of its Government; and

That there appears to remain no refuge save in its being speedily aroused to a sense of its danger and its helplessness.

2. That an Address be prepared and forwarded to the Circassians, calling upon them to rely, as heretofore, on their own valour, and not, like Turkey, surrender to strangers their independence and security.

Political Fly-Sheets.—No. I.

PALMERSTON

AND

RUSSIA.

“Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee.”

LONDON:

E. TUCKER, PERRY'S PLACE, OXFORD STREET;
6, HIND COURT, FLEET STREET;
8, AMEN CORNER, PATERNOSTER ROW.

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NOTES

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PALMERSTON AND RUSSIA.

FROM THE "NEW YORK TRIBUNE."

AT a recent Meeting in London to protest against the action of the British Embassy in the present controversy between Russia and Turkey, a gentleman who presumed to find special fault with Lord Palmerston was saluted and silenced by a storm of indignant hisses. The Meeting evidently thought that if Russia had a friend in the Ministry it was not the noble Viscount, and would no doubt have rent the air with cheers had some one been able to announce that his lordship had become Prime Minister. This astonishing confidence in a man so false and hollow is another proof of the ease with which people are imposed on by brilliant abilities, and a new evidence of the necessity of taking off the mask from this wily enemy to the progress of human freedom.

Accordingly, with the history of the last twenty-five years, and the Debates of Parliament for guides; we proceed with the task of exposing the real part which this accomplished actor has performed in the drama of modern Europe.

The noble Viscount is generally known as the chivalrous protector of the Poles, and never fails to give vent to his painful feelings with regard to Poland, before the deputations which are once every year presented to him by "dear dully-deadly" Dudley Stuart, "a worthy who makes speeches, passes resolutions, votes addresses, goes up with deputations, has at all times the necessary quantity of confidence in the necessary individual, and can also, if necessary, give three cheers for the Queen."

The Poles had been in arms for about a month when Lord Palmerston came into office, in November, 1830. As early as August 8th, 1831, Mr. Hunt presented to the House a petition from the Westminster Union in favour

of the Poles, and "for the dismissal of Lord Palmerston from his Majesty's councils." Mr. Hume stated on the same day that he concluded from the silence of the Noble Lord that the Government "intended to do nothing for the Poles, but allow them to remain at the mercy of Russia." To this Lord Palmerston replied, "*that whatever obligations existing Treaties imposed would at all times receive the attention of the Government.*"

Now what sort of obligations were, in his opinion, imposed upon England by existing Treaties?

"*The claim of Russia to the possession of Poland bears the date of the Treaty of Vienna,*" he tells us, in a speech made in the House of Commons, on July 9th, 1833; and that treaty makes this possession dependent on the observance of the Polish Constitution by the Czar. But from a subsequent speech we learn that

"*the mere fact of this country being a party to the Treaty of Vienna was not synonymous with our (England's) guaranteeing that there would be no infraction of that Treaty by Russia.*"—(House of Commons, March 26th, 1834.)

That is to say, you may guarantee a treaty, without guaranteeing that it shall be observed. This is the principle on which the Milanese said to the Emperor Barbarossa: "If you have had our oath, remember that we never swore to keep it."

In one respect the Treaty of Vienna was good enough. It gave to the British Government, as one of the contracting parties,

"*a right to entertain and express an opinion on any act which tends to a violation of that Treaty. The contracting parties to the Treaty of Vienna had a right to require that the Constitution of Poland should not be touched, and this is an opinion which I have not concealed from the Russian Government. I communicated it by anticipation to that Government previous to the taking of Warsaw, and before the result of hostilities was known. I communicated it*

again when Warsaw fell. The Russian Government, however, took a different view of the question."

So said our hero on the 9th of July, 1833. He had quietly anticipated the downfall of Poland, and had availed himself of the opportunity to entertain and express an opinion on certain articles of the Treaty of Vienna, persuaded as he was that the Czar was merely waiting till he had crushed the Polish people by armed force, to do homage to a Constitution he had trampled upon when they were yet possessed of unbounded means of resistance. At the same time the Noble Lord charged the Poles with having

"taken the uncalled-for and in his opinion unjustifiable step of the dethronement of the Emperor. He could also say that the Poles were the aggressors, for they commenced the contest."—(H. of C., Aug. 7th, 1832.)

When the apprehensions that Poland would be extinguished became universal and troublesome, he declared that *"to exterminate Poland, either morally or politically, is so perfectly impracticable, that I think there need be no apprehension of its being attempted."*—(H. of C., June 28th, 1832.)

When afterwards reminded of the vague expectation thus held out, he averred that he had been misunderstood, and that he had said so, not in the political, but the Pickwickian sense of the word, meaning that *"the Emperor of Russia was unable to exterminate, nominally or physically, so many millions of men as the Polish Kingdom, in its divided state, contained."*—(H. of C., April 20th, 1836.)

When the House threatened to interfere during the struggle in favour of the Poles, he appealed to his ministerial responsibility. When the thing was done, he told them coolly that

"no vote of that House would have the slightest effect in reversing the decision of Russia."—(H. of C., July 9th, 1833.)

When the atrocities committed by the Russians, after

the fall of Warsaw, were denounced, he recommended the House to cherish a great tenderness toward the Emperor of Russia, declaring that

"no person could regret more than he did, the expressions which had been uttered;" that *"the present Emperor of Russia was a man of high and generous feelings;"* that *"where cases of undue severity on the part of the Russian Government of the Poles had occurred, they might set this down as a proof that the power of the Emperor of Russia was practically limited, and they might take it for granted that the Emperor had, in those instances, yielded to the influences of others, rather than followed the dictates of his spontaneous feelings."*—(*H. of C., June 28th, 1832, and July 9th, 1833.*)

When on the one side the doom of Poland was sealed, and on the other the dissolution of the Turkish Empire became imminent from the progress of Ibrahim Pasha, he assured the House that

"affairs in general were proceeding in a satisfactory train."—(*H. of C., June 26th, 1832.*)

A motion for granting subsidies to the Polish refugees having been made, it was

"exceedingly painful to him to oppose the grant of any money to those individuals, which the natural and spontaneous feelings of every generous man would lead him to acquiesce in;" but *"it was not consistent with his duty to propose any grant of money to those unfortunate persons."*—(*H. of C., March 25th, 1834.*)

This same tender-hearted man had secretly defrayed, as we shall see by and by, in a great part the cost of Poland's fall out of the pockets of the English people. The Noble Lord took good care to withhold all State Papers about the Polish catastrophe from Parliament; but several statements made in the House of Commons, which he has never so much as attempted to controvert, leave no doubt about the game he played at that fatal epoch.

After the Polish revolution had broken out, the Consul of Austria did not quit Warsaw, and his Government went as far as to send a Polish agent, Mr. Walewski, to Paris on the mission of negotiating with the Governments of France and of England, about the re-establishment of a Polish Kingdom. The Court of the Tuileries declared "it was ready to join England in case of her consenting to the project." Lord Palmerston repudiated the proposal. In 1831 M. de Talleyrand, the then Ambassador of France at the Court of St. James, proposed a plan of combined action on the part of England and France, but met with a distinct refusal, and with a note from the Noble Lord stating

"that an amicable intermediation on the Polish question would be declined by Russia; that the Powers had just declined a similar offer on the part of France; that the intervention of the two Courts, France and England, could only be by force in case of a refusal on the part of Russia and that the amicable and satisfactory relations between the Cabinet of St. James and the Cabinet of St. Petersburg would not allow his British Majesty to undertake such an interference. The time was not yet come to undertake such a plan with success against the will of a Sovereign whose rights are indisputable."

On February 23d, 1848, Mr. Anstey made the following declaration in the House of Commons:—

"Sweden was arming her fleet for the purpose of making a diversion in favour of Poland, and of regaining to herself the provinces in the Baltic, which have been so unjustly wrested from her in the last war. The Noble Lord instructed our Ambassador at the Court of Stockholm in a contrary sense, and Sweden discontinued her armaments. The Persian Court had, with a similar purpose, despatched an army three days on its march towards the Russian frontier, under the command of the Persian crown-prince. The Secretary of Legation, at the Court of Teheran, Sir John McNeil, followed the prince, at a distance of three days' march from his head-quarters, overtook him, and there, under instructions from the Noble Lord, and in the name of England, threatened Persia with war, if the prince advanced another step towards the Russian frontier. Similar inducements were used by the Noble Lord to prevent Turkey from renewing war on her side."

To Colonel Evans asking for the production of papers

with regard to Prussia's violation of her pretended neutrality in the Russo-Polish war, Palmerston replied
"that the ministers of this country could not have witnessed that contest without the deepest regret, and it would be most satisfactory for them to see it terminated."—(*H. of C., Aug. 16th, 1831.*)

Certainly he wished to see it terminated as soon as possible, and Prussia shared in his feelings.

On a subsequent occasion Mr. H. Gally Knight resumed the whole proceedings of the Noble Lord with regard to the Polish revolution as follows:—

"There is something *curiously inconsistent* in the proceedings of the Noble Lord when Russia is concerned. . . . On the subject of Poland, the Noble Lord has disappointed us again and again. Remember when he was pressed to exert himself in favour of Poland, then he admitted the justice of the cause—the justice of our complaints; but he said, 'only restrain yourselves at present, there is an Ambassador fast setting out of known liberal sentiments; you may be sure we will do all that is right; you will only embarrass his negotiation if you incense the Power with whom he has to deal. So, take my advice, be quiet at present, and be assured that a great deal will be effected.' We trusted to those assurances; the liberal Ambassador went; whether he ever approached the subject or not was never known; but all we got were the fine words of the noble lord, and no results."—(*H. of C., July 13th, 1840.*)

The so-called kingdom of Poland having disappeared from the map Europe, there still remained a fantastic remnant of the Polish nationality in the free town of Cracow. The Czar Alexander, during the general anarchy resulting from the downfall of the French empire, had not conquered the Duchy of Warsaw, but simply seized upon it and wished to keep it, together with Cracow, which had been incorporated in the Duchy by Bonaparte. Austria once possessed of Cracow, wished to have it again. The Czar being unable to obtain it for himself, and being unwilling to cede it to Austria, proposed to constitute it as a free town, and accordingly the Treaty of Vienna contained the following stipulation:—

"The town of Cracow, with its territory, is to be for ever a free, independent and strictly neutral city, under the protection of Austria, Russia, and Prussia and the Courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia *engage* to respect, and to cause to be always respected, the neutrality of the free town of Cracow, and its territory. No armed force shall be introduced upon any pretence whatever."—(*Treaty of Vienna, Art. VI. and IX.*)

In 1831, Cracow, was temporarily occupied by Russian troops. This, however, was considered as a transitory necessity of war, and in the turmoil of that time it was not adverted upon. In 1836, Cracow was again occupied by the troops of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, on the pretext of their being obliged to accomplish, in that way, the expulsion of some Polish refugees from the town and its territory. On this occasion the Noble Lord abstained from all remonstrance on the ground, as he stated, in 1836 and 1840 "*that it was difficult to give effect to our remonstrances.*" As soon, however, as Cracow was definitively confiscated by Austria, a simple remonstrance appeared to him to be "*the only effectual means.*"

When the three Northern Powers occupied Cracow, in 1836, its constitution was abrogated, the three consular residents assumed the highest authority—the police was entrusted to Austrian spies—the Senate overthrown—the tribunals suspended—the university put down, by prohibiting the students of the neighbouring provinces to frequent it—and the commerce of the free city, with the surrounding countries, destroyed.

In March, 1836, when interpellated on the occupation of Cracow, Palmerston declared it to be of a merely transitory character. In fact, so palliative and apologetic was the construction he put on the doings of his three Northern allies, that he felt himself obliged to stop suddenly, and interrupt the even tenour of his speech by the assertion, "*I stand not up here to defend a measure, which, on the contrary, I must censure and condemn. I have merely stated those circumstances which, though they do not excuse the forcible occupation of Cracow, might yet afford a justification,*" &c.

He admitted that the Treaty of Vienna bound the three Powers to abstain from any step without the previous consent of England, but

"*they may be justly said to have paid an involuntary homage to the justice and the plain dealing of this country*

by supposing that we would never give our assent to such a proceeding."

Mr. Patrick M'Stewart, however, having found out that there existed better means for the preservation of Cracow than the "abstention from remonstrance," moved, on April 20, 1836, that the Government should be ordered to send a representative to Cracow as Consul, there being Consuls there from the three other powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia. The joint arrival at Cracow of an English and French Consul would have proved an event, and must, in any case, have prevented the Noble Lord from afterward declaring himself unaware of the intrigues pursued at Cracow by the Austrians, Russians, and Prussians. The Noble Viscount, perceiving the majority of the House to be favorable to the motion, induced Mr. Stewart to withdraw it, by solemnly promising that the Government

"intended to send a Consul or Agent to Cracow."

On March 22, 1837, being interpellated by Lord D. Stuart with regard to that promise, he answered that "*he had altered his intention, and had not sent a Consul or Agent to Cracow, and it was not at present his intention to do so.*"

Lord Dudley Stuart having given notice that he should move for papers to elucidate this singular transaction, the Noble Viscount defeated the motion, by the simple process of being absent, and causing the House to be counted out. He never stated why or wherefore he had not fulfilled his pledge, and withstood all attempts to squeeze out of him any papers on the subject.

In 1840 the "temporary" occupation still continued, and the people of Cracow addressed a memorandum to the governments of France and England, in which it is stated,

"The misfortunes which overwhelm the free city of Cracow and its inhabitants, are such that the undersigned see no further hope for themselves and their fellow-citizens but in the powerful and enlightened protection of the governments of France and England. The situation in which they find themselves placed, gives them a right to invoke the intervention of every power that subscribed to the Treaty of Vienna."

When Palmerston was interrogated about this petition from Cracow, he declared

"that between Austria and the British Government the question of the evacuation of Cracow remained only a question of time."

As to the violation of the Treaty of Vienna, *"there were no means of enforcing the opinions of England, supposing that this country was disposed to do so by arms, because Cracow was evidently a place where no English action could possibly take place."*—(H. of C., July 13th, 1840.)

Be it remarked that two days after this declaration—on July 15th, 1840—the Noble Lord concluded a treaty with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, for closing the Black Sea to English men-of-war, probably in order that English action could take place there. It was on this same day that he renewed the Holy Alliance with those Powers against France. As to the commercial loss sustained by England, consequent upon the occupation of Cracow, the Noble Lord demonstrated that "the amount of general exports to *Germany* had not fallen off," which remark, as Sir Robert Peel justly observed, had nothing to do with Cracow, considerable quantities of English merchandize being sent thither by the Black Sea, Moldavia, and Gallicia.

Closely pressed to state at last his real intentions, the Noble Lord "thought that his experience of the manner in which his unfortunate assertion"—made in 1836, in order to escape from the censure of a hostile House—"of an intention to appoint a British Consul at Cracow, had been taken up by honorable gentlemen opposite, justified him in positively refusing to give any answer to such a question, which might expose him to similar unjustifiable attacks."

On August 16th, 1846, he stated that *"whether the Treaty of Vienna is, or is not executed and fulfilled by the Great Powers of Europe, depends not upon the presence of a consular agent at Cracow."*

On January 28th, 1847, when again asked for the production of papers relative to the non-appointment of a British Consul at Cracow, he declared that

"the subject had no necessary connection with the discussion on the Incorporation of Cracow, and he saw no advantage in reviving an angry discussion on a subject which had only a passing interest."

He now proved true to his opinion on the production of State Papers, as expressed on March 17, '37, by saying *"If the papers bear upon a question now under consideration, their production would be dangerous; if they refer to questions that are gone by, they can obviously be of no use."*

The British Government was, however, very exactly informed as to the importance of Cracow, not only in a political, but also in a commercial point of view, the Consul at Warsaw, Colonel du Plat, having reported in detail thereupon.

Lord Palmerston, himself, was obliged to confess in the House that the Cracow insurrection of 1846 had been intentionally provoked by the three great Powers.

"He believed the original entrance of the Austrian troops into the territory of Cracow was in consequence of an application from the Government. But then those Austrian troops retired. Why they retired had never been explained. With them retired the Government and the authorities of Cracow; the immediate, at least the early consequence of that retirement, was the establishment of a provisional Government at Cracow."

On the 22d of February, 1846, the forces of Austria, and afterward those of Russia and Prussia, took possession of that city.

On the 26th of February, the Prefect of Tarnow issued his proclamation, calling on the peasants to murder their landlords, promising them "a sufficient recompense in money," which proclamation was followed by the Gallician atrocities and the massacre of 2000 proprietors.

On 12th March appeared the Austrian proclamation

to "the faithful Gallicians, who have aroused themselves for the maintenance of order and of law, and destroyed the enemies of order."

In the official *Gazette* of 28th April, Prince Frederic of Schwartzenberg stated officially, "that the acts that had taken place *had been* authorised by the Austrian Government," which, of course, acted on a common plan with Russia and Prussia.

Now, after all these abominations had passed, the Noble Lord was not ashamed to declare in the House, that "*he had too high an opinion of the sense of justice and of right, that must animate the Governments of Austria, of Prussia, and of Russia, to believe that they can feel any disposition or intention to deal with Cracow, otherwise than Cracow is entitled by treaty engagements to be dealt with.*"—(*H. of C., August 27th, 1846.*)

For him the only business then in hand was to get rid of Parliament, whose session was drawing to a close. He assured the Commons, that

"*on the part of the British Government everything should be done to insure a due respect being paid to the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna.*"

When Mr. Hume uttered a doubt about Lord Palmerston's "intention to cause the Austro-Russian troops to retire from Cracow," the Noble Lord begged of the House not to give credence to the statements made by Mr. Hume, as he was in possession of better information and was convinced that the occupation of Cracow was only a "temporary" one.

The Parliament of 1846 having been got rid of in the same manner as the Parliament of 1853, out came the Austrian proclamation of November 11th, 1846, incorporating Cracow into the Austrian dominions.

When Parliament reassembled on January 19, 1847, it was informed by the Queen's Speech that Cracow was gone, but that in its place there existed a protest on the part of the brave Palmerston. But in order to deprive

his protest even of the appearance of meaning anything at all, the Noble Lord had contrived, at that very epoch, to engage England in a quarrel with France, on occasion of the Spanish marriages, very near setting the two countries by the ears—a performance which was sharply overhauled by Mr. Smith O'Brien, in the House of Commons, on April 18, 1847.

When the French Government applied to the Noble Lord for co-operation in a joint protest against the incorporation of Cracow, Lord Normanby—under the instructions of the Noble Viscount—answered that the outrage of which Austria had been guilty, in annexing Cracow, was not greater than that of France, in effecting a marriage between the Duke of Montpensier and the Spanish Infanta;—the one act being a violation of the Treaty of Vienna, and the other of the Treaty of Utrecht. Now, the Treaty of Utrecht, which had been renewed in 1782, was definitely abrogated by the Anti-Jacobin war, and had, therefore, ever since 1792, ceased to be operative.

There was no man in the House better informed of this circumstance than the Noble Lord, as he had stated himself to the House on the occasion of the debates on the blockades of Mexico and Buenos Ayres that “the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht had long since lapsed in the variations of war, with the exception of the single clause relating to the boundaries of Brazil and French Guiana, because that clause had been by express words incorporated into the Treaty of Vienna.”

But we have not yet exhibited all the exertions of the Noble Lord in resisting the encroachments of Russia upon Poland.

There once existed a curious convention between England, Holland, and Russia—the so-called Russian Dutch Loan. During the Anti-Jacobin war the Czar Alexander had contracted a loan with the Messrs. Hope and Co. at Amsterdam, and after the downfall of Bonaparte, the King of the Netherlands, “desirous to make a suitable return to the Allied powers for having deli-

vered his territory," and for having annexed to it Belgium, to which he had no claim whatever, obliged himself, as the other powers waived their common claims in favour of Russia, which was then in great need of money, to execute with that power a convention agreeing to pay her, by successive instalments, the 25,000,000 florins she owed to the Messrs. Hope.

England, in order to cover the robbery she had committed on Holland with regard to the colonies of the Cape of Good Hope, of Demerara, Esquibo, and Berbice, became a party to this convention, and bound herself to pay a certain proportion of the subsidy granted to Russia. This stipulation became a part of the Treaty of Vienna, but upon the *express condition* "that the payment should cease if the union between Holland and Belgium were broken prior to the liquidation of the debt."

When Belgium separated herself by a revolution from Holland, the latter, of course, refused to pay her portion, on the ground that the loan had been contracted to continue her in the undivided possession of the Belgian provinces, and that she no longer had the sovereignty of that country. On the other hand there remained, as Mr. Herries stated in Parliament, "not the smallest iota of claim on the part of Russia for the continuance of debt by England."—(*H. of C., Jan. 26th, 1832.*) Lord Palmerston, however, found it quite natural that "at one time Russia should be paid for supporting the union of Belgium with Holland, and that at another time she should be paid for supporting the separation of those countries."—(*H. of C., July 16th, 1832.*) He appealed in a very solemn manner for the faithful observance of Treaties, and, above all, of the Treaty of Vienna, and he contrived to carry a new convention with Russia, dated Nov. 16, 1831, in the preamble of which it is expressly stated, that it was contracted "in consideration of the general arrangements of the Congress of Vienna, which remain in full force."

When the convention relating to the Russian-Dutch

Loan had been inserted into the Treaty of Vienna, the Duke of Wellington exclaimed, "This is a master-stroke of diplomacy on the part of Lord Castlereagh, for Russia has been tied down to the observance of the Vienna Treaty by a pecuniary obligation."

When Russia, therefore, withdrew her observance of the Treaty of Vienna, by the confiscation of Cracow, Mr. Hume moved a resolution to stop any further annual payment to Russia from the British Treasury. The Noble Viscount, however, thought that, although Russia had a right to violate the Treaty of Vienna with regard to Poland, England must remain bound by that very Treaty with regard to Russia. But this is not the most extraordinary incident in these curious transactions.

After the Belgian revolution had broken out, and before Parliament had granted the new loan to Russia, the Noble Lord defrayed the costs of the Russian war against Poland, under the pretext of paying off the old debt contracted in 1815, although we can state, on the authority of the greatest English lawyer, the then Sir Edward Sugden, now Baron St. Leonards, "That there was not a single debateable point in that question, and the Government had no power whatever to pay a shilling of the money" (*H. of C. June 26th, 1832*); and on the authority of Sir Robert Peel, "That Lord Palmerston was not warranted by law in advancing the money."—(*H. of C., July 12th, 1832.*)

Our readers will now understand why the Noble Lord reiterates, on every occasion, that—

"nothing can be more painful to men of proper feeling than discussions turning on the subject of Poland."

They can also appreciate the degree of earnestness he is now likely to exhibit in resisting the encroachments of the power he has so uniformly served.

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THE TREATY OF UNKIAR SKELESSI.

ONE of those facts hardly adverted to by contemporaries, but broadly marking the boundaries of historical epochs, was the military occupation of Constantinople by the Russians, in 1833.

The eternal dream of Russia was at last realised. The Barbarian from the icy banks of the Newa held in his grasp luxurious Byzantium and the sunlit shores of the Bosphorus. The self-styled heir to the Greek Emperors occupied, however temporarily, the Rome of the East.

"The occupation of Constantinople by Russian troops sealed the fate of Turkey as an independent power. The fact of Russia having occupied Constantinople even for the purpose (?) of saving it, was as decisive a blow to Turkish independence as if the flag of Russia now waved on the Seraglio."—(*Speech of Sir Robert Peel, H. of C. March 17th, 1834.*)

In consequence of the unfortunate war of 1828-9, and the Treaty of Adrianople, the Porte had lost its prestige in the eyes of its own subjects. As usual with Oriental empires, when the sovereign power is weakened, successful revolts of Pashas broke out. As early as October, 1831, commenced the conflict between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, the Pasha of Egypt, who had supported the Porte during the Greek insurrection. In the spring of 1832, Ibrahim Pasha, his son, marched his army into Syria, conquered that province by the battle of Homs, crossed the Taurus, annihilated the last Turkish army at the battle of Coniah, and advanced on the road to Stamboul. The Sultan was forced to apply to St. Petersburg, on February 2d, 1833. On February 17th the French Admiral Roussin arrived at Constantinople, remonstrated with the Porte two days afterwards, and pledged himself to cause the Egyptians to retreat if the Porte acceded to certain terms, including the refusal of Russian assistance; but, unassisted as he was, he was, of course, unable to cope with Russia. "You have asked for me, and you shall have me."

On February 20th, a Russian squadron suddenly sailed from Sebastopol, and disembarked a large force of Russian troops on the shores of the Bosphorus, and laid siege to the capital. So eager was Russia for the protection of Turkey, that a Russian officer was simultaneously despatched to the Pashas of Erzerum and Trebizond, to inform them that, in the event of Ibrahim's army marching towards Erzerum, both that place and Trebizond should be immediately protected by a Russian army. At the end of May, 1833, Count Orloff* arrived from St. Petersburg, and intimated to the Sultan that he had brought with him a little bit of paper, which the Sultan was to subscribe to, without the concurrence of any minister and without the knowledge of any diplomatic agent at the Porte. In this manner the famous Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was brought about; it was concluded for eight years to come. By virtue of it the Porte entered into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Russia; resigned the right of entering into any new treaties with other powers, except with the concurrence of Russia, and confirmed the former Russo-Turkish treaties, especially that of Adrianople. By a secret article, appended to the treaty, the Porte obliged itself, "in favour of the Imperial Court of Russia, to close the straits of the Dardanelles—viz., not to allow any foreign man-of-war to enter it under any pretext whatever."

To whom was the Czar indebted for occupying Constantinople by its troops, and for transferring, by virtue of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the supreme seat of the Ottoman empire from Constantinople to St. Petersburg? To nobody else but to the Right Honourable Henry John, Viscount Palmerston, Baron Temple, a Peer of Ireland, a Member of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, Knight of the Great Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, a Member of Parliament, and His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was concluded on July 8, 1833. On July 11, 1833, Mr. H. L. Bulwer moved for the production of papers with respect to the Turko-Syrian affairs. The Noble Lord opposed the motion,

"because the transactions to which the papers called for referred, were incomplete, and the character of the whole

* The same Count Orloff was lately designated by the *Times* as the "head of the Russian peace-party," and is now on a *pacific* errand to Vienna.

transaction would depend upon its termination. As the results were 'not yet' known, the motion was premature."—(H. of C., July 11th, 1833.)

Being accused by Mr. Bulwer of not having interfered for the defence of the Sultan against Mehemet Ali, and not having thus prevented the advance of the Russian army, he began that curious system of defence and of confession developed on later occasions, the *membra disjecta* of which we shall now gather together.

"He was not prepared to deny, that the latter part of last year an application was made on the part of the Sultan to the country for assistance."—(H. of C., July 11th, 1833.)

"The Porte made formal application for assistance in the course of August."—(H. of C., August 24th, 1833.)

No, not in August.

"The request of the Porte for naval assistance has been made in the month of October 1832."—(H. of C., August 28th, 1833.)

No, it was not in October.

"His assistance was asked by the Porte in November 1832."—(H. of C., March 17th, 1834.)

The Noble Lord is as uncertain of the day when the Porte implored his aid, as Falstaff was of the number of rogues in buckram suits, who came at his back, in Kendal green. He is not *prepared*, however, to deny that the armed assistance offered by Russia was rejected by the Porte, and that he, Lord Palmerston, was applied to. He refused to comply with its demands. The Porte did again apply to the Noble Lord. First it sent Mr. Maurojanni to London; then it sent Nahmik Pasha, who entreated the assistance of a naval squadron on the condition of the Sultan undertaking to defray all the expenses of that squadron, and promising, in requital for that succour, the grant of new *commercial* privileges and advantages to British subjects in Turkey. So sure was Russia of the Noble Lord's refusal, that she joined the Turkish envoy in praying his Lordship to afford the demanded succour. He tells us himself:

"It was but justice that he should state, that so far from Russia having expressed any jealousy as to this government granting this assistance, the Russian Ambassa-

dor officially communicated to him, while the request was still under consideration, that he had learned that such an application had been made, and that, from the interest taken by Russia in the maintenance and preservation of the Turkish Empire, it would afford satisfaction if ministers could find themselves able to comply with that request.” —(*H. of C., August 28th, 1833.*)

The Noble Lord remained, however, inexorable to the demands of the Porte, although backed by disinterested Russia herself. Then, of course, the Porte knew what it was expected to do. It understood that it was doomed to make the wolf shepherd. Still it hesitated, and did not accept the Russian assistance till three months later.

“*Great Britain,*” says the Noble Lord, “*never complained of Russia granting that assistance, but, on the contrary, was glad that Turkey had been able to obtain effectual relief from any quarter.*” (*H. of C., March 17, 1834.*)

At whatever epoch the Porte may have implored the aid of Lord Palmerston, he cannot but own,

“*No doubt if England had thought fit to interfere, the progress of the invading army would have been stopped and the Russian troops would not have been called in.*” (*H. of C., July 11th, 1833.*)

Why then did he not “think fit” to interfere, and to keep the Russians out?

First he pleads *want of time*. According to his own statement the conflict between the Porte and Mehemet Ali arose as early as October, 1831, while the decisive battle of Coniah was not fought till December 21, 1832. Could he find no time during all this period?

A great battle was won by Ibrahim Pasha in July, 1832, and again he could find no time from July to December. But he was all that time waiting for a *formal* application, on the part of the Porte, which, according to his last version, was not made till the 3d of November. “Was he then,” asks Sir Robert Peel, “so ignorant of what was passing in the Levant, that he must wait for a formal application?” —(*H. of C., March 17th, 1834.*)

And from November, when the formal application was made, to the latter part of February, there elapsed again four long

months, and Russia did not arrive until February 20, 1833. Why did not he?

But he has better reasons in reserve.

The Pasha of Egypt was but a rebellious subject, and the Sultan was the Suzerain.

"As it was a war against the sovereign by a subject, and that sovereign was in alliance with the King of England, it would have been inconsistent with good faith to have had any communication with the Pasha." (*H. of C., August 28th, 1833.*)

Etiquette prevented the Noble Lord from stopping Ibrahim's armies. *Etiquette* forbade him giving instructions to his consul at Alexandria to use his influence with Mehemet Ali. Like the Spanish grandee, the Noble Lord would rather let the Queen burn to ashes than step over *etiquette* and interfere with her petticoats.

Perchance it so appears that the Noble Lord had already in 1832, accredited consuls and diplomatic agents to the "subject" of the Sultan, without the consent of the Sultan; that he entered into treaties with Mehemet, altering existing regulations and arrangements touching matters of trade and revenue, and establishing other ones in their stead; that he did so without having the consent of the Porte beforehand or caring for its approbation afterwards.

Accordingly we are told by Earl Grey, the then chief of the Noble Viscount, that "they had at the moment extensive commercial relations with Mehemet Ali, which it would not have been their interest to disturb."—(*H. of L., February 4th, 1834.*)

Why? *Etiquette* did not prevent them from entering into commercial relations with the "rebellious subject!"

But the Noble Viscount's fleets were occupied in the Douro and the Tagus, and blockading the Scheldt, and doing the service of midwife at the birth of the constitutional empires of Portugal, Spain, and Belgium, and he was, therefore, not in a situation to spare one single ship.—(*H. of C., July 11th, 1833, and March 17th, 1834.*)

Now, what the Sultan insisted on was precisely naval assistance. For argument's sake, we will grant the Noble Lord to have been unable to dispose of one single vessel. But there are great authorities assuring us that what was wanted was not a single vessel, but only a single word on the part of the

Noble Lord. There is Lord Mahon, who had just been employed at the Foreign Office under Sir Robert Peel when he made this statement. There is Admiral Codrington, the destroyer of the Turkish fleet at Navarino. "Mehemet Ali," he states, "had of old felt the strength of our representations on the subject of the evacuation of the Morea. He had then received orders from the Porte to resist all applications to induce him to evacuate it, at the risk of his head, and he did resist accordingly, but at last prudently yielded and evacuated the Morea."—(*H. of C., April 20th, 1836.*)

There is the Duke of Wellington. "If, in the Session of 1832 or 1833, they had plainly told Mehemet Ali that he should not carry on his contest in Syria and Asia Minor, they would have put an end to the war without the risk of allowing the Emperor of Russia to send a fleet and an army to Constantinople."—(*H. of L., February 4th, 1834.*)

But there are still better authorities. There is the Noble Lord himself:—

"Although" he says "*His Majesty's Government did not comply with the demand of the Sultan for naval assistance, yet the moral assistance of England was afforded; and the communications made by the British Government to the Pasha of Egypt and to Ibrahim Pasha, commanding in Asia Minor, did materially contribute to bring about that arrangement (of Kutayah) between the Sultan and the Pasha, by which that war was terminated.*"—(*H. of C., March 17th, 1834.*)

There is Lord Derby, then Lord Stanley, and a member of the Palmerston Cabinet, who "boldly asserts that what stopped the progress of Mehemet Ali, was the *distinct declaration* of France and England that they would not permit the occupation of Constantinople by his troops."—(*H. of C., March 17, 1834.*)

Thus then, according to Lord Derby and to Lord Palmerston himself, it was by no means the Russian squadron and army at Constantinople, but it was a *distinct declaration* on the part of the British Consular agent at Alexandria, that stopped Ibrahim's victorious march upon Constantinople, and brought about the arrangement of Kutayah, by virtue of which Mehemet Ali obtained, besides Egypt, the Pashalik of Syria, and other places added as an appendage. But the Noble Lord *thought fit* not to allow his consul at Alexandria to make this

distinct declaration till after the Turkish army was annihilated, Constantinople overrun by the Cossack, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi signed by the Sultan and pocketed by the Czar.

If want of time and want of fleets forbade the Noble Lord to assist the Sultan, and a superfluity of *etiquette* equally forbade him to check the Pasha, did he at least employ his Ambassador at Constantinople to guard against excessive influence on the part of Russia, and to keep her interference confined within narrow bounds? Quite the contrary. In order not to clog the movements of Russia, the Noble Lord took good care to have no Ambassador at all at Constantinople during the most fatal period of the crisis.

"If ever there was a country in which the weight and station of an Ambassador were useful—or a period in which that weight and station might be advantageously exerted—that country was Turkey, during the six months before the 8th of July."—(*Speech of Lord Mahon, H. of C., April 20th, 1836.*)

Lord Palmerston tells us, that the British Ambassador, Sir Stratford Canning, left Constantinople in September 1832—that Lord Ponsonby, then at Naples, was appointed in his place, in November, and that

"difficulties experienced in making the necessary arrangements for his conveyance,"

although a man-of-war was waiting for him,

"and the unfavourable state of the weather did prevent his getting to Constantinople until the end of May 1833."—(*H. of C., March 17th, 1834.*)

The Russian was not yet in, and Lord Ponsonby was accordingly ordered to require seven months for sailing from Naples to Constantinople. But why should the Noble Lord prevent the Russians from occupying Constantinople?

"He for his part had great DOUBTS that any intention to PARTITION the Ottoman Empire at all entered into the Policy of the Russian Government."

Certainly not. Russia wants not to partition the Ottoman Empire, but to keep the whole of it. Beside the security Lord Palmerston possessed in this DOUBT, he had another security "in the *doubt*, whether it enters into the policy of Russia at present to accomplish the object" and a third "security" in his third "*doubt* whether the Russian nation (just think

of a Russian nation?) would be prepared for that transference of power, of residence, and authority to the southern provinces which would be the necessary consequence of the conquest by Russia of Constantinople.”—(*H. of C., July 11th, 1833.*)

Beside these negative arguments the Noble Lord had an affirmative one :

“*if they had quietly beheld the temporary occupation of the Turkish capital by the forces of Russia, it was because they had full confidence in the honour and good faith of Russia. The Russian government in granting its aid to the Sultan has pledged its honour, and in that pledge he reposed the most implicit confidence.*”—(*H. of C., July 11th, 1833.*)

So inaccessible, indestructible, integral, imperishable, expungable, incalculable, incommensurable and irremediable ; so boundless, dauntless, matchless, was the Noble Lord's confidence, that still on March 17th, 1834, when the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi had become a *fait accompli*, he went on declaring that “*in their confidence ministers were not deceived.*”

Not his is the fault if nature has developed his protuberance of confidence to altogether anomalous dimensions.

The contents of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi were published by the *Morning Herald* on August 21st, 1833. On August 24th, Sir Robert Inglis asked Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, “*whether there really had been concluded a treaty, offensive and defensive, between Russia and Turkey? He hoped that the Noble Lord would be prepared, before the prorogation of Parliament to lay before the House, not only the treaties that had been made, but all communications connected with the formation of these treaties between Turkey and Russia.*”

Lord Palmerston answered that

“*when they were sure that such a treaty as that alluded to really did exist ; and when they were in possession of that treaty, it would then be for them to determine what was the course of policy they ought to pursue. It could be no blame to him if the newspapers were sometimes beforehand with the government.*”—(*H. of C., August 24th, 1833.*)

Now, was the Noble Lord really not "*sure*" in August that such a treaty "*really*" existed? At a later epoch he himself stated that

"the British Government was surprised to find that when the Russian troops quitted the Bosphorous, they carried that treaty with them."—(*H. of C., March 1st, 1848.*)

On March 17, 1834, he assures that "it was perfectly impossible that the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, not to be ratified at Constantinople until the month of September, should have been *officially* known to him in August."

He is, then, obliged to own that he *did* know the treaty in August, although not *officially*. He thus proved that he was in possession of it *before* it had been *ratified*. Yea, the Noble Lord was in possession of the treaty *before* it had been *concluded*.

"No sooner had the Porte received it (*viz.* the draft of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi) than the treaty was communicated by them to the British Embassy at Constantinople, with the prayer for our protection against Ibrahim Pasha and against Nicholas. The application was rejected—but that was not all. With an atrocious perfidy, the fact was made known to the Russian Minister. Next day the very copy of the treaty which the Porte had lodged with the British Embassy, was returned to the Porte by the Russian Ambassador, who ironically advised the Porte to choose better another time its confidants."—(*Speech of Mr. Anstey, H. of C., February 8th, 1848.*)

But the Noble Viscount had obtained all he cared for. He was interrogated with respect to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, of whose existence he was not *sure*, on August 24th, 1833. On August 29th, Parliament was prorogued, receiving from the throne the consolatory assertion that "the hostilities which had disturbed the peace of Turkey had been terminated, and they might be assured that the King's attention would be carefully directed to any events which might affect the present state or the future independence of that empire."

Here, then, we have the key to the famous Russian Treaties of July.

In July they are concluded; in August something about them is transpiring through the public press. Lord Palmerston is interrogated in the Commons. He, of course, is aware of nothing. Parliament is prorogued, and when it reassembles, the treaty has grown old, or, as in 1841, has already been executed, in spite of public opinion.

Parliament was prorogued on August 29th, 1833, and it reassembled on February 5th, 1834. The interval between the prorogation and its reassembling was marked by two incidents intimately interwoven with each other. On the one hand the united French and English fleets proceeded to the Dardanelles, displayed there the tricolour, and the Union Jack, sailed their way to Smyrna, and returned from thence to Malta. On the other hand, a new convention was concluded between the Porte and Russia, on January 29th, 1834,—the convention of St. Petersburg. This convention was hardly signed when the united fleet was withdrawn.

The combined manœuvre was intended to stultify the British people and Europe into the belief that the hostile demonstration on the Turkish seas and coasts, directed against the Porte, for having concluded the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, had *enforced* upon Russia the new Treaty of St. Petersburg. This Treaty, by promising the evacuation of the Principalities, and reducing the Turkish payments to one-third of the stipulated amount, apparently relieved the Porte from some engagements enforced on it by the Treaty of Adrianople. In all other instances it was a simple ratification of the Treaty of Adrianople, not at all relating to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, nor dropping a single word about the passage of the Dardanelles. On the contrary, the small alleviations it granted to Turkey, were the purchase-money for the exclusion of Europe, by the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, from the Dardanelles.

“The very day on which the demonstration (of the British fleet,) was being made, an assurance was given by the Noble Lord to the Russian Ambassador at this court, that this combined movement of the squadrons was not intended in any sense hostile to Russia, nor to be taken as a hostile demonstration against her; but that, in fact, it meant nothing at all. I say this on the authority of Lord Ponsonby, the Noble Lord’s own colleague, the Ambassador at Constantinople.”—(*Speech of Mr. Anstey, H. of C., February 23rd, 1848.*)

After the convention of St. Petersburg had been ratified, the Noble Lord expressed his satisfaction with the moderation of the terms imposed by Russia.

Parliament having reassembled, there appeared in the *Globe*, the organ of the Foreign Office, a paragraph stating that “the Treaty of St. Petersburg was a proof either of the moderation or good sense of Russia, or of the influence which

the union of England and France, and the firm and concerted language of those two powers had acquired in the councils of St. Petersburg.”—(*Globe*, Feb. 24th, 1834.)

Thus, on the one hand, the Treaty of Adrianople, protested against by Lord Aberdeen and the Duke of Wellington, was surreptitiously to be recognised on the part of England by Lord Palmerston officially expressing his satisfaction with the convention of St. Petersburg, which was but a ratification of that Treaty. On the other hand, public attention was to be diverted from the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the animosity it had aroused in Europe against Russia, to be soothed down.

Artful as the dodging was, it would not do. On March 17th, 1834, Mr. Sheil brought in a motion for “the copies of the Treaties between Turkey and Russia, and of any correspondence between the English, Russian, and Turkish Governments, respecting those Treaties, to be laid before the House.”

The Noble Lord resisted this resolution to his utmost, and succeeded in baffling it by assuring the House that “peace could be preserved only by the House reposing confidence in the Government,” and refusing to accede to the motion. So grossly contradictory were the reasons which he stated prevented him from producing the papers, that Sir Robert Peel called him, in his parliamentary language, “a very unconvulsive reasoner,” and his own Colonel Evans could not help exclaiming:—“The speech of the Noble Lord appeared to him the most unsatisfactory he had ever heard from him.”

Lord Palmerston strove to convince the House that, according to the *assurances* of Russia, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was to be looked upon “as one of reciprocity,” that reciprocity being, that if the Dardanelles should be closed against England in the event of war, they should be closed against Russia also. The statement was altogether false, but if true, this certainly would have been Irish reciprocity, for it was all on one side. To cross the Dardanelles, is for Russia not the means to get at the Black Sea, but on the contrary, to leave it.

So far from refuting Mr. Sheil’s statement, that “the consequence of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was the same as if the Porte surrendered to Russia the possession of the Dardanelles,” Lord Palmerston owned

“that the treaty closed the Dardanelles to British men-of-war, and that under its provision even merchant vessels might, in effect, be practically excluded from the Black

Sea, in the case of a war between England and Russia. But if the Government acted with temper, if it showed no unnecessary distrust,"

that is to say, if it quietly submitted to all further encroachments of Russia, he was

"inclined to think that the case might not arise in which that Treaty would be called into operation, and that, therefore, it would in practice remain a dead letter."—*(H. of C., March 17th, 1834.)*

Besides, "the assurances and explanations which the British Government had received from the contracting parties to that Treaty greatly tended to remove its objections to it."

Thus, then, it was not the articles of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, but the assurances Russia gave with respect to them, not the acts of Russia, but her *language*, he had in his opinion to look upon. Yet, as on the same day, his attention was called to the protest of the French Chargé d'Affaires, M. Lagrene, against the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the offensive and contumelious *language* of Count Nesselrode, answering in the *St. Petersburg Gazette*, that "the Emperor of Russia would act as if the declaration contained in the note of M. Lagrene, had no existence,"—the Noble Lord, eating up his own words, propounded the opposite doctrine that

"it was on all occasions the duty of the English Government to look to the acts of a Foreign Power, rather than to the language which the power might hold, on any particular subject or occasion."

One moment he appealed from the acts of Russia to her language, and the other from her language to her acts.

In 1837 he still assured that the

"Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was a Treaty between two independent powers."—*(H. of C., December 14th, 1837.)*

Ten years later, the treaty having long since elapsed, and the Noble Lord being just about acting the play of the truly English Minister, and the "civis romanus sum," he told the House plainly,

"the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was no doubt to a certain degree forced upon Turkey by Count Orloff, the Russian Envoy, under circumstances"

created by the Noble Lord himself,

"which rendered it difficult for Turkey to refuse acceding to it It gave practically to the Russian Government a power of interference and dictation in Turkey, not consistent with the independence of that state."
—(*H. of C.*, March 1st, 1848.)

During the whole course of the debates about the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the Noble Lord, like the Clown in the Comedy, had an answer of most monstrous size, that must fit all demands and serve all questions—the Anglo-French Alliance. When his connivance with Russia was pointed at in sneers, he gravely retorted,

"if the present relations established between this country and France were pointed at in these sneers, he would only say, that he should look with feelings of pride and satisfaction at the part he had acted in bringing about that good understanding."—(*H. of C.*, July 11th, 1833.)

When the production of the papers relating to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was demanded, he answered that

"England and France had now cemented a friendship which had only grown stronger."(*H. of C.*, March 17th, 1834.)

"He could but remark," exclaimed Sir Robert Peel, "that whenever the Noble Lord was thrown into a difficulty as to any part of our European policy, he at once formed a ready means of escape, by congratulating the House upon the close alliance between this country and France."

Simultaneously the Noble Lord took good care not to quench the suspicions of his Tory opponents, that he had been compelled to connive at the aggression upon Turkey by Mehemet Ali, because France had directly encouraged it.

At that time, then, the ostensible *entente* with France was to cover the secret inoffensiveness to Russia, as in 1840, the clamorous rupture with France was to cover the official alliance with Russia.

While the Noble Lord fatigued the world with ponderous folios of printed negotiations on the affairs of the constitutional kingdom of Belgium, and with ample explanations, verbal and documentary, with regard to the "substantive power" of Portugal; to this moment it has proved quite impossible to wrest out of him any document whatever relating to the first Syro-Turkish War, and to the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. When

the production of the papers was first demanded, on July 11th, 1833, "the motion was premature, the transactions incomplete, and the results *not yet* known."

On August 24th, 1833, "the treaty was not officially signed, and he was not in possession of it." On March 17th, 1834, "communications were still carrying on. . . . the discussions, if he might so call them, were *not yet* completed."

Still in 1848, when Mr. Anstey told him that in asking for papers, he did ask for the proof of the Noble Lord's collusion with the Czar, the chivalrous Minister preferred killing time by a five hours' speech, to killing suspicion by self-speaking documents. Notwithstanding all this, he had the cynic impudence to assure Mr. T. Attwood, on December 14th, 1837, that "the papers connected with that treaty, viz., the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, *were laid before the House three years ago*," that is to say, in 1834, when "peace could be preserved only" by withholding them from the House. In 1834, he enjoined the House not to press upon him, as "*peace could be preserved only by the House reposing confidence in the government*," which, if left alone, would certainly protect the interests of England from encroachment. Now, in 1837, in a thin House, composed almost entirely of his retainers, he told Mr. Attwood, that it had never been "the intention of the Government to have recourse to *hostile measures* to compel Russia and Turkey, two independent powers, to cancel the treaty made between them."

On the same day, he told Mr. Attwood that

"this Treaty was a matter which had gone by, that it was entered into for a limited period, and that period having expired, its introduction by the Honourable Member was wholly unnecessary and uncalled for."

According to the original stipulation, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was to expire on July 8th, 1841. Lord Palmerston tells Mr. Attwood that it *had* already expired on December 14th, 1837.

"What trick, what device, what starting hole, can'st thou now find to hide thee from this open and apparent shame? Come, let's hear, Jack—what trick hast thou now?"

Political Fly-Sheet.—No. III.

ENGLAND'S PART

IN

TURKEY'S FALL.

“ And be these juggling fiends no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense.”

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ENGLAND'S PART IN TURKEY'S FALL.

"Diplomacy's ways are tortuous, and may lead an honest man where he designs not to go."—ADMIRAL SLADE.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE MORNING ADVERTISER.

SIR—I am induced by the facts which have come to light since I last addressed you, to address you again.

There can be now no question, that I stated what was true, when I said, the Anglo-French squadron was sent to Constantinople to coerce Turkey; and I wish to bring together the evidence of that truth.

The two Ambassadors, on being requested by the Porte to declare themselves after the affair of Sinope, and to send their squadron into the Black Sea, delayed *for eight days* giving an answer, keeping for so long, the Turkish Government in suspense, and so preventing the pursuit and destruction of the Russian squadron. In their answer we find, first, an avowal of the most astounding nature—that they had exercised their influence to arrest the operations of the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea. We furthermore, have grounds assigned for this course, grounds which are false; namely the defective material and crews, and the possibility of an encounter with an enemy of superior force; and this statement is made immediately after that affair of Sinope, which placed in the strongest imaginable relief the naval superiority of the Turks over the Russians, in regard both to ships and men, and the dread which the Russians entertained of both. As to the assumed numerical superiority of the Russians, the statements before the world show it

to be a known falsehood, the Turks possessing in line-of-battle ships and in steam-frigates the superiority, whilst they command the entrance of the Danube, and have taken possession of the entrance of the Phasès. Here let me remark, that in the last war, though the Turkish navy had then been recently destroyed by Great Britain, the only naval achievement in the Black Sea was the capture of a Russian frigate, and notwithstanding the immense preparations of Russia, which we hear of, she has only at present thirteen line-of-battle ships in that sea, and she had the same number in 1829. The Russians have themselves sedulously put forward that half of their squadron is not sea-worthy. The native Russians, comprising the crews, have two months ago, been landed for means perfectly transparent, and their places supplied by drafted and unwilling populations from the shores of the Baltic. The Ambassador goes on to state—"The presence of the Anglo-French fleet in the Bosphorus is an incontestable proof of the interest and sentiments which animate the Emperor of the French and her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain."

Interest in whom? Sentiments of what? Not, certainly, interest for Turkey, or sentiments of honour.

"Their presence has a political signification."

True, political! It has no naval meaning, no military sense!

"It is a moral support as long as there remains a hope of effecting a reconciliation between the adverse Powers."

Moral support, and this too, limited to the hope of effecting a reconciliation! *Reconciliation* too! and between not States at war, but "*adverse Powers.*" The withdrawal of the Russian Ambassador from Constantinople has not impaired the composition of English despatches. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has become a proficient in two branches at once, and can

do Russia's work in Russia's fashion. Well, indeed, say the *Times* and Mr. Cobden designate him "the Great Diplomatist." Now, listen. "Should, however, Russia attempt to land a force on the Bosphorus, or at any other point on the Turkish coast, the combined fleet will then be required to act, and enter immediately the Black Sea, if necessary, to protect the territory *as well as* the integrity of the Ottoman empire."

We need not now await for the assembling of Parliament. The explanations are anticipated, and all explanation henceforward is superfluous. The case is stated; the murder committed; the fact avowed. Of course, the Turkish troops are recalled from Georgia! and a modification takes place of the Turkish Government, in a *pacific sense*.

Mr. Gladston has told us, that there was an independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, though they were different from the integrity and independence of England and France. We have now advanced a further step in political discrimination; we distinguish between "territory" and "integrity," so that we may choose the one, and leave the other—give up the territory and save the integrity, and so also keep even the territory, and lose the integrity. This is not in the abstract, but in practice and effects. We shall be "required to act" if the Russians land, but we are not required to act when they "march," or when they "cross." In other words, the "territory" of the Ottoman Empire is now exclusive of Wallachia and Moldavia, and its "integrity" is to be henceforward exclusive with Russia.

In a word, geography intervenes, and that powerful argument stretches beyond the Danube nay, has originated beyond it. The historian of French Diplomacy thus reports the words of Alexander to Napoleon:—

“ He said that Constantinople stood in the relation to Russia of a provincial city at the extremity of the empire, and that *geography assigned it to him*; he said that it was the key of his house-door, and that while another had possession of it, he would not look upon himself as master of his own house.”

You may perhaps suspect that I am laying too much stress on terms, especially in the presence of such events—events which put argument aside; but it is by the selection of terms, and not by the advance of armies, that Russia effects her conquest. She is proceeding to the subjugation of Turkey and the world by the poisoning of our ears; nor has she the trouble of making up the doses: her drug-vendors are the Foreign Ministers of England and of France.

When the hapless town of Sheffield, after its demonstration of sympathy for Turkey, communicated its labouring and anxious thoughts to the Muscovite apothecary of Downing-street, he quickly seized the occasion, and administered a pill, and told them that Russia had not occupied, but taken *possession* of the Danubian Provinces. When the Provisional Government at Bucharest issued the incomparable order for the confiscation of neutral vessels that should communicate with the right bank of the Danube,—neutrals, which could only reach that river, by passing Constantinople, through the sufferance of the Turks,—the same functionary instantly announced it in the *Gazette* of the 7th of last month, as proceeding from “*the Russian authorities at Bucharest.*” No notice was taken of this fact in any single journal, whether in Great Britain or in Europe. When at Derby at the second meeting, I went over, at considerable length, the diplomatic correspondence in reference to the mouths of the Danube, the point which produced the greatest effect upon the audience, was the exposure of the stealthy and laborious process, through which

the Vice-Consulate at the mouth of that river was withdrawn from the jurisdiction of a British Consulate within the Turkish dominions, and placed under the British consulate at Odessa, that is to say, within the Russian dominions.

Placing the Danubian Provinces in the hands of the Czar, the British Government will only be crowning the labours of half a century—labours in which it has already sacrificed thousands of millions of treasure and millions of lives. We resumed war with France in 1806, for the accomplishment of that end, and since that period the wrenching of these Provinces from Turkey has remained amidst all our vacillation and contradiction, the ever-leading and coherent purpose of British policy. It is true that, in the first period, the end was pursued openly and avowedly, because then the sympathies of England were anti-Turkish: now that the feelings of the nation are the reverse, it is to be pursued with cunning and with fraud.

In the late work of Mr. Savagè Landor there is a preposititious conversation between the Emperor and Count Nesselrode, in which the following appears:—

“*Nicholas.*—France and England can never act together.”

“*Nesselrode.*—They did at Navarino.”

It might have been supposed that the writer had got the key. However, the answer which he puts in Nicholas's mouth is, “*It was but for a day.*” Alas! alas! how can this people be made to comprehend? Can the potsherd say to the Potter, why hast thou made me thus?

Now let me call your attention more particularly to the affair of Sinope. You will recollect that when this nation rejoiced in the vigorous measure taken by sending the squadron up the Dardanelles, I declared that it was so sent for the express purpose of coercing Turkey, and overawing its capital; not as open adver-

saries, because then I should not have feared it, but as professing friends, and so capable of over-reaching and betraying the Turks. What could appear more improbable, more impossible, more preposterous, than such an assertion—in fact, I was set down as insane and in what did my insanity consist? In understanding the English Government, and the English People. I knew the English people, and it did not know itself. I know what Nicholas knows—what Palmerston knows. I have sounded the depths of its imbecility. I know who are its managers, whether in regard to the resolution of some, or the weakness of others. Well; events have run exactly as I had stated. But do not believe I was alone in this conviction: let me give you some evidence to the contrary. A letter which I received from a leading personage of the Wallachians, written before the commencement of hostilities—(I read it to the meeting at Manchester) has these words:—

“The Turks will win the battles, but England will then interpose with a note. The Russian generals (at Bucharest) do not conceal their utter inability to meet the Turks, but at the same time they make no scruple in avowing their confidence that the Anglo-French squadron will come to their aid with another Navarino,”

An English gentleman writes from Constantinople—“Should this inference (a declaration of war by England against Russia) prove groundless, infatuation alone can explain the Porte’s placing the sovereign and his empire at the mercy of Turkey’s pretended allies. Were it not that we are living in an age of absurdities, a supposition so monstrous could not be admitted one instant as possible.”

You will recollect the letter from Constantinople, which I enclosed to you a few days ago, wherein I am informed, by an old correspondent of one of the lead-

ing journals, that the seeds of dissension sown by European diplomacy were beginning to bear their fruit in the Turkish Councils, and asserting that "Turkey had been most treacherously betrayed by her allies."

A Rayah, or Christian subject of the Porte, writing from Constantinople on the 5th of December, after dwelling upon the position in which 'Turkey would be, if she stood alone, writes—

"But, no; we are persecuted by pretended friendship, which masks nothing but treacherous cunning. This conduct is only inflaming still more the fury which recent events has awakened among us; and should the impending period be marked with a deeper dye of blood than any that has yet been recorded in history, those alone, I protest before God, will be responsible who have stripped the policy of the British Government of every idea of honour which was once associated with the name of England."

I might multiply quotations to the same effect from Englishmen, Germans, Frenchmen, and Christian subjects of the Porte. It is the Turks alone in their blind infatuation who, according to their own estimate of honour, and their misjudgement of English freedom, persevere, ostrich-like, in burying their perceptions in the sand.

On the occurrence of the Sinope massacre, the correspondents of the various journals of Constantinople become open of speech. One of these says:

"The *Greeks*, with their usual malicious feeling, exclaim that it is England that has brought about this little Navarino, in order to obtain peace at any price. It is, however, really a question what the English and French fleets are doing here; the only answer to which seems to be, that their sailors and officers get drunk in the public streets, insult women, and violate the sanctuary of private houses. Besides this, the fleets serve the Ambassadors as a means of

threatening the Turks, so as to restrain them from marching on Bucharest, and forcing them into an arrangement such as the Two Powers may please to dictate."

From Paris indignant denunciations proceed, charging England with restraining the French; and it is the general belief that England "is" inviting France on," so as to compromise her, having herself made her terms with Russia. From Germany we have similar results.

"The best informed men in Vienna," says the correspondent of the *Times*, "roundly assert that England has never seriously thought of opposing Russia. This idea has, by degrees, become a popular one."

Another curious fact is reported, that it was known, by anticipation, that a disaster was to occur, and the Russians had time to send to Sebastopol for a re-inforcement; whilst the English Ambassador was preventing the Turks *from* sending out their ships, "for fear of the possibility of an encounter with an enemy of superior force!"

On the arrival of the intelligence in London, the journals, too, began to be free of speech. The following is from the *Morning Advertiser* :—

"A statement appeared in a morning contemporary of Saturday, to the effect that Lord de Redcliffe had prevented the main body of the Turkish fleet, commanded by Admiral Slade, from entering the Black Sea, under a threat that if the Turkish Government did send its fleet into the Black Sea to meet the Russians, he would immediately order the English fleet away from Constantinople. This statement was so startling, and involved such an amount of criminality on the part of our Government, that the public were unwilling to believe it. We regret to be compelled to state, that we are in a position to vouch, from private sources of our own, for the accuracy of our

contemporary's assertions. But for the interference of our Ambassador at Constantinople, and his threat to send off the English fleet from that place, in the event of the main body of the Turkish fleet going into the Black Sea to encounter the Russians, the Turkish fleet, under Admiral Slade, would have met the Russians, and destroyed every one of their ships. On the head of England, therefore, rests the guilt of the catastrophe at Sinope."

The *Press* says :

"Our readers are aware that the Admiral of the Turkish fleet is a gallant English officer, Captain Adolphus Slade, bearing in Turkey the title of Mushoover Pacha. It being known, some little time ago, that a squadron under this officer was about to cruise in the Black Sea, Lord Stratford, our Ambassador at the Porte, sent for Captain Slade, and endeavoured to prevent the expedition, on the ground that, *as the Turkish Admiral was an English subject, it might tend to embroil us with Russia.* The gallant Slade, as became a man of honour, in the service of the Porte, treated the appeal with the contempt which it deserved. He went, and he returned; and he recommended to the Turkish Government that the whole fleet should immediately repair to the Euxine. Every means were had recourse to, in order to prevent this step; and, finally, Admiral Dundas—no very wise man, to be sure, but one, certainly, who would not act from his own inspiration—declared to the Turkish Government, that if their fleet entered the Black Sea, he would return with the English fleet to the Mediterranean. The Divan, with a protest, yielded to this violence, and, under these circumstances, the English, the French, and Turkish fleets permitted an expedition of five thousand troops, convoyed by a few frigates, to be massacred by Russian men-of-war. What infamy!"

Again—

“ With the fleets of France and England in the Black Sea, the astonished Sultan of Turkey is already surprised that one of his ships is captured with impunity by a Russian vessel. The spring will bring him further wonders. Lord Aberdeen will do that in 1854, with regard to Turkey, which he did in 1829. He will betray the honour and the interests of our country. It is the law of his nature and the destiny of his life.”

In 1829 Lord Aberdeen was engaged according to his lights in doing his best to resist Russia—he did indeed record a protest against her Treaty of Adrianople, and perhaps he might have done more had he *then* been supported in his resistance by that public which now brands his subserviency. He might have done more had he not had at once to combat Russia's diplomatic art and Parliament's popular denunciations. He was attacked in the House of Commons because not sufficiently Russian, and the then Leader of public opinion, his then assailant in the House of Commons, is now his colleague at the Council Board. It is, therefore, no wonder if we hear, that there has been a commotion of Fanatics in the streets at Constantinople, and “ that the English and French marines had been sent for.”

I cannot resist making another citation from a Dublin journal (*Commercial Journal*), which, as I write, has been placed in my hands :—

“ The *Times* seems at one time to consider that a great point has been gained in the consent of Turkey to negotiate—Is it possible that the disaster at Sinope was permitted in order to bring about this result? The supposition is by no means improbable : indeed the reluctance of France and England to punish the aggressor seems strongly confirmatory of that view. The *Times*, at the first burst of feeling produced by the intelligence of the slaughter of the Turks, gave

way, and joined in the general shout of condemnation of Russian proceedings; but when that wore off a little, it came out a day or two after with a conditional statement, putting the case as if Russia had acted merely on the defensive. It was quite possible this may be the case; and it was necessary to observe caution in any co-operative measures. That this view was not put forward without a purpose will be quite plain from the letter addressed by the Admiral, commanding the attacking fleet, to the Austrian Consul resident at Sinope, counting upon his good offices to make known that the imperial squadron has had no hostile intention either against the town or against the port of Sinope."

Is it possible that suspicions such as these could have spread unless there were grounds? It is possible that the English nation should at once suspect and endure?

If Russia were able to conquer Turkey, do you think the powers would be interfering? They have given to the Emperor the magnificent Provinces of the West; they hold back the Turks until winter sets in, when their re-conquest is impossible: then the Turks break out in Asia, they are marching through the parallel trans-Caucasian Provinces of Russia; the Christian populations hail their advent; they are regaining the mighty barrier of the Caucasus, when you interpose to cause them to withdraw their forces and to evacuate Georgia and Armenia! Then you plan a Navarino, all Russia's own, and thus construct the case of Turkey's weakness, which enables you to interpose in Russia's aid. I can speak now as the language of events, which I have before proclaimed in the visions of futurity—"Your pretext is the weakness of Turkey, your acts will be the strengthening of Russia."

Let us here set down why it is that you are made to interfere, and what it is that Russia has to apprehend.

The season opens in the south before it opens in the north, consequently the Turkish troops can enter on the campaign at least two months before the Russians can move any bodies of men to the southward. It is utterly impossible for her to send forces to the Pruth, across the deserted steppes of the Ukraine, before the beginning, or rather the end, of May. The Turks may, in the month of March, or even a month earlier, bring to bear their united power in Wallachia, and can pour into that country 300,000 men, if necessary, and commence operations from the extreme northern point of the Dobrodja; that is to say, taking the Russian force in flank and rear. The peasantry are all ready to rise upon the Russians. The force of the Russians beyond the Pruth is actually reduced to 40,000, say at the outside 50,000 men. Two months will reduce it largely, still. The utmost of the reinforcements it can expect from Bessarabia is 20,000 men.

To the East, the communication of the Turks with the Circassians, who are at war with Russia, involves the sacrifice of Russia's 50,000 men in Georgia, and opens, beyond the mountains, the territories of Russia to an invasion; the consequences of which can only be apprehended by those who know the spirit that ferments among the Malo-Russians, and who have studied the revolt of Pugatcheff.

As to the Black Sea, the Turks have the superiority in vessels, and, it is needless to say at present, crews. We may add, that the wages of a Russian seamen are about half-a-crown a-month, and that there is not a native Russian on board their vessels. The crew of the *Ajax*, the vessel which captured the *Vixen*, proposed to the English sailors, if they would head them, to carry off that Russian man-of-war.

The consequences, therefore, of war in the spring, would be, as stated by General Bem, "the resumption

by the present Sultan of the territories wrested from his predecessors, by the perfidy of the Czars of Russia." Such is the contingency which Europe is now busied in averting; and this is the explanation of the assertion which I have so often repeated, that the present crisis will decide whether it is Russia or Turkey which is to fall. Turkey might be beaten by Russia, without any risk or danger beyond such as was incurred at the Treaty of Adrianople, but it is quite another thing to hold Turkey down; in other words, there would be safety, if Turkey were weak; the danger comes from her strength.

The decision of "the Four," on the 13th September, *has been carried into effect.* The Anglo-French squadron is supporting the Sultan against his people. We have now to prepare for his dethronement and a disputed succession. Thus, too, are the explanations in Parliament anticipated; and if you have any care left for such matter, it will soon be diverted to Reform at home and Revolution abroad, to cover the features of danger, and smooth the pillow of treason. There remains absolutely but one door of safety—it is that of Westminster Hall. There is but one cry to be raised—the cry of a whole people calling for vengeance—for the misuse of its own powers for its own undoing. It has been shown that you cannot prevent—let it appear that, at least, you have the thought of avenging. There is to choose between drops of guilty blood on the scaffold, and the deluging of Europe with innocent gore.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.

D. URQUHART.

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HOW IS THE WAR TO BE CARRIED ON?

THE Emperor disdains to notice your ultimatum, and of course England DECLARES WAR. No—a *message* comes down. After it is listened to in breathless silence, the members ask if this is or not a declaration of war? They ask, but there is none to answer. Even legal advisers of the Crown being questioned, themselves ask in turn. I answer, that it is *no* declaration of war. I but repeat the words of Lord Aberdeen at the Mansion House. "*To defend the Ottoman Empire*" is not to attack Russia—neither is it to defend Turkey. So that the message of the Crown is as destitute of meaning as of form, unless for those who have the cipher. However, I will assume that we do declare war, and on that assumption write this letter.

Declaring war and making war are not the same thing. Nay, possessing fleets and armies, and even sending them out, may be as little to the purpose of making war as the declaring of it, even when the purpose is *bonâ fide*, and the declaration not collusive. As the Government has been careful to avoid informing the nation of its intentions, as it could not foresee the results, there is no reason why those who foresee the results should not be a little less reserved as to the measures. I drop, then, for the moment the diplomatic question, though it is the only one, to review the practical circumstances of the war as they are now presented to us.

In a former letter I have entered at considerable length into the invulnerability of Russia by England, and of England by Russia, whilst they remain within their own territories, but the exposure of each to be crushed by the other the moment it adventures on an invasion of a third state; and on the same occasion I have shown that the invasion of the Principalities placed Russia entirely at the mercy of England, if England chose to exert on the spot its maritime power. This the reader must bear in mind in perusing the following remarks, because in dealing with the case as the Government have now made it, the whole case is, in fact, excluded, and the issue has to be tried on other and therefore irrelevant grounds, so that we have to turn our back upon the contest as it exists, before we can so much as come in sight of it as it is presented in their fiction.

THE BALTIC.—The entrance of our squadron was not preceded by measures concerted with Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, the governments whose territories are washed by that sea. We form with the first two no alliance against Russia, nor could we propose it, without offering them the chance of the recovery of the territories which Russia had wrested from them. There was consequently no basis of operation, and these governments, failing to perceive a hostile intention in England against Russia, could be moved by no other consideration than the fear of consequences should they commit themselves, and be afterwards abandoned. Thus it was that on the announcement of England's intention to send a squadron into the Baltic, Sweden and

Denmark formed a coalition against England, in the shape of a treaty of neutrality, for to be neutral in such a case was to be against England, and to deprive her of the ports placed in balance to those of Russia.

Prussia not having been secured, has in like manner withdrawn from a co-operation sustained until the moment of the movement of our fleet, and has become also neutral, in a sense verging towards opposition.

The English squadron enters at a moment when it cannot proceed to operate against Russia; and, therefore, to take up a position which can only be on the coast of one of the powers which has declared its neutrality,—a declaration which England has admitted, and to its violation.

Its mere passage along the shores of that country produces an internal convulsion, throws the government into abeyance, and places it in the alternative of an act of despotism or a revolution. This is the very first result for the country first approached. We have to anticipate similar effects for Sweden, and even for Prussia. In fact, the prostration of the Scandinavian kingdoms and the disturbance of Northern Germany are the immediate consequences of the passage into the Baltic of that fleet, the departure of which from the shores of England a few days since, was held to be the signal of resistance to that aggressor who had so long tortured every neighbour, and the rallying on the side of England of all the smaller states, and especially those of the north.

The state of war has to be considered, independently of its operations. By exciting the fears of nations, internal principles are set in operation, to the intense anxiety of every household. Trade is interrupted, credit paralysed, vast sums of money withdrawn from profitable investments; and should there be suspicion, or even doubt as to the motives of the power causing this disturbance—if, in fact, that power is not understood as straightforwardly proceeding to a clear end, it will be held to be “the wanton destroyer of public peace;” and, consequently, nations and governments will turn towards its antagonist, however inimical they might have been to that antagonist before, and however ready to support the war against him had it been conducted in another fashion.

Now, let us take the possible operations against Russia. I can see but two: the one the destruction of the Russian fleet; the other the expulsion of the Russians from Finland.

As to operations against the fleet, the first point was, of course, to have ensured the co-operation of Denmark and Sweden. But it may be said that that is superfluous—that England wants no assistance to cripple Russia's power; and, besides, has the assistance of France. No doubt England wants no assistance to destroy the maritime power of Russia; but we are dealing with the case as we have made it for ourselves—that of an attack upon the Russian fleet. A portion of it is exposed to be cut off in detail, but you do not proceed to do so; you send your vessels to *wait at* Kiel, until it has been withdrawn from its exposed position and collected under the guns at Cronstadt.

I do not stop now to show that there is no intention of making war, and that this fact alone proves it ; but I take your own case. You have allowed them to escape and to concentrate. What are you to do with them when so concentrated, protected by such batteries, and in a position which you can approach only between shores, exposing you to a succession of cross-fires? It is true that the most distinguished of English admirals has offered to stake his reputation on destroying them ; but he has not been employed ; and the admiral selected for the service has commenced by announcing to the country the danger of war, and the uncertainty of the issue of the expedition.

From these circumstances, small as they are, it cannot be inferred that England is about to run a great risk to destroy the fleet, and the attempt in this fashion cannot be made without great risk, as the Russians have prepared those terrible means of destruction which England used in the siege of Gibraltar—namely, red-hot shot, while the English vessels are not so armed. I therefore conclude that this operation has been made sufficiently perilous not to be attempted.

Besides, what would the destruction of the fleet matter? A few vessels, lasting but five years, more or less, in the Baltic, could no ways affect the operations in the East, except in so far as would arouse the hitherto *quiescent* Russian nation.

As to the descent on Finland, that is entirely out of the question, except as the result of a combination with Sweden and a purpose of aggressive war against Russia. The first does not exist, the second is formally disavowed.

The operations, therefore, of your fleet in the Baltic cannot extend beyond the prostration of Sweden, the convulsion of Denmark, and perhaps a revolution at Berlin, and must end by giving over the north of Europe into the hands of the Czar.

THE BLACK SEA. — You have passed the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus ; you have done so with a squadron too powerful to be required against Russia, and you have done nothing with it. Your delay is excused by the absence of certain formalities, not by the absence of the causes of war. There is no excuse, therefore, for the delay of formalities. Your squadron has only served to arrest the operations of the Turks, to prevent the attack of Odessa, and the invasion of the Crimea, with the capture of Sebastopol by the Turks, when it was unprotected by fortifications, and destitute of defenders. In that sea your future proceedings must either consist in naval operations against the Russians, or in descents upon the territories of Russia.

Let us consider these points severally :—

ATTACK OF THE RUSSIAN NAVY.—If there be a question of attacking the Russian navy, it will be found concentrated in Sebastopol, and then we come to a parallel case to that of the fleet of the north at Cronstadt. The ships will here have their batteries in front, and the English vessels will be exposed to red-hot shot. That operation is, therefore, out of the question.

Coming to descend upon the coast, we must divide them into several heads, and first we have—

DESCENT ON THE KRIMEA.—The plan has long been under contemplation by the English government. It has been so long and so openly, that we may conclude that it is not intended. Reasons even are assigned for not adopting it, and they are strange. The difficulty, according to the government, is not in entering, but in going out. They say, "What shall we do with it? We cannot surrender it to the Turks—we cannot hold it for ourselves, unless we are prepared for an Algeria. The people of England would never suffer a permanent occupation by 50,000 men, with a corresponding fleet. With less we cannot hold it. France and Austria would be jealous; the most serious embarrassments would arise for the present, and even if 'overcome, permanent ill-will would be established throughout Europe; the Turks would look upon us as a partitioning power, and Russia would ultimately be the sole gainer." All this is very true, nothing can be truer. But what does it serve to prove? Only that we wish to prevent the Turks from acting for themselves; or, in the words of Lord Ponsonby, to "protect Russia." You will, therefore, not occupy the Krimea, and you will prevent the Turks from occupying it.

DESCENT ON GEORGIA.—This plan has also been a long time before the English government, and in like manner it has been furnished only to obtain arguments against it. Here, again, it is said—"The difficulty is to get out, not to get in. This territory was not conquered from the Turks, therefore, we cannot surrender it to them. As we cannot dream of holding it, we must in retiring allow Russia to return."

Thus each case of Russia's weakness becomes an argument for England's inaction and for Turkey's sacrifice. Besides, we have laid down two maxims: the one, that the war shall not disturb territorial arrangements; the second that our operations shall be confined to the defence of Turkey. Consequently we are precluded from the attack of Russia. There remains, however, the very delicate point of her expulsion from the Danubian provinces.

Nothing of course can be easier than cutting off the Russian army in the Principalities: but that done, the whole matter is concluded. That that is not to be done is rendered certain by the fact of a squadron being sent to the Baltic, which in that case would be wholly superfluous. This was equally proved by troops being sent to Turkey, because the squadron there sufficed. Nay, the squadron itself testifies in the same sense, for the Turks alone sufficed. England has opened the Principalities to the Russians. She has held in the Turks. How can she undo her own work, and if now she were going to undo it she would do so in an effectual and rapid manner, that is to say, by a dispatch to Constantinople, which would put in movement at once the Turkish armies, with the allied squadrons if requisite, to carry the Turkish forces upon the rear of the Russians. If, then, instead of using the forces you possess, you go on moving forces and ships upon other points, the inference follows that you have no intention of operating, and are only masking by these displacements your purposed inaction.

But let us take the case of an intention to operate on the Danube.

What can you do? You might have done everything, and you could do everything, if your troops were on the field at this moment; but you have so managed that it has become impossible for them to arrive there before those fevers have set in which regularly mow down one-half of a Russian army, and against which our northern constitutions, good living, and excellent commissariat will be no protection. It was not unintentionally that the time was lost; therefore it follows, that you will no more run the risk of fever on land, than of red-hot shot afloat, and that these considerations will be held wise and prudent by the British nation when the time comes for urging them.

These may be considered speculations, or foregone conclusions of mine; but look at the facts. You send out your troops by steam, your horses by sailing vessels. You send out your troops, and keep your generals at home. The French send out generals and keep their troops at home. You send out troops and no commissaries—you send a cargo of commissaries by themselves. It is a general remark in military clubs that an order is given only to be countermanded, and it is notorious that everything is in utter confusion. Is this to be explained by “credulity?”

Now, I come to a more serious matter. It has been publicly stated in the *Times* newspaper, that the English and French forces were respectively to occupy a line across the Thracian Chersonese, and the extremity of Thrace, on which Constantinople stands—that is to say, that the plan of the campaign is *not the expulsion of the Russians from the Principalities*.

But here follows a question which no man in England has, as yet, put to himself, and on which the fate of this country absolutely depends—“WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT OF MAKING THIS WAR A DEFENSIVE ONE?”

I shall leave the answer for another letter.

The Clarendon, March 27, 1854.

In the meantime, I beg insertion of the enclosed remarkable letter of Gentz, given by the Trieste journal:—

J. R. COUNCILLOR FREDERIC VON GENTZ TO LORD STANHOPE,
DEC. 30, 1827.

“Whenever we turn our eyes to Russia, we are seized by real shudder. *The policy of CANNING and of PALMERSTON has, in the last two years, given such advantage to this empire, so immensely dangerous to the security and freedom of Europe, as it would scarcely have obtained by the most successful campaign*, whilst it has not discharged a single gun, unless against the miserable Persians. It was for Russia alone that England and France have worked—that they have signed the fatal triple treaty—that they have destroyed the Turkish navy at Navarino. The convention of Akierman has completed the naval and political conquest of the Danubian Principalities, it requiring only one step for the national conquest. The way to Constantinople is now open to the Russians on all sides, since, whilst their fleet in the Black Sea can accompany or provision their army without hindrance, the line of

the Iraxey and the possession of Northern Persia puts the entrance into the Asiatic provinces of Turkey at their disposal. They can, by a march of four or five days, expel the Shah from Teheran; in eight or ten days fall upon Erzeroum. If, indeed, the often predicted danger of the British possessions in India was more than a dream, then the time has come when this dream might be accomplished. And England puts all this at stake for the most ridiculous of all delusions; for the so-called liberation of the most worthless rebels upon whom ever the sun has shone! It cannot be! The foe of Russia, and the hatred of this insatiable power will, and must shortly, become the universal rallying cry all over England, and the better portion of all the continental nations will join it heartily.

F. G."

CONSEQUENCES OF MAKING THE WAR DEFENSIVE.

A month ago we were very bold: we sent to demand *the Evacuation of the Provinces*, and bound ourselves to declare war if it was refused. The Emperor seized the opportunity to fling back a contemptuous insult. You had been treating of war as if you were settling a pic-nic, and he deals with your demands as with children at romps. You retort by no declaration of war. The Queen is made to send a Message, which dares not utter the word of WAR, but does introduce the word "*peace*." She says that she is "bound to afford *active* assistance to her ally," in a war which I shall show to be a passive one. Of Russia she dares only say, that "the negotiations have terminated," and the power and resources of the nation are to be employed "*for protecting the dominions* of the Sultan against the *encroachments* of Russia." I declare that every man engaged in such a war,—if the name can be so prostituted,—is a bandit and a pirate. This—ominous approximation!—is a repetition of "the declaration of Simla," when you send forth troops, never to return, to attack Russia where she was not, and—may it be a warning to the Sultan—to dethrone a Prince because he was not subservient to Russia, forging documents to represent him to the English nation as their foe. Then, too, were you intoxicated with joy—then, too, would you listen to no warning, and look at no facts. Then you sacrificed but an army,—now your empire goes.

The organ of Russia and the English Cabinet informs the nation this morning "that a declaration of the *motives and objects* of the war," it presumes, "will be prepared, to publish in the *London Gazette*, according to precedent." Why will it not venture to say, declaration of war—that is the point! It continues:—"these formalities are not strictly necessary to create *the state of war*." Of course not. They are necessary for a lawful war—for that war to which England has so much repugnance, while the absence of them does constitute that state of piracy for which the British nation has so much affection. And strange, this nation would consider it murder to shoot a man without

calling him out. I leave to Russia the task of amplifying on this theme, when she will reveal to the world the atrocities, as she has already done the perfidy, of the British Government.

What would have been easier than to have placed ourselves within the law? Why then this care to put ourselves without it? The article of the organ of the Government of yesterday will explain. In that article, sacrilegiously invoking the protection of ALMIGHTY GOD, it declares "that the decay of the Ottoman Empire has long been predicted as the first serious cause of *European war*;" so that you assume as the basis of your operations the decay of the very state which you propose to support. Who predicted that the decay of the Ottoman Empire was to bring war? It was predicted that war would come from a scramble for the spoils, but you have surpassed imagination, and are making a European war for its destruction.

All this care and labour has been given in these documents to prepare a case which would render impossible war against Russia. Observe, that to pretend to make war, while you limit the field of operations, is simultaneously to constitute a state of war and a state of peace; but as it would prove impossible, whatever the intention, to balance the effects of such repression between the parties engaged, such intervention must favour the one, and injure the other. Who is to be favoured in this case does not come in question, for Russia is already in possession of an immense Turkish territory. You have, besides, laid it down as a rule that the state of possession is not to be altered. This might appear equal-handed justice, but we know by experience that such compacts have already been made without ever standing in the way of Russia's acquisitions, whilst all compacts which even practically can be turned to her account are religiously observed. The simple interpretation of these words is, therefore, that no attack should be suffered against Russia, and if so, she has the means thereby secured to her, without cost, not of gaining some particular fragments of the Ottoman Empire, but of convulsing it to its very foundation.

The question which I have at present to answer is answered by the mere statement of the case. The danger is from Turkey's strength compressed, and you add to it new force still further to compress it. Human flesh and blood—at least Turkish flesh and blood—will never stand this.

The vulgar believe that Turkey is too weak to support herself. The men in power (and I make no distinction between political and military) are satisfied that Russia has no means to endanger, or even to attack, Turkey. Opposed as these opinions are, as pole to pole, they equally leave those who entertain them in the dark respecting the position which the English troops are to occupy in that country. The first imagine that our forces are to come as protectors, and consider the expedition as necessary. The second believe that the sending out of the expedition "for which the nation is mad," is superfluous, and therefore innocuous; consequently, between the madness of the one, and the complacency of the other, the expedition, never to revisit its native shores, goes forth.

This is what I have experienced in the course of this transaction. I tell a man beforehand what is to happen. He answers—"It is nonsense—it is impossible." My words are borne out, and he says—"Tis very strange." The process is repeated several times. He admits there is, or may be, a purpose. He does not on this proceed to do anything—he merely waits. Then an expedition is sent, or a declaration of war is announced, and he says, "Now they are going to do something." I point out to him that men so compromised must do what is required of them. I am immediately answered by—"My good friend, you are too theoretical. You don't allow for accidents. Don't you see that public opinion is now aroused, and we all know the value of public opinion?" This is what happens with the tens of individuals whom I can reach with my own voice. What then is the condition of the rest? On what sure ground Russia acts. A Cabinet which she holds, an Administration without an Opposition, a Nation without the faculty of judgment, or the sense of action; Diplomats who can be used by the pettiest passion; and an Army and a Navy of tremendous power, and mere machines.

In the letters which I have heretofore addressed to you, I have been moved by an impulse as strong, and influenced by a feeling as solemn, as the human mind could be subject to—that of exposing guilt that is deadly, and the infatuation that sustains it; but the feeling which dictates my present communication is of a nature to make me forget that up to this hour I ever had to deal with a serious matter. It appears to me that if I could state on this point that which I know, I might still save this Empire and the world.

The Turkish army is destitute of the qualities of that of Russia. It has not the passive obedience which makes men stand to be shot, and maintain unbroken lines while they tremble. It has not the virtue of passive obedience, nor will it submit to be ordered back in face of a discomfited foe. It has discipline; but it has also judgment. It has valour, and also patriotism. It is irresistible in an attack, and whatever its qualities as defending the most hopeless position against overwhelming force, it is not an army to be held down with impunity. Taking it in its available properties for the protection of Europe against Russia, and this is the question, it is all-sufficient if launched—useless if restricted.

Similar are the circumstances of the Empires. They remind us of Carthage and of Rome. Each is vulnerable at home. Russia may not indeed be vulnerable to a European conqueror, but the circumstances here are different—she is not vulnerable to conquest, but she is to resumption—12,000,000 of Catholics, 8,000,000 of Starovirtze, identical with the Oriental Church of Turkey, and looking to the Sultan as their protector—5,000,000 of Mussulmans inhabit his southern regions, spreading from the Baltic to the Caspian. Need I repeat the names of the races? Poles, Malo-Russians, Bessarabians, Tartars, and Cossacks. Aye, Cossacks, that name so falsely identified with the Russian. 25,000,000 of men, the closest to the field of action, animated by hostile feelings towards the Czar, both of religion and of

race, and with sympathies for the Turks, and reliance on the Sultan ; these races furnishing one-half of the troops to be employed against him ! That danger which your diplomatists falsely proclaimed for the Ottoman Empire, by the approach to its territory of a Russian force, is terribly real for Russia, by the approach to its territory of a Turkish force. In the one case, Turkey might indeed fall, but it would be by her strength. In the other, Russia must fall, but it will be by her weakness. This is the dilemma in which *she* has placed you, and because above all things, you dread her fall, you will, in the words of a Russian Ambassador, throw yourselves "on the Turkish provinces that suit you best." But a Russian force could approach the Turkish territory at the present time only through your help. You have brought it there. You have so brought it after a compact—a compact secret and confidential, ratified, acted upon—a compact which alone has brought the present convulsion—a convulsion which will end by its accomplishment.

This matter is not to be understood by daily news, or newspaper comments. It must be traced from the beginning to the end, followed in all its windings, known in the motives from which it springs, in the deceptions which have been practised, in the bonds held over the individuals dealt with. It must be examined by means of the light of anterior transactions. Russia and her craft must be known—Europe and its character understood. You must see events before they come, in order to recognise them as they approach. Unless you know beforehand what is to happen, you can never know what has happened. Do you expect that what Russia has been preparing for a century and a half, and what you have been lending your aid to her to accomplish during all that course of time, can be understood by the careless and uninformed individuals, although they be 27,000,000, upon whom a crisis has suddenly sprung, and who will not even then examine the matter, but content themselves with uttering general propositions in reference to it ? The fate of the world hangs, not on the events on the Danube, but on the senseless breath issuing in England from heedless lips.

All this art has been given to prepare the case, so that Russia shall be protected from danger. She is so protected the moment you give to the war a defensive character. But this defensive character is a double-edged sword, to be wielded only for the back-stroke.

The Turks under arms amount nearly to 400,000 men. A levy of nearly 100,000 more is in course of being assembled. Of these nearly 250,000 are regulars, the rest volunteers and irregulars, collected from the remotest regions, and composed of the most dissimilar races, animated by one common feeling of devotedness and enthusiasm. This army is not like that of Russia, required to watch hostile frontiers, or disaffected nations ; it is not scattered over immense spaces, rendered more impassable by barrenness than distance, and it is all congregated on the frontiers, and in sight of the foe. This mass of armed men does not exhaust the resources of the empire. That empire, in a cause such as this, might furnish as many more. The whole population is animated

with the same spirit as the army, and the nation is prepared to perish rather than submit, and to encounter any hazard that might attend a struggle with a superior or a victorious enemy.

The force which the enemy can bring against it, in addition to the 80,000 men at present occupying its territory and Bessarabia, is not estimated, by the highest *British authorities*, at more than 100,000 men. Supposing Austria to join Russia, the force of the latter would not be increased, for in that case Hungary would be for Turkey. Besides, Russia would be burthened with her support, Turkey relieved from her friendship. We must put aside, then, all questions of allies, and consider the contest as restricted to Russia and Turkey alone, and for that contest Russia could furnish 150,000 men to occupy a country where one-half would, of necessity, fall victims to the climate in a single campaign, whilst Turkey can bring to bear on the same field of operations, from 300,000 to 400,000 men, and these, as has been proved more than a match, in case of numerical equality, for their antagonists, are, in the judgment of some high military authorities (Bem for instance), equal to cope with double the number of Russians. There therefore can be no question in reason as to the result of that war, nor is even a single military operation requisite. The Turks have but to maintain their healthy and impregnable positions south of the Danube to see the Russians die out, if not in the first campaign, at least in the second.

I am assuming here the case of Turkey acting for herself, and not subject to the coercion of a British squadron, or the dictation of a British Ambassador.

We have been drummed into the belief that the Russians are superior, at least at sea. Sir Charles Napier got his appointment to the Baltic fleet by threatening to destroy the Russians in the Black Sea. He told the quaking Government that, if refused, he would offer his services to the Sultan, and when in command of the Turkish fleet, would be stopped neither by Lord Stratford nor Admiral Dundas.

But if the Turkish army or people is ready to fight under every disadvantage, they are not the less convinced that every advantage is on their side. They are at once satisfied as to the necessity of the war, convinced of the probabilities of success, and filled with enthusiasm to achieve it. However absurd, and perhaps fatal, as a strategic measure, the passage of the Danube at Kalafat, it has had the effect of confirming these sentiments, and inflaming this enthusiasm. Let no sane man trust for a moment to the Ministers of the Porte, as expressing the nation's sense of its duties and its power; let no man suppose that a Government three times successively broken, and changed by conjoined Russian and English intrigue, and actually under the guns of the Anglo-French squadron, can retain a trace of independence in its breast, or allow to escape a sentence not falsehood from its lips. I can with certainty say, on behalf of the Turkish people, that it is confident of its power to crush Russia, and resolved to exert it.

If, so confident and so resolved, auxiliaries parading their enthusiasm in the common cause, land in force on their soil, and, instead of pro-

ceeding to attack the enemy, entrench themselves on lines covering and *commanding* Constantinople and the Dardanelles—what can be the consequences? You insult the nation by pretending to defend its strong places against an impossible descent. The Russians, indeed, have occupied as a foe; but you as a friend; for this is occupation, not even defence. The Russian troops meanwhile will be far advanced—yours in the midst of the population, filled with astonishment, suspicion, and fury. But you are in force to put down local insurrection, and you have an irresistible squadron within hail, in a channel commanding the capital and bisecting the empire. Well, but do you not go to force the Russians to evacuate the Principalities? But do you go to occupy Turkish territory? Will not then be realised what I said long ago, and when none *could* see how it could happen? “If you prevent the Turks from fighting the Russians, you will have to fight them (the Turks) yourselves.”

By giving to the war the character of defence for Turkey, you render it perilous for the British troops. You place them in the position of the troops of the Emperor of Russia, and so soon as they are engaged, he can draw off to play a separate game. Ally yourselves at least with Russia first, for I can tell you that all the troops you have sent or can send, that all the troops France can send, joined to all those that Russia can bring, will not put down the Turkish people.

What, then, does Russia desire? The convulsion of Turkey, and war between England and France. The swords of the Mussulmans turned against each other, and at the same time Europe engaged in a “hot war,” she holding herself the while in reserve. Her ends may be, and will be, accomplished, but not otherwise. All this was settled during the Emperor’s visit in 1844. It is all recorded in that memorandum then drawn up, which lays down the fallacies, which, ten years afterwards, Europe was to hold for its opinions, holding, to act upon, and acting upon to convert the world into chaos.

You are placed within the horns of this dilemma. You have to admit either insanity in the Russian Cabinet, or treason in the British. Can you admit the first? Can you deny the second? You have long tried to apply the first theory, and it has always failed to hold water.* Launch the second, and see if it will swim. On the first you cannot ride off, the other is your only plank of safety if you will only grasp it in time. It is not a question of who is to be the minister; the question is, how is the Empire to be saved?

“The national spirit of Turkey,” says Lord Clarendon, “which might have been so useful against the aggressor, has now become dangerous to its own Government.” It has become so because that Government has yielded to the counsels of England. It will become no less so to the troops of England sent to the aid of that Government, now dependent on its protection.

* On the first political matter with which I had to deal—the speech of Warsaw—I was told that Nicholas had gone mad. I then answered, “Yes, Nicholas is mad as Philip was mad, and his madness will prove the brightest gem in the Russian Crown.”

Such, then, is my answer to the question often put to me when I speak of the dangers of defensive war, "How can an additional force endanger Turkey?" It will do so, because Turkey is already too strong, and such is precisely the argument used by Russia at Vienna—"Turkey is too strong therefore take care of yourselves." And this, be it observed, I announced at the very beginning of this struggle. "*You are now alarmed at Turkey's weakness; the day is not far distant when you will be terrified at her strength.*"

One word more. You seize this moment to enforce on Turkey an internal change, which the agents of Russia at the German courts are not backward to proclaim as giving Russia all she required; and you doubt the reality of the compact of 1844 and 1853. Yes it gives Russia that which she wanted, and it is this, *that you shall become their oppressors*. You have imposed upon them the MILITARY CONSCRIPTION. Russia now is the protector of the Christian population throughout Turkey. No, she is not going to partition Turkey; she will have it all. Now you will have Christian revolts against Mussulman fanaticism, and your troops will have to do with Christian no less than with Mussulman insurgents while defending Christian rights and Mussulman independence.

The question which I would now place before the British nation is this—"Are you, or are you not, prepared to partition Turkey?" If the answer be in the negative, I say, Stop your expedition. If again, in the affirmative, I say, Stop your expedition, for you will never get a fraction of territory. I say to you, of yourselves, what Demosthenes said to the Athenians, of the Olynthians: "By coveting the territory of others you will lose your own." It is that fatal lust that is at the bottom of this delirium. Why, otherwise, the rancour of every man when he is told that Turkey is strong enough to defend herself? But the world is not without a Providence; you may despise warning—you cannot escape punishment.

The Clarendon, March 28, 1854.

P.S.—A Council is to sit to-morrow morning to decide on the steps to be taken, and it may appear imprudent in me not to wait till to-morrow to publish this letter in which I assert that a declaration of war will not be made—that is to say in the precise and legal terms required in such an instrument, and that, moreover, the mere publication of this letter may force the adoption of a course, as on some former occasions, for the very purpose of falsifying my assertion. But as the object of my prognostications is not to obtain, but to frustrate their realisation, this is a reason for publishing the letter before the council meets. Every step they can be forced to against their will is a gain, and is a disturbance of Russia's plan, and I shall be the first to hail a measure which will at least place within the law, in as far as Russia is concerned, the devoted men, whom a nation, which itself imagines it runs no risks, is sending forth an offering to pestilence and the sword.

CHRISTIANITY—FANATICISM—AND BLOOD.

The following announcement appeared in the *Times* of to-day :—

“BERLIN, MONDAY.—Prince George of Mecklenburg-Strelitz arrived here yesterday, the bearer of a letter from the Emperor of Russia to the King of Prussia, in answer to the mission of General Lindheim. Its tenor is as follows :—When the Western Powers succeed in securing the emancipation of the Christians in Turkey by treaty, the Czar will be willing to evacuate the Principalities simultaneously with the evacuation of the Euxine by the combined fleets.”

I have already pointed out this event as about to happen. I have explained beforehand that Russia would make you impose, in the name of Christianity, on the Ottoman Government, conditions which should alike exasperate the Mussulmans or the Christians, making you to be held the oppressors of the former, and which would constitute herself really the protector of the latter.

The conditions which you have extorted from Turkey if the public statement be correct, are the imposing of the “blood tax” upon the Christians, that is to say, conscription; and this you call raising them to an equality with the Mussulmans. Further you have obtained for the Christians the right of possessing property. You are the victims of an infamous hoax!

The Mussulmans are the *oppressed* people of Turkey. By bearing exclusively the load of conscription, they are socially depressed, the sources of population restricted, wealth and industry hampered entirely to the advantage of the Christians, who are rapidly gaining in numbers, in wealth, and in territorial possessions. The Mussulmans being a patient race, endure this state of things, because it is the law. They do not see, at present at least, that the drain in consequence of the conscription is tenfold augmented by the inclinations of Foreign Cabinets, and the consequent necessity of the maintenance of a large military force. It is superfluous to state that Christians do enjoy in Turkey the right of possessing property, since the land is chiefly in their hands.

Once you have struck at the legal condition of Turkey, and in such a manner as this, you put an end to the submissiveness of the Turks, and to the contentment of the Christians, and Russia can quite afford to tell you that she would withdraw, for she has now got your squadron, and will soon have your troops, there, to maintain the Government in its anti-national course—to bring up a crop of insurrection all over the land—leaving to you the task of mowing it down, she being ready to come in to support the Christians, aye, or even the Mussulmans, against you and their unnatural Government. I need say no more on this matter. Words are thrown away.

Now observe the proposed distribution of the forces of the allies. England gets Constantinople, France the Dardanelles. You have

25,000 men: the French 50,000. Will you get Constantinople with 25,000 men? Will not France get the Dardanelles with 50,000?

Oh, but you have your squadron in the Bosphorus! Well, but is there not a French squadron there too? If by your squadron you have got the capital of the Ottoman Empire to dispose of, has not France got your squadron, with the Dardanelles?

Oh, but we are the best of friends with France! Will you be so with France in possession of the Dardanelles, and you not in possession of Constantinople? This prize, which you first secured, and cannot keep, now passes to France. Do you suppose the French Cabinet to be proof against so mighty a temptation? If you have had your "secret" with Russia, has not France had her "secret?" When the Emperor was dropping words to Sir Hamilton Seymour, was he dropping no words to Louis Napoleon? He was at the same moment proposing a joint Russian and French expedition to our shores, to put down, once for all, the insolent islanders, by destroying their fleet at Sheerness and Portsmouth. Have we, as yet, had this revelation?

I see it stated, in various quarters, that I am leading to the rupture with France by speaking of it. Those are insuring that rupture who, like the bull, rush with their horns and close their eyes, who hold "secret communication" with the Emperor; who speak of relieving France from the treaties of 1815; who assent to the advisability of the possession of Egypt and Candia, and then send out ships and troops, pretending to maintain the Ottoman empire—who sanction the sending of French troops in common with those of England, not to *act in common*, but to occupy different portions of territory.

The plan has been adjusted in the same fashion as an engineer constructs a machine. The engineer calculates powers and weights, and uses brute matter through his understanding. So does Russia.

Judge now of the concurrent effect of the rivalry established of necessity with France, of the occupation of the Turkish territory, and of the protection you afford to Christians. Yes, religion, as before now, will get drunk with blood; and ambition, relieved from the necessities of sacrifice or effort, will enjoy bloodless triumphs, grasping its crown, not pale and faltering with the strain, but ruddy and convulsed with laughter.



Political Fly-Sheets.—No. VIII.

THE WORDS OF PALMERSTON.

The following letters appeared in the 'Morning Herald' and 'Morning Advertiser' of August 1854, signed CARITAS. They place the characters of LORD PALMERSTON and MR. URQUHART in a new light, and suggest a new inquiry. How opinion can be made and how it can be used.

LETTER I.

SIR,—You have marked your sense of the importance of the disclosures made the other night by Lord Clarendon, as bearing on the character of the Government, by admitting into your columns an able article on the subject from a contemporary, which throws on the matter the additional light of contrast—Lord Clarendon and Mr. Urquhart are placed in juxta-position, and the accuracy of every statement and prediction made by the latter, brought out in strong relief by the false assertions of the former. Make out the best case you can for Lord Clarendon; give him the benefit of every doubt; suppose him to have been only intensely ignorant, and not designedly treacherous, still but one conclusion can be arrived at. As long as incapacity is not necessary for a British minister, or knowledge a disqualification, it is plain, that Lord Clarendon and Mr. Urquhart ought to change places

Sir, are we determined to be the trumpeters of our own folly, and turn ourselves into ridicule for the amusement of the world? The very power with whom we are “at war” can throw in our teeth, through its organ the *Times*, that our House of Commons is imbecile, and our Government depraved. “What the rulers are that must the people be.”

This is the truth we must now lay to heart, that in the acts of our rulers, and the submissiveness of our Parliament, we may see our own apathy and folly; and each man at once begin the task of saving his country by reforming himself.

What one man has done shows us what we ought to have done.

That we may be convinced that the difference between Mr. Urquhart and ourselves is really that between a blind man and a seeing one, I propose to go over the grounds on which his judgment was formed—facts that were equally available for all of us; that is, *what* it was that he saw, and we were blind to. We were as much “surprised” last year at the line taken by Mr. Urquhart in these matters, as at everything that has occurred. We had hitherto thought him extravagant in his fears of Russian aggression, and his view of the importance of an intimate alliance with Turkey. But

when we were all mad for war with Russia, and denouncing our Government as traitors for negotiating, he said "For God's sake! do nothing to help Turkey. Instead of sending out fleets and armies, only withdraw your ambassador—leave Turkey to her fate. Force your Government into inaction. It is your only chance." No public man in his senses could have taken such a course without the most positive certainty that it was the right one. His only means of action was through public meetings and the press. He took the course that was most unpopular. It was putting his reputation to the severest test. It was exposing himself to the most odious imputations. He *was* denounced as a Russian agent, and the Turks themselves might well have resented this novel method of support.

Events have since triumphantly justified him; so that we know he was not out of his senses. *Then he had grounds.*

The question is—what were they?

The conclusions he had come to, from facts which I shall presently mention, were these:—

That the balance of power in the East had been reversed; that danger was now to Russia, by the consolidation of the power of Turkey; for if she did not go on she was ruined, and that by arms she could not go on; that Turkey being unassailable by her, "she must use the other powers to break her down."

That she was able to do this, because she commanded the British Cabinet.

The successive steps for working out this scheme are exactly what have taken place. To give the quarrel a "European character," by establishing herself in the Principalities, thus "violating the public law of Europe."* To this end, keeping the Turks out of them. By protracted negotiations to give time for the Sultan to collect a powerful army, which, at the same time, must be prevented from fighting. To bring England and France on the field as her enemies, that they might get into Turkey as friends.

Now for the grounds on which Mr. Urquhart's conclusions are formed.

By an extraordinary circumstance we have had put into our possession Russia's judgment in her own words of her position in the East.

Let me make some quotations from "the very secret despatches" published by the Foreign Office in the *Portfolio*. That of Count Pozzo di Borgo was written in November, 1828, at the close of the first Campaign of the last war between Russia and Turkey:—

"If the Sultan has been enabled to offer us a more determined and regular

* Lord Clarendon in the House of Lords.

resistance, whilst he had scarcely assembled together the elements of his new plan of reform and amelioration, how formidable should we have found him had he had time to give it more solidity, and to render *that barrier impenetrable* which we find so much difficulty in surmounting, though art has hitherto done so little to assist nature. Things being in this state, we must congratulate ourselves upon having attacked them before they became more *dangerous* for us."

"The campaign has convinced us of the necessity of multiplying precautions, in order to *diminish the dangers of the future*."

"The consequence of any negotiation in the present state of things would be, throughout Europe, a desire opposed to what we are under the *necessity* of obtaining. The disposition is very naturally the consequence of that species of European amalgam to which we have had to associate the *special policy of the Empire*. The interest of all the others is to retain us there, because they thus possess more chances of impeding our progress. Ours should tend to deliver us, imperceptibly by the force of events, and without having the air, if possible, of being desirous to escape from them. The surest method of accomplishing the object which is *essential to our present and future independence* is to evade the ill-timed negotiations. This *superiority* has become a condition of our political existence, such as we must establish it, and maintain it in the eyes of the world and our own."

"If *unforeseen obstacles* have existed, the Emperor knows how to surmount them, and I see in the *very necessity in which we are placed of conquering* a principle of activity and energy which will preserve to the empire and its glorious chief, in the sphere which is their own, that supremacy, from which it belongs to no human power to make them descend."

"It was the Russian empire which, after *two years of preparation*, put itself in motion against the Turkish empire, reduced to the Mussulman population of Europe."

"This time (the winter) ought to be put to profit to show ourselves on a *formidable footing* at the opening of the next campaign. This condition is *vital*. It is the only chance that remains to us to re-establish ourselves in public opinion."—(*Count Pozzo di Borgo to Count Nesselrode Paris, Nov. 28, 1828.*)

"It remains only to combine all our forces and to employ them with energy on the theatre of war." "Then we shall confirm the influence of Russia on the internal and external repose of the rest of Europe. It would be dangerous, on the other hand, to dissemble from ourselves that these ends, easy of acquisition in 1829, risk becoming problematical, or even impossible, in 1830."—(*Prince Lieven to Count Nesselrode, London, June 1, 1829.*)

Danger to Russia from Turkey! And that not from encroaching projects on the part of the Sultan, but only because he was becoming able to resist her! He had then but begun to form his army, as we know from Colonel Chesney, he was never able to bring no more than 30,000 regular troops into the field. Russia after two years of preparation was obliged to "combine all her forces" to make any impression. She judged that one year more would

render the barrier of Turkey "*impenetrable*." This is Russia's own judgment as to her physical force; yet we thought Mr. Urquhart doting when he told us, at the beginning of these transactions, that Turkey "was unassailable by Russia."

But what was the "danger" from Turkey becoming strong? Why was Russia "under the necessity of conquering?" She answers: "This superiority has now become a condition of our political existence, such as we must establish and maintain it in the eyes of the world and our own." It was "*a vital condition*" "to re-establish herself in public opinion," because running every moment the risk of ruin by discovery. At this moment she has imposed upon us to the extent of several millions of money—the flower of our army, and the whole of our fleet, even although the war has put an end to itself.

I have said that the other conclusion Mr. Urquhart came to was, that Russia could effect her purposes only by having the control of the British Cabinet. Every act and word of *one man* in that Cabinet proves him to be the agent of Russia. In secret conclaves the longest head must rule.

LETTER II.

SIR,—I have asserted that Lord Palmerston and Mr. Urquhart are both distinct from us. To justify that assertion, let me now quote some of the words of each.

"There is no nature no moving power but mind. All else is passive and inert. In human affairs this power is opinion; in political affairs it is public opinion, and he who can grasp the power, with it will subdue the fleshy arm of physical strength, and compel it to work out his purpose. Those statesmen who know how to avail themselves of the passions, the interests, and the opinions of mankind, are able to gain an ascendancy, and to exercise a sway over human affairs far out of all proportion greater than belongs to the power and resources of the state over which they preside."—(*Lord Palmerston Speech June 11, 1829.*)

"In every age of great movement it has been the secret thoughts of one or two men, unsuspected either in their tendency or power, that have done and undone, and that by using the 'opinions' that men think their own,"—(*Mr. Urquhart's "Central Asia."*)

The words first quoted were used by Lord Palmerston, in a speech in which he opposed the Wellington Administration, for not being sufficiently hostile to Turkey. Russia then trembled lest Europe should discover her weakness—(*Prince Lieven to Count Nesselrode, June 4, 1829*)—speaks of the necessity "not to alienate completely from us the Cabinet of London;" declares "that tranquillity will be maintained"—that is that Russia was safe from interference, "in spite of the faults and passions of the Duke of

Wellington," because "the cry of peace had resounded to the Lower House."

"The ministry has not dared to answer the speech in which Lord Palmerston, whose name is henceforth associated with those of the first parliamentary orators of England, has insisted on the preservation of the public peace, and *proved that an Austro-Turkish policy would only disturb it.*"

"Aided by our moderation, this *salutary* disposition will make every day new proselytes."

Next year after the Treaty of Adrianople was signed, when the object of Russia was to secure that she should not be hindered in carrying that treaty into effect, he again attacks the Ministry:—

"Sir, I object to the policy of making the integrity of the Turkish empire an object necessary to the interests of Christian and civilized Europe."—(*Debate on the Address, Feb. 5, 1830.*)

In a speech on the 16th February he declares that the war arose not out of the fault of Russia, but *the aggressions of Turkey*. He then charges on the Cabinet the results of the war (which he thus appears to lament), because they had not made to Turkey sufficiently urgent representations to agree at once to the demands of Russia. These are his words:—

"I should like to see that while England adopted a firm resolution—almost the only one she could adopt—upon no consideration, and in no event to take part with Turkey, that decision was fairly and frankly communicated to the Turk, and that he was made acquainted from the beginning that he *was in no possible contingency to look to England for assistance.*"

Meanwhile *Prince Lieven* writes to his Government:—

"I took advantage of this opportunity to remark to Lord Aberdeen that from the moment that justice was rendered to our policy it would be right to manifest it publicly, and to abstain from all the direct and indirect measures which *make people believe in too favourable a disposition on his part towards the Porte, and which might encourage its resistance.*"—(*Prince Lieven to Count Nesselrode, June 1, 1829.*)

Let us recall to ourselves that Russia—as we know by her own words—had undertaken this war to avert "the dangers of the future," arising from the reviving power of Turkey; that the treaty which ended it was obtained from the Porte only by their ignorance of the real position of the Russian army at Adrianople, and by the help of the British Ambassador; that its terms were a violation of her engagements with all other powers, "as she had bound herself not to seek territorial aggrandisement."

In 1832 Lord Palmerston, being himself Foreign Minister, again says:—

"In the Turkish war Russia was not the aggressor, and it can hardly be supposed that the Duke of Wellington, who was certainly friendly to

Turkey, would have left her unaided had she been unjustly attacked. It would be fatiguing to the house to detail all the provocations Turkey offered to Russia. There cannot be a doubt that she violated the provisions of the treaty of Akerman, and then denied redress; so that if ever there was just ground for going to war Russia had it for going to war with Turkey.”—(*Debate on Russia and Poland, August 7, 1832.*)

Of the treaty of Adrianople, he says, what Lord Aberdeen recently repeated.

“She did *not* on that occasion acquire any increase of territory, *at least, not in Europe (!)*. I think the official situation I hold in the house renders it my duty to state *facts (!)* like these when powers are attacked in debate with whom we are in alliance, who profess to be, and I believe to be, desirous to stand upon the best terms with this country.”

Russia was at this time occupied in subjugating the Poles. Her failure or success depended, as in the case of Turkey, on England.

In August, 1831, Lord Palmerston said, “that whatever obligation existing treaties imposed would at all times receive the attention of Government.”

In 1833 he put this construction upon that promise:—

“The claim of Russia to the possession of Poland is not of old right, but bears the date of the treaty of Vienna. The British Government feel, therefore, that, as one of the contracting parties to that treaty, they have *a right to entertain and express an opinion* on any act which, in their view, tends to a violation or a departure from the stipulations into which they entered with the other contracting parties.”—(*House of Commons, July 9, 1833.*)

He continues:—

“The contracting parties to the Treaty of Vienna, had a right to require that the constitution of Poland should not be touched. This was an *opinion which I had not concealed from the Russian Government. The Russian Government, however, took a different view of the question.*”

Having thus stated what he had done, he justified what he had *not* done,—

“If the British Government had wished to make the fate of the Poles certain, and to involve them in a contest with forces so superior as to render resistance on their part for a *week* impossible, they had nothing to do but to declare that they would by force of arms compel Russia to maintain the constitution of Poland.”

This, while but for *his* presence in the British Cabinet, Russia would have been at once attacked by four warlike nations, (France, Sweden, Turkey, Persia,) eager to avenge their own wrongs, as well as to save Poland?

It was then to Russia that really applied the words which his hearers were to understand as applying to England, “exercise a sway far out of all proportion greater than belongs to the state over

which he presides." In the remarkable passage which so ends, the power is revealed of this transfer. He makes "mind" and "opinion" synonymous, and confounds together "interest" and "opinion," but opinions alone can be grasped and used. A man could not avail himself of the knowledge of others to use them. The blind only are led. For England's interests no leading was required, and no blindness serviceable. The above-cited instances show how he blinded, how he led—whom he operated upon, and whom he served. This is a wonderful story; I proceed.

In 1829 Lord Palmerston said:

"Every nation has a right to manage its own affairs as it pleases. And one nation has no right to control by force of arms the will of another nation in the choice of its own Government. To this principle I cordially assent. It is sound—it *ought to be sacred*—and I trust England will never be found to set the example of its violation."—(*Debate on affairs of Portugal, June, 1, 1829.*)

In 1834, he makes England place, "by force of arms," Russia's candidate on the throne of Persia. In 1839, by force of arms he deposes the ruler of Affghanistan, and sets up an obnoxious exile. This wanton attack was made because that ruler was the friend of Russia. How bitter, then, must be his enmity to that power herself!

Yet the understanding between Lord Palmerston and the Russian Cabinet was, "that the interests of Great Britain and Russia, in Persia, were almost the same;" that their representatives "should have *corresponding instructions!*" Under these instructions the Russian candidate is set on the throne of Persia. He attacks Herat. All Asia is moved to a confederacy to subvert British power in Asia. Then comes an explosion. Russia is vehemently called to account, and the hostile despatch ends in these words—

"The British Government readily admit that Russia is *free* to pursue, with respect to the matter in question, whatever course may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburg most conducive to the interests of Russia.

The "interest of Russia." Here is the explanation. Yes; that explains everything. Whether he keeps England quiet, or pushes her on; whether he refuses to avenge, or inflicts in anticipation punishment.

The second extract at the head of this letter was written as explanatory of this proceeding, so that one of these two men saw what the other was about. These two *alone* saw before them.

When at length suspicions spread and charges are made, a singular defence is adopted, and just such as was to be expected from one who knows what opinion was, and had made it his own. It amounts to a moral *alibi*—impossibility.

"It is the grossest ignorance to suppose that the man who may be for the

time charged with the conduct of its foreign relations *can be* influenced in the management of those affairs by *any other feeling than his conception of what is his duty according to his political opinion.*"—(July 21, 1847.)

A few more curiosities of the kind may not be unacceptable.

He had said, April 20, 1836—"It is not prudent or wise to anticipate wrongs. It is sufficient to deal with wrongs when they have occurred." "Anticipation of wrong" became two years after, the ground of the war in Affghanistan, where no wrong could have been inflicted.

In 1833 he refused to help Turkey against Mehemet Ali, and urged the Porte to accept Russia's aid, consequently :—

"Russia, to the surprise of the Government, was able to carry away the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, of which the most objectionable portion was that it gave practically to the Russian Government a power of interference and dictation in Turkey not consistent with the independence of that state."—(*Speech on Mr. Urquhart's Motion, March 1, 1850.*)

At the time he said :—

"We have a double security, in the first place, in the good faith of Russia; and secondly, in the doubt I entertain whether it enters into the policy of Russia at present to accomplish this object (the partition of Turkey)."—(July 11, 1833.)

In the same speech he reiterates :—

"We have interests in common with Russia;" and again puts forward the weakness of England—"we wish to be on friendly terms with Russia, because the consequences of war may be nearly as disastrous to the conquering as to the unsuccessful Power."

In 1839, Mehemet Ali is again in the field. Now Lord Palmerston is all activity. At first to save Turkey from Russia, he communicates to the French Government a plan for forcing the Dardanelles—(*Viscount Palmerston to Lord Granville, June 19, 1839,*) in case of a Russian Force entering the Turkish territory.

Next year it is *concert with Russia*, and accordingly he speaks of her in these terms :—

"It is possible for any government to have acted with more honour and good faith in any matter than the Russian Government has acted with the other Powers in respect to Turkey. I feel bound to say this from a thorough knowledge of the facts of the case. It is not just to impute to that Power that her present conduct has any tendency whatever inimical to the integrity of the Turkish Empire."

This after, "to the surprise of the Government," she had "carried away the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi." But that was no "surprise," it was only convenient to say so.

This concert with Russia led to the rupture with France—to the war, which, undertaken to preserve the independence and integrity of Turkey, ended in that integrity being broken by the permanent

separation of Egypt, according to Lord Palmerston himself, who, in the speech just referred to, argued against his very act.

"What would any man say supposing I were to argue that the best way to maintain the integrity of the British Empire would be to make the Lord-Leiutenant of Ireland the hereditary Sovereign of Ireland and Scotland because by so doing it would more firmly unite the population of the British Islands?"

The "independence,"—also according to his own statement—as the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi was revived on July 13, 1841, with this difference, that Turkey was now bound to all, instead of one of the powers, just as at present the protectorate of the five is to be substituted for the one.

Sir, I apply to Lord Palmerston his own rule—"We can only judge of the intentions of Russia by her conduct." In 1829 he availed himself of our ignorance of the designs of Russia, and could affirm that "the extension of Russia in the direction of Turkey was not for the interest of Russia herself," to constrain the then Government to abandon all resistance to her. Now he avails himself of our knowledge of those designs, but of our ignorance as to their instruments to accumulate the armies of Europe on the soil of the Ottoman Empire, and crush it by an untried and unimagined method of unneeded defence. Meanwhile he makes England "Content to send out nearly the whole of her fleet and the flower of her army, to be engaged thousands of miles from home, in stormy seas, and on dangerous shores, so that her position has scarcely a parallel in her own, or any foreign history."—(*Times*, May 29, 1854.)

Why was not the Turkish fleet, at least, spared in 1828? or why is not Turkey now told that she could look, "in no *possible* contingency for England's aid?"

By opinion's means he has grasped the fleshy arm of physical strength to work out *his* purpose—the bones and sinews, the blood and treasure of England are now working out that purpose on the plains of Bulgaria, in the Baltic, and the Black Sea. The passion of the nation for war against Russia he has turned into a weapon for her. The interests at stake against Russian dominion he has made her bank—she trades upon them, and makes her fortune.

People say what motive can he have? Motive! The intellectual pleasure—"the magical power to sway the minds and govern the conduct of all mankind"—*—of working out such a scheme. The man who "sees" must either oppose her or help her: he has not done the one—then he has the other.

I point out the danger to save, not to destroy, and do, very truly, sign myself,

CARITAS.

* His own words in reply to Mr. Anstey.

LETTER III.

SIR,—I did not complete the subject in my last, Let me now resume by another quotation from Lord Palmerston on the value of "opinion." In a speech on the war in Hungary, he marks out the course to be taken by England in the affairs of the world to be the expression of opinion (July 21, 1849); and thus defends it:

"It is quite true that it may be said your opinions, are but opinions, and you express them against our opinions, who have at our command large armies to back them. What are opinions against armies? Sir, my answer is—Opinions are stronger than armies."

Shall we take this as an explanation of his conduct to Poland? He expressed his "opinion" in her favour, but he held back the armies advancing to her rescue.

In the same speech he exposes the great importance of putting an end to the Hungarian contest—for

"The political independence and liberties of Europe are bound up with the maintenance and integrity of Austria, as a great European power." And "if, on the one hand, the Hungarians should be successful, this would lead *dismemberment* to of the empire." "If Hungary should be crushed, Austria in that battle will have crushed her own right arm. . . . It is, I say, devoutly to be wished that this great contest may be brought to a termination by some *amicable treaty*."

He had often before asserted that the policy of his Government was "to give friendly advice."

On this occasion the Hungarians appealed to him, as the Greeks had done to Mr. Canning. To them he replied:—

"That the British Government had no diplomatic relation with Hungary except as a *component* part of the Austrian Empire."—(*Foreign Office, August, 12, 1848.*)

With regard to Austria. In the same speech he says:—

"Her Majesty's Government have not, in the present state of the matter, thought that any opportunity has *as yet* presented itself that could enable them, with any advantage, to make official communication of those *opinions* which they entertain on the subject."

In St. Petersburg he said, two months before:—

"Much as her Majesty's Government regret the interference of Russia, &c., they have not considered the occasion to be one which at present calls for any formal expression of the *opinions* of Great Britain on the matter."

Here are juxta-positions, the most wonderful, and most bewildering. One and the same word, is used on all these occasions. A Minister of England, tells the Parliament of the Realm, when

speaking of events, of such magnitude, as avowedly to decide the fate, that is to compromise the peace and destroy the independence of Europe, and the world, that the action of England, consists in the expression of opinion, and that, as a substitute for the exercise of her power to repress the wrong. He tells them, that he does not employ armies and fleets, that he leaves in abeyance the whole physical power of England to defend her right, and thereby with it, the restraining effect of fear, for this reason, that opinions, are stronger than armies. The maxim is accepted, it is hailed as a new discovery. He is allowed to act upon it, and therefore he immediately writes to Austria, directly engaged in the matter, and to Russia, who interferes in the quarrel, to say, that the English Government, has *no opinions* to express on the subject. When Lord Palmerston said, "Opinions are stronger than armies" he put it, as his answer to Russia and Austria, and his hearers believed that he was acting against Russia and Austria and they inferred, that he was using means to paralyse Austria and Russia, and to call forth, and to combine, those opinions that were hostile to Austria and Russia, into a form, and with a force, that would make them stronger than the armies of Austria and Russia. But what would have been the feeling of any man, who listened to him, had he known, that at the very moment, he had taken the most absolute means to repress in Hungary, every hostile opinion, and to relieve Austria and Russia, from every opposition to the effects of their armies,—from the opinions of England, or the opinions of its Government. Would the opinion of such a listener have been, that Lord Palmerston was imbecile, yet, when the facts are brought out, when we have before us the evidence of this game practised, upon ourselves, by deception, the conclusion we come to, is not treachery, but imbecility. Imbecility not in us, but *him*. Such is the very conclusion drawn from the case, by the Westminster Review.

But while a war is going on, between Austria and Hungary, which in the opinion of Lord Palmerston, if not concluded by an "*amicable treaty*," must bring such terrible consequences for Europe, which treaty nevertheless, he abstains from uttering one word to bring about, another war is going on which could have no earthly consequences for the rest of the world, unless *he* had interposed, for its adjustment. There was a civil war between the Danes, and the inhabitants of the Duchies regarding matters of internal administration: there no armies threatened Europe, and no "opinion" was required to counterbalance them. Lord Palmerston finds reasons for a formal expression of the "opinion:—" Great Britain interposes with mediation, enforces an armistice, has so much to say at St. Peterburg, as to make the correspondence

occupy 6000 folio pages, and the end is a treaty, which delivers over to Russia that Denmark, which she had never entered, nor could enter with her armies. This awful crime was announced to the world by the "Times," as the triumph "of the active, pacific, and intelligent diplomacy of our day, which had contrived to avert the calamities of a general war."

By speech or by silence, Lord Palmerston equally arrives at his end. By having opinions to express, he puts Denmark in the hands of Russia—by holding his tongue, Hungary. By speaking in one quarter the Sound becomes the inheritance of the Czar, by having nothing to say in another quarter, he enables that Czar, to say, "When I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria, what suits one, suits the other." But of course who cares for what the Czar says? Austria is now to get the Principalities, because it does *not* suit Russia.

In 1836, Lord Palmerston, in a debate on Russia and Turkey, said:—

"We feel as deeply as my honourable friend how essential it is to the commercial resources of this country to secure the advantages which may be derived from an extension of our commercial interests with Turkey."

In 1823, he declared "The commerce of Turkey is very material to this country."—(*House of Commons, August, 1853.*)

In 1825, he had branded as "Russian" a proposal made by the Porte to England, for the establishment of "free trade" between the two countries.

In 1837, he had signed a treaty with Turkey, by which import duties were *raised* from 3 to 5 per cent, exports from 3 to 12 transit charged 3 per cent., the original draft to which the Porte had agreed having left untouched the old duty on imports, and secured considerable reduction on exports, with transit *free*. Lord Palmerston said there was no *material* difference between the two; but gave as an explanation to the House of Commons, May, 1, 1848:

"Nobody can suppose, especially in arranging commercial transactions between the two countries, that you can go with a draft treaty in one hand and a pen in the other, and say to a foreign minister, 'Now, Sir, sign that treaty, or jump out of the window.'"

The explanation of the Turkish Minister was—"What could we do? *It was the condition on which England granted her support against Mehemet Ali.*"

After the affair of Sinope the *Times* thus expressed the popular feeling:—"The English people are resolved that Russia shall not dictate conditions to Europe, or convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake."

How that "conversion" had taken place comes into my story.

I have already quoted Lord Palmerston's special pleading for Russia on the treaty for Adrianople:—

"She did not on that occasion acquire additional territory—at least in *Europe*."

By one paragraph Turkey is made to cede "all the eastern littoral of the Black Sea." But it did not belong to Turkey. It was, and is still, the property of the Circassian people, who do preserve, in our time, worth and courage to oppose the arms and gold of Russia. To make the Black Sea a Russian lake, it was necessary to extinguish the trade of this people.

In 1836, the *Vixen*, a British merchant-vessel, was seized by a Russian man-of-war while peaceably trading with the Circassians, and confiscated, because, according to the Russian admiral, "It was employed upon a blockaded coast in an unlawful trade with the enemies of this country."

More than two months after Lord Palmerston is informed of this proceeding, he writes to St. Petersburg, and thus winds up the matter:—

"His Majesty's government, considering that Soudjouk Kale now belongs to Russia, by virtue of the treaty of Adrianople, as stated by Count Nesselrode, and that the port is occupied by a Russian fort and garrison, see no sufficient reason to question the right of Russia to seize and confiscate the *Vixen*, on the grounds set forth in Count Nesselrode's note. Under all the peculiar circumstances of the case, his Majesty's Government have no further demand to make upon that of Russia with respect to the capture of the *Vixen*,"

Count Nesselrode's "grounds" are, not that it was seized in a harbour blockaded, but in one belonging to Russia.

The crew had held uninterrupted communication with the inhabitants, even according to the Russian admiral, where Lord Palmerston installs a "Russian Garrison." In this "peculiar" manner Lord Palmerston acknowledges for Count Nesselrode the treaty of Adrianople, whilst extinguishing Circassia and its commerce for England, and so far converts the Black Sea into a "Russian lake."

Questioned in the House of Commons, he said:—

"He (Mr. Bell, the owner) wished to know what was the opinion of the Government with regard to those great questions, namely, the right of Russia to the sovereignty of Circassia, and if I thought she was or was not entitled to establish those custom-house or sanitary regulations *she was enforcing by the power of her arms*. If such questions be put, it would be most dangerous and imprudent in the Minister to satisfy them."

Dangerous and imprudent! Of course. But the answer he had taken credit for having refused to a British merchant he did give to Russia—the answer that Russia desired.

I must again recur to the "inevitable" treaty of Adrianople. Lord Palmerston's, "at least in Europe," overlooked the very trifling matter of the mouths of the Danube:—

"As Russia *thought fit*, by virtue of the treaty of Adrianople, to possess herself of the mouths of the Danube, that great watercourse, and highway of nations," &c.—(*House of Commons, July 7, 1853.*)

This was said last year, in answer to a question as to what was to become of the British vessels detained in the Danube, he continues:—"Local feelings and interests must have obstructed, *without their being aware of it, the good intentions* of the Russian Government." These "local interests," he explains to be "rivalship on the part of Odessa,"* "profits made by bargemen and lightermen," &c.

In 1836, in reply to a motion on the same subject, he said:—

"*I do not stand here to expound, or explain, the intentions of Russia. . . .* It is enough for us to look at facts, and deal with events that have actually taken place."

The motion was to address the Crown to protect the commercial interests of Great Britain in Turkey and the Euxine, and also to send a diplomatic agent to Cracow.—(See *Annual Register*, 1836.)

Two events *had* taken place:—The subjugation of the free state of Cracow, and a Russian ukase ordering vessels for the Danube to go to Odessa.

The address was got rid of by his informing the house that the Government had already determined to send a consular agent to Cracow, and by the declaration:—

"That her Majesty's Government had no desire or disposition to submit to aggression from any power."—(*February 19, 1836.*)

The agent was never sent! The aggressions have continued to this day!

Trade interdicted with the Circassians—obstructed at the mouth of the Danube—*Turkey bound to keep out the men-of-war of her allies* by the treaty of July, 1841, *his* treaty; "now, that it no longer exists, to be revised in the interests of the balance of power in Europe." The Black Sea was a "Russian lake," but for one circumstance—the *Turkish fleet*. This has been got rid of, by the destruction of some frigates at Sinope; by the fleet itself being prevented from fighting, and "shut up in harbour, for the crews to die of starvation and the scurvy."—(*Times Correspondent, Aug. 7.*)

* She is brought he says, 162,000 men into the field by the aid of "£11,000,000" remitted to St. Petersburg.

He did not share in the popular delusions with regard either to the strength of Russia or the weakness of Turkey.

In 1837, in reference to the Russian fleet in the Baltic, he stated "that Russia could not find means to commence an offensive war" (Dec. 14, 1837); denied that her efforts in the great continental war were a criterion of her resources, and referred those efforts to the subsidies of England and France.*

He continues:—

Although she has a large number of men under arms, yet, when we consider the little means she possesses to muster them from various distant places, and to train and bring them into the shape of an offensive army, honourable members may depend upon it she is not in a situation to give reasonable cause for alarm *to any power*, ranked among the principal states of Europe. I assert that Russia would find it more difficult to undertake a war, which had not for its object self-defence, than England. And such being my decided opinion, I do not think I shall be going too far in assuring the alarmed honourable member, that he may, with confidence, proceed to his nightly slumbers without the least fear of being awoken by the news that the Russian fleet is anchored in the Pool, or that the crews of their ships are parading the streets of London."

At a later date just as the Hungarian war had become matter of history, in offering to mediate, he says:—

"The *whole disposable force* of the Russian empire has been brought up to take part in the war," and adds, "the *combined* Russian and Austrian forces are said to amount to 300,000 men."

Neither was he deluded with respect to the power of Turkey. In August 1853, he says:—

"I assert without fear of contradiction, that Turkey, so far from having gone back within the last thirty years, has made greater progress and improvement, in every possible way, than, perhaps, was ever made by any other country during the same period. There are countries in Europe, to which the hon. gentleman has referred, that are in *much more danger of sudden dissolution from internal causes* than Turkey, *Turkey, it is certain, has no Poland and no Siberia.*"

On another point of great importance at this moment he is equally decided.

In 1845, he attacks the Peel ministry for neglecting the national defences thus:—

"France has a fleet equal to ours. The Channel is no longer a barrier; steam navigation has rendered that which was before impassable to a military force nothing more than a river passable by a steam bridge. Well,

* During this year the exports of Odessa have doubled, rising from 1,400,000 to above 3,000,000 quarters.

then, I say that is not a state of things under which you can remain secure of peace, unless you are in a state of preparation to meet any sudden attack. Sir, I shall be told perhaps, that our relations with France are of the most amicable nature. I admit it, *but questions of the greatest importance may start up in any quarter of the globe*, and we can never be sure from month to month with respect to two countries which have such extensive and diversified interests to be considered, that questions of the utmost delicacy and difficulty will not unexpectedly arise." Again, "I venture to state that no country in Europe is in such a state of defencelessness as England is at this present moment."

On these points, then, Lord Palmerston is at variance with public opinion. One other man has, however, coincided with him.

Mr. Urquhart, writing last year on the relative strength of Russia and Great Britain, used these words, "Let us take the case of a war with Russia—will it be aggressive or defensive? We may set it down as a preliminary that Russia will not send a fleet into the Thames. The resources of Russia since 1828 have not increased but diminished. In 1828 the Polish Constitution had not yet been put down—political and religious aspirations had not been awakened among the Cossacks."

"In Turkey has occurred one of the most extraordinary revolutions ever observed, and the maxim signally disproved, that nations cannot recover. Each of the diseases severally judged lethal, has been eradicated."

He also pointed out for us the danger lay in a rupture with France, to arise from interfering in remote countries, showing that every case of the two governments uniting so to interfere, "had led to differences between themselves."

Lord Palmerston is now a member of a Cabinet that has acted as if it were *Turkey*, not Russia, that was in danger of dissolution, and as if Russia could give cause of alarm not to *one* but to *all* the "principal states of Europe;" as if France had no means of attacking us, and as if no question could possibly "start up between us in any quarter of the globe."

Mr. Urquhart has predicted that we should hold Turkey back, that Turkey will consequently fall by reason of her strength, so unnaturally compressed, and that we shall pass from "a collusive war with Russia to a real one with Turkey and with France."

Which of these two men will we have? The one who has used his knowledge to warn, or the one who has used it to deceive?

CARITAS.

Political Fly-Sheets.—No. IX.

(*Double Number.*)

THE SPIDER AND THE FLY.

THE CRIMEA AND THE ALLIES.

"Will you walk into my parlour? said the Spider to the Fly:
'Tis the prettiest little chamber that ever you did spy."

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The Author has permitted the following important Pamphlet to be incorporated in this Series. The reader's attention need hardly be called to the melancholy result so clearly foretold in the following pages.—E. T.

AN APPEAL FROM TO-DAY TO TO-MORROW.

"Turkey was stabbed in the back by diplomatic action in 1828, arising from great prejudices combined with intense ignorance."

D'Israeli's Speech on Servia, August, 1843.

"No wrong decreed by Russia could equal the misfortunes brought on Turkey in a single year by the friendship of the British Government."—*Bright, Feb. 1854.*

"Russia has dragged our forces to her shores."—*Times.*

THE Invasion of the Crimea has no analogy with any previous operation to which the same term is applied. The mere reference to similar movements in the late war suffices to render clear my meaning. England invaded Egypt, she invaded Sicily, she invaded Spain: in all these cases invasion was tantamount to the war itself; the enemy was there, and had to be driven out; there was no question as to the selection of the point; the only question was as to the adaptation of the means.

There is, however, another kind of invasion which may be supposed to bear some analogy to it: that of Scipio's descent on Africa, but it is in terms only, not in facts. Rome was unable to cope with Carthage in Italy: Scipio struck at Carthage *herself*, denuded at home by her generals, armies, and elephants being despatched across the Mediterranean.

The present war arises out of an invasion of Turkey by Russia, and the belligerents, calling them so in courtesy, reply by an invasion of Russia, not because Russia is irresistible in Turkey, and invade Russia at a point where she is not vulnerable. There are reasons, however, assumed for the operation, which, if true, would establish an analogy with the cases of Rome and Carthage, namely, that the Turks are unable to cope with the Russians at home, and that the Crimea is, or contains, the "centre of Russian power." Neither of these statements is true; and we must have true facts and not false ones to reason upon, when we are dealing with operations deserving the title of rational, and therefore capable of being successful.

But if the averment were true, is this the rational course to adopt? If Turkey alone were unequal to cope with Russia, she must cease to be so when backed by the power of England and France; and if the Crimea menaced the Ottoman Empire by means of the sea, that menace ceases from the moment the maritime power of England and France is introduced into the Euxine. There being henceforward no possible danger to Turkey, and the Allies being able to operate in the rear of the Russian armies, and having at their mercy Odessa, from which

port, and not from Sebastopol, in this and in all former wars the Russian forces have been despatched seawards, it is clear that our course was to operate there, and so capturing the Russian armies bring upon her the penalties of her violence and ambition. To effect this no effort was requisite, for to take Odessa was no gigantic performance.

The false facts on which the false inferences are built are not a spontaneous delusion. They proceed from industrious indoctrination furnished by an organ which has absorbed so much of the public reading as to be considered equivalent to the opinion of England—notwithstanding the impression almost universally made by its course and articles that it is a mere vehicle for the ideas which the Russian Government wishes the English nation to entertain. It is this organ that has asserted and made England to believe that from Sebastopol all the operations against Turkey now and heretofore have been conducted, and that that geographical point is the basis of “Russia’s southern policy.” In fact it is by means of the *Times* that Russia carries on the war, not by armies that she has in the field; those armies have been beaten by the Turks, and without the *Times* the war would be at an end by Russia’s discomfiture. The *Times* has driven England to send in armies to prolong the war by extending it in a false direction, so as to enable Russia hereafter to force, through the Allies, conditions upon Turkey the reverse of those which must have followed the actual defeat of Russia by Turkey.

The invasion of the Crimea has thus to be considered not only with reference to war, but with reference to negotiations. As regards the first, it is considered not so much in its direct bearing, as by furnishing a test of the sincerity of the Government; whilst the nation is utterly incapable of dealing with that matter at all, as proved by the falsehoods which it has received as truths. In an honest war it would be an act of folly, and only one of sense in a collusive war, because it is not a point from which you can operate against Russia, and operating there you neglect those where your power would have proved fatal to her. If the war is collusive, even what you have gained in the Crimea will be hereafter surrendered; and here a test for the future is afforded in this review of the present. Here is another prognostication to stand or fall as so many that have preceded it. Will you or will you not make use of your triumph to require from her indemnity? If you do require from her indemnity,

I shall be proved wrong in every word that I have uttered before, as well as in those I now speak; if you do not, then must you confess that you have been deluded from first to last.

But, in truth, the time is gone by for such a test. The evacuation of the Danubian Principalities was "to precede any negotiation," that surely meant their restoration to Turkey; your first and only negotiation has been to convey them away to another power.

So far then as the first point is concerned, that of war, it is clear that the Invasion of the Crimea is not dangerous to Russia, and is not beneficial to Turkey; that it is not a test of the sincerity, but a proof of the insincerity, of the British Government.

As to negotiations, the first point to strike is this: that you have proposed terms to Russia on the basis of securing Turkey against her influence and interference in times of a future peace; whilst you send an expedition with the avowed purpose of breaking up her power at home, and reducing her to a political nullity in the affairs of the world. Now as this Invasion is not calculated to effect the latter warlike object, it follows that it is undertaken with a view to the negotiations, and therefore under a false pretence. If the war is collusive, the negotiations must be collusive also; that they are collusive appears on their face, for your proposals carry no indemnity, and they profess to share with Russia in her pretensions not to bar them.

A graver case was never submitted to the consideration of a nation or a world. I have endeavoured to elucidate it in the three subjoined letters, which were written at the close of last month, and consequently before the event was known. They were at that time transmitted to the Journals which have been in the habit of publishing my letters, but not having appeared by the time that the intoxication produced by the success of the invasion occurred, I have found myself deprived of the opportunity of speech. This is not the first time that the like has happened to me—a crisis sprung upon nations operating in a similar manner as described by Pozzo di Borgo when sprung upon governments. I am, therefore, reduced to adopt the present method of publication to put my protest on record and to bring the knowledge of what I have to say within the reach of any individual, who may not consider that worth and safety reside in spinning around in the whirlpool of ephemeral passion.

However I may deplore such infatuation, I rather rejoice

tian otherwise that the exclusion should be so perfect and the signs of it thus rendered so complete. In great calamities or in the state of mind which produces them, it is character more than reasons that reaches the conscience of man; those who might fail in testing the validity of a fact, or in tracing the sequence of an argument, may be struck and startled by the audacity of a single individual confronting a whole people, and may be led to reflect that so bold a solitariness must have roots of reason and fibres of truth; and consequently that truth and reason must now, as heretofore, be wanting in the multitude that is led and in the leaders that are followed.

It is not a speculative subject which we have in hand; it is not the rotation of the globe, or the circulation of the blood; —it is the management of a nation's affairs: it is the making of events which will come to break down opinions however popular, to justify truth however despised.

I have placed as a motto to this pamphlet, words of Mr. D'Israeli, which accurately define the false course taken in reference to Turkey on the last great crisis of 1828, which he attributes to "diplomacy," to "prejudice," and to "intense ignorance." A nation whose diplomacy, that is whose policy, is based on prejudice and ignorance does not easily change; such maladies are constitutional, they grow with time. The definition is still correct as regards the nation but as regards the government the case is altered. That government is not prejudiced and is not ignorant; he has himself asserted the reverse in designating its policy "collusive." Not venturing to proceed upon that charge, he has shown his conviction of the nation's prejudice and ignorance. He is a practical politician, and if such a one does coincide in judgment with one not a practical politician, it is difficult to imagine how the conjunction has taken place, unless on the supposition that they are right.

I am not a practical politician in an English sense, that is, the securing of votes in Parliament; but I know the countries where you are operating, a knowledge which cannot be practically possessed by any individual whose life has been spent on the Treasury or Opposition Benches, and who is known as a British statesman.

My knowledge of the subject has been acquired by the same process through which the servants of the Emperor of Russia acquire their knowledge. An English statesman may indeed perceive, after the event, the error or the treachery of

English ministers ; but it is only one situated as I am who can tell beforehand what the servants of the Emperor of Russia are going to do. I tell you, that it is the servants of the Emperor of Russia who have planned your invasion of the Crimea, and that in your success Russia now rejoices.

Even so was it in 1838, when you made your former war against Russia ; you effected it, you rejoiced, and she profited.

On that occasion the English Cabinet consulted none of the men who were authorities upon the question, and while the nation was intoxicated with its success, these men were in secret protesting against the act. The Duke of Wellington, the Marquis of Wellesley, Sir Hartford Jones Brydges, Mr. St. George Tucker, Sir Gore Ouseley,* &c.

In this second war against Russia—ominous word ! the Government consulted on no branch of it, any of the persons who were authorities—Colonel Rose, Lord Ponsonby, Sir John Mc Neil, &c. The recorded opinion of these and others against them, is before the world. If the government did not act on the advice of their own servants, the few they had conversant with the matter—*on whose advice did they act ?*

You are now reduced to this predicament, that you are trembling for news : a telegraphic paragraph, a line in a paper, may fill you with exultation, or appal you with fright,—both equally vain. You are in a position where Russia can inflict on you a blow, if she wishes to stun, or grant you a victory—if you have still to be seduced. She can retrieve on you the defeats she has incurred from the Turks, or suffer you to perpetrate, by a treaty of Sebastopol, the deed you attempted by a note from Vienna.

When you prevented the Turks from attacking the Russians, I told you that you would have to fight the Turks yourselves. When your expedition sailed, I told you that not a man would return. But the Turks were, in spite of you, victorious, and the war at an end—of course, then, there was end of my prediction ! No ; a new case is invented. If the Crimea is gained and *evacuated*, still I will say, “ not a man will return,” and you will make new efforts to accomplish my words. The difference between us is this : you wait on events—I know their source. You interpret purposes by occurrences,—I fore-
results in intentions.

The former forced conversation upon the subject with Lord Palmerston, galled that minister under the impression that he had convinced him of the impolicy and the guilt of the proposed measures.

LETTER I.

RUSSIA INVITES US TO THE CRIMEA.

“Will you walk into my parlour? said the spider to the fly:
 ’Tis the prettiest little chamber that ever you did spy.”

Worthing, Sept. 29th, 1854.

“THE eve of great events,” says the Public Instructor, “is the fool’s holiday;” it is also the knave’s harvest. But if it be the reaping-time of cunning and deceit, it is also the sowing-time of sorrowing forethought: let me seize it for a few more seeds, before irrevocable fate has compressed fear into fact, and converted doubt into disaster.

“The all-atoning name of an attack on Russia silences reason.” Such was the aphorism propounded by the *Times*, two months ago. So that for the discerning eye it required no attendance on events to apprehend the modicum of discrimination in the possession of a British public, no more than it required a similar experience to give freedom and boldness to the cunning hand to whom it was given to play with it. It was tantalized for a time, with ever dissolving hopes of that dearly loved attack, so as to confer on that word, when exhibited in practice, a tenfold atoning power, at a period when a greater number and variety of sequences of thought than at any other were requisite for the judgment of a warlike operation, a field, where a multiplicity of consideration is involved, which throw into the shade the subject matters on which a Cæsar or an Alexander had to act, and in dealing with an adversary, whose high intellectual powers constituted it an incorporate and consecutive genius, England is judged, and is proved to be, capable of divesting herself of the attributes of human reason, and places her security and her pride in the indulgence of brutish ferocity. England attacks, and rejoices in attacking—England loves to attack—she cares not to know whether it was necessary or to what it will lead, and it is the use of reason in some, which prompts the weakness of all. Exhibiting in herself the fable of the ancient Centaur, combining in evil partnership for deadly ends, an ex judgment and a fatal force.

I wish to submit to my fellow-country men three questions :—

Is it necessary to send an expedition to the Crimea to humble Russia?

Will the taking of the Crimea humble Russia?

The third I will put after the first two are answered.

As to the first, the time of argument is gone by. Had the Russians been triumphant, and had the Turks been beaten—had the Russians been ready with 200,000 men to pour across the Balkan, then we might have discussed, whether the sending an expedition to the Crimea was a prudent course for England, or a dangerous one for Russia. Had again, England acting in an intelligible fashion, threatened Russia before she moved, resisted her when she had done so, then, Russia having beaten Turkey and England (for otherwise the war was ended) an attack upon the Crimea might have stepped down from the clouds, and become a matter for grown-up persons and rational beings to discuss. But after Russia has been wholly and entirely discomfited by Turkey—after England, putting forth her power, has avoided every act that could savour of war, an expedition to the Crimea becomes a proposition entertainable only by a Bedlamite—at least as a means of humbling Russia.

To humble Russia, is a very simple operation for an English minister; and that for the reason, that England has made Russia what she is, and sustains her where she is. Let England but withdraw her hand—her helping and sustaining hand, and Russia tumbles at once: tumbling in any degree she falls with a crash. "Russia," said Cardinal Gonsalvi, "has risen to a position, where her vigilance dares not slumber for a single day." Thus, while you float water-logged in an ocean of neglected, unknown, and misused resources, she is hourly on the rack and the stretch to maintain the semblance of bulk necessary to impose upon that credulity which furnishes the props of that phantom size, hereafter to be converted into a colossal reality.

I cannot prove this to you, but I tell it you. What other dealing is there between one who knows, and those who know not. You cannot believe me though I tell it you; but at all events, you must be conscious to yourselves, that you cannot say. But from this piece of profound and wholesome instruction, you may derive the knowledge of your ignorance.

Then must you recoil with horror from the thought of staking your fortunes on a game, not of hazard, but of skill, against an antagonist, master of that very art, and who, you must see, has invited you to play. If you go to the Crimea, it is that Russia wishes you to go there. That need not be argued—had she feared you, she would have at least spared you insult: she would have accepted your terms, *which are her own*.

To humble Russia, not one, but twenty means were within reach of an English minister. First of all it needed but to have backed Turkey at the beginning. The blindest must now see that the Government has made no discoveries in the course of these transactions, and that their policy, like an Epic, in modifying its march has pursued its aim to the end. It sufficed to call Poland to arms even without Turkey. It sufficed to restore to independence the Scandinavian kingdoms, giving back Finland to Sweden, and tearing the infamous compact that has made Denmark the inheritance of the Czar. It sufficed to let the fact of war take its course in reference to the commerce of Russia. Any of these measures sufficed to humble Russia, and every one of them must have been adopted by an English Government that was at war with Russia, or that intended to humble her. But these have not been adopted, therefore there is no intention to humble her. This case is not one of a mental condition, it is one of action. There is no alternative between acting against Russia, and acting with Russia. If the English Government is not using its power to crush Russia, it is using it "to protect Russia;"* and an expedition to the Crimea not being the way to humble Russia, is undertaken with the view to humble Turkey.

But we have interposed in a war between two belligerents. Our profession is that we are there only to protect the one, and to resist the other; and if our profession is not true there is nothing to discuss upon the subject. This war arises out of the entrance of the one upon the territory of the other. At the very moment that you are despatching your "colossal" and "unparalleled expedition" against a "dependency" of Russia, you are handing over the matter in dispute, *i. e.* the invaded province of Turkey to a third power; † and are posi-

* Lord Ponsonby.

† There is no intention that any farther ambiguity should remain as to the atrocity.

Austria evidently hopes that her *actual possession* of the Danubian Principalities will give her a weight to which the rest of her conduct does not entitle her."—*Times*, October 6th.

tively constituting Austria a co-partitioner with Russia. This never could have been devised with a view of humbling Russia, and an expedition so planned, however successful, will not be the means of humbling Russia.

Our consideration of the question under the brute-force principle, of course, restricts itself to guns, gabions, military and mortars. There is no thought beyond that of beating the enemy on the field: the capture of the Russian fleet, the surrender of Sebastopol, and the occupation of the Crimea, is the very horizon of your intellectual world. The suggestion never arises of failure or success beyond these facts; or of a play in which the fleet or the Crimea should merely be the pieces: and yet the evidence lies sparkling and glaring in our face, that Russia has "dragged our force to her shores."

People neither send expeditions on perilous enterprises, nor expose fleets, fortresses, and dependencies to imminent hazard without an adequate motive. The reader of this letter may wonder at this proposition, as he may be charged with the idea, that in our expedition we are aiming at humbling Russia, and that in the risk she runs, Russia is aiming at acquiring the supremacy of the East. But this idea, however universal, is utterly false. It is not a falsehood, that it requires discrimination to detect; but it is a falsehood, which ineptness alone could admit. It is a falsehood persisted in by the nation, despite the most expressive and decisive act of the Government, which has offered terms to Russia, and published the fact. All vagueness now vanishes: the expedition is undertaken, solely because Russia will not accept those terms,—Russia incurs the risk rather than accept them. What are they? The sharing of the Allies with her in a Protectorate which she has failed to make good! A Protectorate which I, as knowing the country, assert she could no more enjoy without the aid of the Allies than she could the protectorate of Timbuctoo.

The sincerity of the Allies was, in making any proposal, exposed to one simple test which must settle the matter in the mind of any man, however limited in capacity, however inexperienced in affairs, and that was the indemnity. An indemnity being required, clearly the English Government had been sincere, however mistaken or stupid. But if no indemnity was required, clearly it was an understood thing between them, and the war was a farce. I have not waited the event to put the case in this fashion. I said before-

hand that no indemnity would be required. How could I know events still in the womb of Time, unless by knowing their parents who walked the earth, the actors of the scene?"

But on this comes cumulative evidence. If no indemnity is exacted, no penalty henceforward attaches to any violence; consequently Russia remains without a single pretext of incurring the invasion of the Crimea, for she could have accepted any terms, however hostile, and, having so disposed of the preparatives of the Allies, have recommenced next day.

It will not be easy to make the world see itself in its new aspect. It will probably remain for some philosopher removed from us by a space, immense in horrors, if not in planetary revolution, to make the discovery, that, in August, 1854, by an anomalous interchange of notes between the Powers of the West and Russia, against whom they were arrayed, and which interchange led to no other ostensible consequences than the resumption of more active hostilities, that the basis of international law had been undermined, that treaties henceforward possessed no binding power, that the lines separating peace and war had been blotted out, and that henceforward, for a criminal community, the same impunity had been proclaimed, which the closing of the courts of law would confer on a private malefactor.

If I have made it apparent that there were other means to humble Russia, and that it is not the intention of our Government to humble Russia, I shall have laid the ground for my next letter, in which I will endeavour to answer the third question which I propose to put,—What Russia's object is in making us attack the Crimea?

LETTER II.

WHY SHE INVITES US TO THE CRIMEA.

"I have no fear of Russian arms, but every fear of British diplomacy.
Lord Ponsonby, late Ambassador at Constantinople and Vienna.

IN my letter of Friday, I showed that to humble Russia there was no need to send an expedition to the Crimea—that every effective means of humbling Russia had been avoided by the Allies, and I inferred from the one and the other that there was no intention on the part of the English Government to humble Russia, and that consequently the expedition to the Crimea was not planned for that object. I further showed, that the acts of Russia indicated an intention to draw us to the Crimea. I now propose to show what Russia has to gain by that manœuvre.

The recent proposals for an accommodation artfully impressed upon the public mind, through the succession of notes, now in course of transmission and publication, make *conditions for Turkey, without her concurrence.*

As in our present frame of mind, we have only appetite for news, and as the passing of Turkey by, in settling points affecting her own Sovereignty and existence, had been commented upon, at the time of the two Vienna Notes, and indeed exhausted, in a single sentence, by Lord Lyndhurst, no one has at present noticed the fact. Let me, however, tell you, though it be not a novelty, that the process of passing Turkey by, in settling her affairs, has the same relation to the existence of that empire, as a breaching battery has to the defence of a beleagured fortress. If so it will appear to those who have eyes, and those who have ears, that the interest of the contrivance does not expire with its novelty, but the very reverse.

What the terms are it matters not; the moment you treat for Turkey, without her concurrence, you have over-ridden her sovereignty, and have extinguished that "independence" which Russia had only threatened—threatened in vain, and to her cost. But you have bound Turkey beforehand to submit to your so dealing with her interests; you then anti-

cipated resistance to your plans—resistance not from your enemy, but from your ally. You explained this unparalleled act of pre-ordained treachery, by your great fears, lest Turkey left alone to deal with Russia, might be overreached by that wily Power, and make unwarrantable and unheeded concessions. That was the false reason for the villanous fact. It was known to Europe, what the conference had done at Vienna, and yet such things pass. Of course, the Turks alone could understand the nature of Russia's proposals, as they alone had discomfited her arms; and if it involved a question of Turkish Sovereignty, that the Porte should treat unfettered, so it involved the whole case of European security, that the Porte should treat alone. What a triumph did Russia achieve when those words were inserted in a European treaty!—then might she boldly tell the Turks, as she immediately did, that it was not she but the Allies who were the real enemies of their Sovereignty and independence.

The terms proposed, justify the precautions taken beforehand, and the method of their actual appearance. It is not Russia that makes them to the Allies—but the *Allies to Russia!* Yet in the nature of things, whether as to the relative power of the parties, whether as to the subject matter of the overture, the reverse was the course. It was natural for Russia to say, "Let me have what I want, and you shall share with me;" but quite unnatural for the Allies to say, "You must renounce that you have not got and cannot get, and these we will share altogether." But the proposal is made in this fashion, and from this quarter, not for it to be accepted—but rejected; and why? For the very simple reason, that you would have found some little trouble still with Turkey. The Porte would have rejected your terms, as she rejected your Vienna Note;* the play now going on, is for the purpose of subjugating that resistance. The acceptance of the Vienna Note has not ceased to be put forward as the measure which would have laid

* The *Times*, of the 9th instant, has an article which entirely confirms this view. It contains this passage:—

"English blood has been drawn. *Jacta alea est*—the Czar must make up his mind to fight it out, to the perdition of one or both,—at least until one shall have submitted to the terms which the other may impose."

How was it possible, in the moment of a supposed victory, to speak in such a fashion of the conquered enemy? It is morally impossible that it could have been penned except with the consciousness of the Russian end, which I assume the English Government to have had in view.

the basis of the future peace of Europe. The Vienna Note and the proposals for peace are the same, in character at least, but worse in degree ; just as the Vienna Note was worse than the Menschikoff demands. The Porte is in a position to-day, no loss than in August last, to resist that pretension, which as might be supposed to denounce in some such language as this :

“The sublime Porte did reject the note settled by the Conference at Vienna, and it is in consequence of that rejection, that it is at war with Russia and that the Allied Powers have found themselves, in like measure, at war with Russia. On that occasion the Allies urged the Porte to accept conditions which they subsequently went to war with Russia to resist. Their present proposals of peace to Russia coincide with their original proposals of adjustment to Turkey ; except that the former transferred to Russia alone, the Sovereignty of the Sultan ; whereas the latter transfers it to Russia and the Allies. So that we have five Russias instead of one.

“The Sublime Porte rejected the Vienna Note whilst Russia was in occupation of the Principalities, before we had measured weapons with her, while yet we were alike unconscious of our own power, and of her weakness. We are called upon to submit, after she has been beaten, and beaten by ourselves, by Allies who have done nothing against the enemy and have only interfered to restrain our hand.

“Were the Sublime Porte of one mind with our friends, it could not answer for a nation, now as confident of its strength to conquer Russia, as hitherto it has been resolved to try to do so, and who will see in this adjustment the purpose to establish for Russia pretensions practically defeated, as a means of introducing new and far more dangerous pretensions of their own.

“The Sublime Porte has indeed assented to stipulation binding it, not to treat separately with Russia ; but it never engaged to surrender its own Sovereignty, or to annihilate its own existence. It has not bound itself to accept any terms that the Powers may agree upon ; and as they now have come to a settlement with Russia, it will pursue its own war alone.”

That some such course was anticipated, is proved by the measures that have been adopted, and this in fact is the only difficulty which has presented itself throughout to the carrying into effect of that “perfect understanding,” originally sketched in August 1844, and definitely settled in February

1853; as consigned in the "Secret and Confidential Communications," the revelation of which was forced by Russia, from the English Government, after that Government had been committed to warlike measures. Therefore it was, that the proposal was made, not by Russia but to Russia; and rejected by her. It is proposed by the Allies, to make it appear anti-Russian. It is rejected by Russia that the Porte may, after its stupid fashion, lose its chance of being heard. It is on this ground, namely, on the "four points," that active operations are now to be carried on. The public, disgusted with delays, now restores its confidence to the Government. Not a moment is lost, the couriers are on the road together, with pacific communications to Vienna, and hostile instructions to Varna. The "gigantic" invasion proceeds: Russia is threatened in "the very centre of her power"—the Allies are desperately in earnest—Russia is filled with dismay. Who can doubt that the "four points" contain matter, most threatening to Russia, most beneficial to the world. But when armies are engaged, it is as when lawyers are engaged. We must look to the plea. What is charged, what is demanded? A single line of a document may be worth more than 500,000 men and fifty line of battle-ships, even in this age of brute force; and more so than at any previous period for which the bewilderment of the judgment increases the power of words. "All the Queen's horses, and all the Queen's men" will not get out of Sebastopol and the Crimea more than the "conditions." You have taken good care to lay them down beforehand. You have familiarized your public with a *no-indemnity Peace*; you have protocolized a *no alteration of frontiers*; you have declared yourselves *no enemy of your antagonist*, but only on the defensive, for Turkey. You are therefore exposing your expedition for the "four points," and the blow to be struck at the "centre of Russian power," amounts to the carrying of the "four points"* and nothing else. As this is truth, and a truth of the deepest import, the tempter has it in charge to falsify it. "The demolition of Sebastopol is plainly indispensable, and even if the Czar were to offer the evacuation of the Principalities, and the withdrawal of his demands upon the Porte the peace so con-

* The free navigation of the Danube,—the revision of the treaty of 1841,—the present protectorate of the Principalities,—and the joint officious protectorate of the Christians.

cluded would be illusory, so long as the stronghold of the Crimea remained intact."—*Times*, August 1st.

The above was written five days before the first announcement of the Expedition, and seven days after the proposals of the Western Powers had been despatched to Vienna. It was then in the very heat of the negotiations that the expedition was planned, unquestionably it had reference to them; that reference as the world believes it, consists in enforcing acceptance by Russia; but as I know, and assert it in enforcing submission on Turkey.

Observe how it will act. The Allies are in possession of the stronghold of the Crimea, &c. and Russia assents. Turkey then finds that the case has arisen, when she must speak. She will be told that she had nothing to say when the case was originally mooted, and can no longer pretend to have that voice in the matter, which he might have had, when her own armies had beaten the enemy, and when, as yet, those of the Allies had not been employed. That now the case was in their hands—that the interests of Europe had to be provided for in the Crimea, as those of Germany had been in the Danubian Principalities. A Turkish corps will be in the hands of the expedition in the Crimea; that expedition thus accumulated and moveable, will be used to strike terror; and from Sebastopol the Ottoman throne will be menaced and upset. Thus the remonstrance and protest, which might now open the eyes of Europe, and break its traitorous Governments, will then only serve to arouse its passions and rivet its chains.

The conditions of peace will thus be settled, according to Mr. Gladstone's aspirations to the "satisfaction of the Powers." The Crimea, Sebastopol, and the fleet, will be restored, and so, limiting the consequences to this one hypothesis, Russia will have obtained the terms demanded by Prince Menschikoff, in April 1853, with the addition of the absolute separation of the Danubian Principalities, the destruction of the grain trade of Turkey, the exhaustion of its resources, the prestige in the East of having triumphed over the united power of Europe, and the occupation of the positions and seas of Turkey by the Allies.

The successful landing of the expedition at Eupatoria is, according to the "*Times*," *the answer* "to the whole race of cavillers, sceptics and alarmists, both here and abroad." I have the courage to assume that whatever amount of scepticism

or alarm may be in presence, is the produce, indistinct and indirect as it may be, of my own work. Now before that "answer" was given, and so far back as the 9th of August, I wrote and published a letter, since reprinted, upon this question,* "*Whether it would be for the interest of Russia, that England should occupy the Crimea and destroy the Russian fleet?*" Nevertheless I was no alarmist in the vulgar sense, as this extract will show:—

"Every company and every ship of England is tenfold the value to Russia, of a company or a ship of her own, and it would only be under heavy pressure, that she would sacrifice anything of that force of ours which she wants against Turkey and France."

The length to which this letter has extended, constrains me to defer the conclusion to a third.

October, 16th

In revising this sheet I turn this vacant space to account by inserting a passage from a recent speech of Lord Granville at a Yeomanry Dinner—the perusal of which will prepare the reader for the letter which follows. I can characterize this minister's revelation only as Bedlamite sentences. Now may Russia sing pæans: the mouse is at the toasted cheese and the wire is under its windpipe. Now too *The Times* can tell you that you are "at the *beginning* of the war;" whilst in private the doubling of the income tax can be whispered. This speech was not inserted by the journals for a whole week, and not one has observed its contents or importance.

"Government did not conceal from themselves the great responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both services an attack on Sebastopol. They were not ignorant of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers of every country in Europe, that, if not impracticable, the attempt was of a most difficult nature; but they did feel that the integrity and independence of Turkey was a mere joke so long as that fortress was deemed impregnable, situated, as it is, in the very centre of the Black Sea; as the only port from which vessels can come in or go out with safety; they felt that it was the very key of the position."

LETTER III.

HOW THE INVITATION WAS ANTICIPATED, AND
WHAT WILL FOLLOW.

(THE VALUE OF SEBASTOPOL.)

"The statesmen and cabinets of Europe are the tools with which Russia works."—*Sir John McNeil, Author of the "Progress of Russia in the East," and late Envoy in Persia.*

THE invasion of the Crimea was an after-thought. When on the 5th of August it was pompously announced by the *Times*, it was not believed. This incredulity resulted from very opposite causes. The cry of wolf had so often been raised, that the word had lost its value. The nation had been so industriously taught that Russia was invulnerable and Sebastopol impregnable, that the difficulties attending the enterprise were set down as insurmountable, and the belief having been established by these means, that to invade the Crimea would be a serious blow struck at Russia, scepticism took additional grounds on the friendship of forty years of the British Premier and the Russian Czar. The operation is therefore accepted at once as a grand military exploit, and as an evidence of ministerial integrity.

That it was an afterthought the season at which it is undertaken sufficiently proves, but it is rendered indubitable by the fact, that it was proposed and discussed in the month of March, and *then set aside* on grounds which I shall subsequently state. The discussion I refer to was with the military authorities, and the hostile decision was based upon its valuelessness as a military operation.

I now add another proof afforded to us since this letter was first written, by the Government statement, that it was the original design of the war. It would be unworthy of the position of the Government to state what was true. Its only object in speech is falsehood. After an historical and descriptive review of the Crimea, of which every line is a lie, the *Times*, in its impression of the 4th instant says :

"Such was the state of things a year ago, when first the pretensions of Russia, and the approach of hostilities, drove us to consider where the most severe and decisive blow against her should be aimed. These considerations sufficed to demonstrate that the Crimea was that spot, and that a blow struck home at Sebastopol, must at once paralyse and annihilate those means of external aggression in the East against which we found ourselves more particularly arrayed in arms."

This time last year the Government, that is to say, England and the *Times*, were doing their best to prevent Turkey from declaring war, and frantic against Turkey, because she had ventured, despite of them, on that outrageous step. Have we not here the whole case? what more can we need? England striving for nine months to constrain Turkey to submit to an aggression of Russia, avowedly aimed at its life, and, when it has failed, pretending to join Turkey in a war against Russia, and professing to direct the operations of that war to the dismemberment and destruction of Russia.

When the announcement was made, on the 5th of August, I no more shared in the public incredulity than I now share in its exultation. Knowing that the Crimea, and the fleet, was not available for any active operations of Russia against Turkey; knowing that that peninsula was not a position available for the Allies for effectual operations against Russia; knowing that its possession by Russia neutralised a large Russian army, and that its occupation by the Allies, would neutralise the whole of their available force,—I judged that expedition to be most probable in itself, on the same grounds that I had argued against it in the month of March. But these reasons existed as much in the month of March as in the month of August. There was therefore a new motive, or a new combination. Was it that something had to be done to satisfy the public anxiety? Was it that something had to be done to remove the royal disquietude? Was it that delay was required to make Europe believe that the Crimea was the centre of Russian strength? Was it in fine that the Allies might be able to take the negotiations for peace out of the hands of the Turks? Probably each of these considerations had its weight, as all were combined in the procedure and result.

Although with the additional light now thrown on the transaction, and the further reflection to which it has given rise, I might be able at this moment to state the case more succinctly and more conclusively, yet, lest I should be suspected of concluding only after the event, I will present my reasons in the very words which I used in letters published in the *Morning Herald* and the *Morning Advertiser*, between the 7th and the 12th of August, quoting specially from that of the 10th, as follows:

“You may land from ten miles to ten miles along the whole coast. You have a force sufficient to block them up at every creek, and to fill up every inlet. The population, though

scanty, is warlike and friendly to the invader. The scene of operations in the mountainous part of the Peninsula, and in mountains the Russians are worth nothing, consequently they cannot meet you in the field. Until you approach the walls of the fortress your proceedings are (*unless you make them otherwise**) tranquil as on a parade.

Sebastopol resembles the harbour of Valetta. It is a deep creek running direct inland for four miles, with tranverse creeks opening to the eastward. The ground in which this natural harbour opens is elevated and looks down upon it. The headlands rising abruptly as escarpments, and the coves swelling gently up through valleys. The land then stretches away on all sides with diversity of accident but gradually upon the ascent. In fact, the appearance of the whole recalls the slopes and sides of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The fortification is also analogous; there is no defence landward, whence no attack was contemplated, and against which no defence was practicable.

“Such was the state of this place up to the year 1852, when in evident contemplation of the present contingency, works of great extent were commenced. I say commenced, because the completion of such works would require the labour of years, even with all Russia’s resources, and if not completed, they are of course utterly valueless. To place Sebastopol in a position to stand a siege in form would require a line of complicated fortifications running along the heights surrounding the bay, with detached forts for the culminating points beyond, which is tantamount to saying, that there must be here accumulated the works of half-a-dozen of the principal fortresses of Europe, with those of Paris to boot, involving an expenditure of twenty or thirty millions sterling, requiring an army of 200,000 men to defend them, and, after all, being exposed by the original sin of the soil to easy capture. I need not say that these works have not been completed—that no fortress exists, and that no defenders are there,

“But let us suppose the town fortified, according to the rules *and* with all the luxury of art—then, I ask, ‘*What have we to do with Sebastopol?*’ It is not the walls we care for, but their contents. Their contents are, however, afloat, and we can get at the one without entering the other. It is just on a parallel with the remainder of this discussion, and in all

* Why did you land at Eupatoria,—why did you not threaten the south if you were to land to the north,—why attack at Alma in front?

that has been said and written about Sebastopol, no one has observed, or at least no one has remarked, that the Russian fleet is not protected by Sebastopol. Your end, we will suppose, is to destroy the vessels, and for that there is no reason to take Sebastopol. Half-a-dozen mortars, or half-a-dozen Paixhans guns for horizontal shells and red-hot shot, can do the business. You have only to occupy a position on one of the western hills, to sink them there, or to drive them out for your fleet to catch at their leisure. They have no place to run to. You don't want a pack, but a weasel, for your fox.

"These are considerations which, as the French say, spring to the eye. There is nothing abstruse or elaborate in the matter it is impossible not to see it. It was remarked to me standing on the deck of the *Turquoise*, the only English vessel that ever entered that harbour, 'How cunning of the Russians to forbid merchant vessels to come in here, that the hoax of this famous fortress should not be found out.' But the street-walkers of London have now got it before them in every print-seller's window, if indeed English eyes had any connexion with the brain."

So much for the new operations, against the place. Now for the Crimea as affecting the war.

"The Crimea expedition, if successful, does not interfere with the immediate object of the war. IT DOES NOT GET RUSSIA OUT OF THE PRINCIPALITIES.

"Neither the Crimea, nor the fleet, tells upon the actual war.

"The Crimea is only an exposed province, inhabited by a Tartar population which Russia requires an army to watch,—(the *Times* takes care to tell you that you would land in face of a 'hostile population')—which is so much withdrawn from her forces on the Danube and the Phasis. The course of the war has hitherto spared her any hostile action in these quarters, in either of which the presence of the Allies would have been fatal to her and on both of which she holds her ground solely by the action of the British Ambassador on the Porte, as I have shown in my preliminary letters. The force of the Allies being brought to bear on the Crimea, she is freed henceforward from their appearance on either of these fields, whilst it was necessary to employ them somewhere, and from the moment that they are in possession they are *locked up there*, because they must hold it against her. She is then on the aggressive and they on the defensive. Their 50,000 men are absolutely neutralised, they are cut off by the marshes of

the Azof, and the steppes of the Black Sea from the Circassians on the left, the Cossacks in the rear, and the Poles and Hungarians on the right. Nay, as they will suffer considerable loss, they will require reinforcements, and thereby furnish a pretext for further troops from home. Her army will, meanwhile, be set free; in fact she will gain, and you will lose 50,000 men. I stated in March, when this plan was discussed in high quarters, and after discussion set aside, 'your difficulties will commence only when you have captured the Crimea;' what can you do with it, and how are you to get rid of it?

"The Crimea contains an important fortress. Are the English and French to hold it conjointly, or is it to be delivered over to one, and to which?

"In this occupation the Turks will see at once a pretext for avoiding co-operation on the Danube, and for securing the inheritance of the Tartars. They will find that they have introduced into the Black Sea, their sovereignty, which you in 1841 made use of to transfer or to attempt to transfer to Russia—not one foreign, but two rival Powers, to convert their empire into a battle-field.

"Now as to the fleet. It has done nothing in the war. The affair of Sinope will not be, I imagine, adduced as an exploit even by a mere sailor. That event attained its diplomatic end, the entrance of your squadrons. It has done its work. The very exploit of a single steamer which actually rings through England is an evidence to those who can understand it, in the same sense. Russia wishes you to believe that that fleet is of importance: if she does so, it is not true. See how the *Times* parades it.

"In 1833 the Black Sea squadron suddenly appeared at Constantinople with an army of disembarkation, but it was only through collusion with the English Minister that that force was sent. That operation was followed by the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi which was considered the death blow given to Turkey. But Turkey was not killed. Notwithstanding the daily menace of that fleet, Turkey restored her army and her fleet, and so recovered her power as to be able to defy with success, on two occasions, a conjoint menace of Austria and Prussia, and at a later period to compel Russia to withdraw her forces from those very Danubian Provinces which they occupy to-day. It is not then true that the Sebastopol fleet menaces Turkey: for twenty years that fleet

has never been employed : but it is true that it has occasioned the restoration of Turkish power by its very presence, because it has disturbed the lethargy and broken the torpor of the Empire. Whenever I have been urging on the Porte measures tending to that end, I have found that fleet my great auxiliary.

“ Besides, that fleet is in itself of no value. Russia might as well, except for the mere transport of troops, have a paper squadron. It might be captured by a single brig ; it was nearly captured by the Vixen, for the crew of the capturing vessel entreated the eight Englishmen, their prisoners, to head them to carry it off, declaring, that immediately the crews of the rest of the fleet would follow their example, rise upon their officers, and, if they could but navigate their ships, carry them to Constantinople. It is expressly stated that the Vladimir, which recently broke our blockade, and captured the Turkish grain ships at Heraclea, was manned and *commanded by Greeks*.

“ Therefore this fleet has long ceased to be a means of overawing Turkey, which empire is now far beyond the reach of Russia’s physical blows. It is no longer as an enemy that she can appear there—she can only do so now as protector against internal rebellion and foreign dismemberment, both of which you are preparing, and for which, if requisite, she would sacrifice twenty fleets. She must make you strong on Turkish soil to conquer Mussulman aversion and be called in.

“ On these grounds I conclude that the occupation of the Crimea and the destruction of the fleet are in perfect harmony with the motives upon which I announced, *before the event*, that it was desirable for Russia that your fleet should enter the Black Sea.”

A further reason was dwelt upon in the same letter, that of carrying attention away from the point where Russia was vulnerable, Odessa ; by occupying which you took her armies on the Danube in the rear, and made them prisoners.

“ My conclusion therefore before the event was, that the occupation of the Crimea would be undertaken, and would be successful, and that on the grounds of collusion between the English Minister and Russia. This does not, however, preclude the intertwining with the military operations of that negotiation which is to constrain Turkey to accept as the proposal of the Allies the terms of Russia, which I consider to be the more direct object of the invasion itself.

In the Baltic, you proposed to reduce Russia not by calling the Poles to independence, or recovering Finland, but by

operating against her fleets, and fortresses. You are filled with a great dogma, that stone cannot stand against wooden walls. But you are delayed by the ice; the ice breaks up, you send great vessels, and allow nine Russian line-of-battle ships to escape. You then exchange your great dogma about wooden and stone walls, and the summer is lost, because vessels cannot attack granite fortresses—Meanwhile the nation grumbles, and you operate against a fortress that has no connexion whatever with the conduct of the war. The result practically belies the doctrine on which the summer has been shipwrecked, and your vessels are immediately got out of the way.

Our squadron is recalled from the Baltic, the *Times* hints at its being sent to the Black Sea. At the same time that journal devotes an article to show the facility of revolutions at Paris. Now if we consider the part that Russia has had in setting up Louis Napoleon, the present condition of Paris, and of France, interpreting it by her former part in the subversion of two dynasties, it will strike any one that Louis Napoleon cannot, in any case, adopt a course really hostile to Russia. I used these words, some months ago—speaking of the future Map of Europe, “Louis Napoleon must sell the English squadron, or be driven by an insurrection from Paris.”

There is no case in which I have been more struck with the public imbecility than in respect to France. What can be of more palpable importance than the ascertaining of our mutual position? yet, there is nothing that Englishmen more dread to look at. I am constantly reminded of the words of Prince Lieven applied to the Duke of Wellington: “He dreads and even avoids the examination of his position and trusts to events the care of overcoming difficulties.” Here, in a single phrase, is all Europe—Russia in it describes the character which gives her Europe. So soon as the results begin to manifest themselves hesitation will give place to virulence. When differences with France have become news and gossip then there will be as vehement a chattering as now there is a maleficent reserve.

Two significant facts have recently come to light; the one, the plan of a man-of-war harbour at Boulogne; the other, the suppression of the *Charivari* for its enmity to Russia. Add to this the winter camp at Boulogne, which is certainly not for the invasion of Russia, and if for overawing of Prussia, for the service of Russia just as much as if ostensibly directed against the ungarded coasts of England. You have allowed Louis Napoleon to fortify the Thracian Chersonese, and

thereby to gain virtual possession of the Dardanelles, so as to command your squadron. The *Times* wants you to send the whole of your fleet into the same trap. These are facts that would suggest reflection to the dullest of men, and might make the most foolish pause in their exultation at striking a blow at Russia, where the whole available force of England is to be shut up in a Sea commanded by France, and for the avowed purpose of forcing terms of settlement, which go to the confiscation of the sovereignty of the Ally whom you have undertaken to defend. Surely, if any profitable result could be obtained from the expedition, it would be first felt by the Turks, and by the English officers in command—Now, we have it on the authority of the *Times*, that the first, whenever the expedition is mentioned, give significant, but inarticulate signs of their incredulity and contempt. That the second view it with a profound feeling of distrust, hitherto unexperienced in British armies—not a “croaking,” as industriously represented, not despondency, but a conviction of treachery. And this sentiment is so general, that Lord Raglan has to be quoted as an exception. They too apprehend that the difficulty is not to get in, but to get out, whilst the nation at home thinks every thing is gained by getting in; it is right, every thing is gained, not however for England, but for Russia.

Now have you plunged more deeply into the mire; Russia has now got you; you are between the upper and the nether millstone; she will grind till you are dust. Let me recall the issue of your last war against her in the plains of Central Asia. Let me predict for you the result of this, as I did of that. When then you were exulting in your easy triumph, I told you that not a man would return. These lines will be read when probably you will be astounded, as well as overjoyed, by a similar triumph. I now tell you, your army will not return, but others will go forth. Then the Duke of Wellington announced that your dangers would commence with your success. What he told you of Cabul, I tell you of Sebastopol; but your danger then, as compared to what it is now, is as a mole to the Himalaya. Then your Shah Shuja only was imperilled and your buccaneer army; now it is your empire and existence. Turkey is first to be sacrificed, and after awhile Europe. The Crimea is a bone cast by the Czar to the dogs, over which they will hold a bloody carnival.

Is there one opinion which you successively entertained, which has not proved to be false? Is there one calculation

you have formed in which you have not been deceived? Have you not lived on surprises, and fattened on contradictions? Can you not learn at least this much—that whatever you believe must be false, whatever you expect, a delusion.

Turn back to the beginning. The beginning is the whole case: it consists of two points—the pretensions of Russia, and her strength. If Russia were the patron of the Christians of Turkey, she would use that patronage, not be seeking to obtain it. Had Russia been more than a match for Turkey you would have heard of her conquest, before you had learned her intentions. Look now at the end. Is not Russia beaten? is not the war ended? is this the moment to undertake a “gigantic” and “hazardous” expedition? But you have now discovered a new reason; the necessity of repressing Russia “by European guarantees.” Is not this falling back on the original fallacy, which events have disproved, that Russia is strong and Turkey weak. If Turkey is strong, there is no danger to Europe through Russia. If Turkey is strong, treaties are useless. Were she weak they would be equally so. How have your treaties been observed? Do not your ministers, in the very proposals for accommodation, speak of Russia’s aggression, *by virtue* of this or that treaty. If Turkey be able to hold her own, as is now established by facts, what need is there of a “gigantic” operation against the power, the keys of whose house are in Turkey’s possession?

It is because of this that you will not hold back; you will not hold back that Russia may not be beaten; for the government to hold back would require in it honesty; for the government to be held back would require in the nation an effort which is not in the order of its courage—that of the examination and condemnation of itself.

In summing up the case of the Afghan war, I said, “it is in this midnight of your intoxication that I announce to you an awakening of bitterness; it is in this springtide of your joy that I tell you an ebb of troubles is at hand; a voice of sorrow and warning I raise, if it be alone, and though its accents may not break your slumber, its tone will be remembered and will sink into your spirits when you are softened by misfortune.” But hearts of stone cannot be softened, and misfortune for you brings neither wisdom nor repentance; and Russia holding you by your passions, who can touch you by reason?”

Having now warned you, I conclude, thankful to have lived on two eventful occasions to denounce to this people its crimes, in the hour of its guilt and folly,

APPENDIX.

SOME months ago I stated that in March last the military authorities did not share in the delusion of the weakness of Turkey and its danger from Russia. Immediately after Lord Clarendon, in the House of Lords, stated that the "military authorities" concurred with the political authorities in the contrary opinion, and declared that the expedition was sent out not to repel Russia, or to save Turkey, but to secure Constantinople. In the course of my reply I gave publicity to a letter to Lord Raglan, which I here subjoin, together with an extract of a letter of Lord Ponsonby's, who has authorized me to publish it.

MR. URQUHART TO LORD RAGLAN.

The Clarendon, March 21st, 1854.

MY LORD,—At the close of the conversation I held yesterday with General Hardinge and Colonel Muttsin, a question was put in reference to the positions to be taken up by Her Majesty's troops on arriving in Turkey. My reply thereto was necessarily based upon a judgment of the entire case, and I am desirous of submitting it in this form to your Lordship, the more so, as yesterday the question came upon me suddenly.

The answer which I then gave, and which, in substance, I am about to repeat, was, it must be observed, given after a conversation of considerable scope, and in the course of which I either found concurrence, or had the opportunity of showing reasons for preliminary conclusions respecting facts, a perfect knowledge of which is requisite for appreciating the effect of any mere military operation, and to which I only advert at present, because of the extraordinary but universal misjudgment which prevails in this country.

First. Inadequacy of the resources of Russia for any great military operation against Turkey.

Secondly. The impossibility of the Russian armies, even when reinforced, on the opening of the spring, to cross the Danube with a view of attacking Turkey.

Thirdly. The numerical superiority of the forces which Turkey could bring upon the field of action, and also their superiority to their antagonists in soldier-like qualities.

Fourthly. The danger to Russia from an onward movement of the Turks, whether in Europe or in Asia, not only from the disaffection of populations within, but from the vast expansion of the contest itself, the number of points to be guarded, and the rallying to the cause of Turkey of numerous and warlike populations.

The impression left upon me by the conversation is, that these gentlemen already entertain opinions similar in character, if not equal in extent, and that they accepted the illustrations I offered from the late war, and from topographic considerations, and also the testimony I bore as to the character and feelings of the Turkish army, as materials for further judgment. The conclusion I submitted to them was this, that if a defensive character was given to the war, on the side of Turkey, it would end in the convulsion and ruin of that Empire, in consequence of its strength,—that if the war was carried forward to the frontiers of Russia, it must bring the dismemberment of that Empire as a consequence of its weakness. I said that the contest was, in one respect, analogous to that between Carthage and Rome, each being vulnerable at home. I did not say—what was in my mind, and which I avoided as being political—that Russia could make her war an aggressive one only by the aid of the Powers of Europe, whether under the form of allies or of enemies.

It was then that the question was put to me as to the effect of stationing the English forces on the lines of the ancient walls of the Chersonese and of Thrace, and my instant answer was—"For such an operation to be safe you require 200,000 men and an ostensible alliance with Russia."

I observed in explanation, that these gentlemen, being military men, could perfectly apprehend the effect on an army full of courage and vigour, and conscious of its power of crushing its enemy, of the arrival of foreign auxiliaries not to join in its triumph, but to restrain its action—that the occupying of lines, intelligible only as defending the capital and the castles of the Dardanelles from an impossible Russian descent, would be considered as an insult by the Turkish

nation ; that, consequently, the auxiliaries would be held by them as on the same line as the Russians ; they would be considered the real enemies, and be within reach ; that to them would, in fact, be transferred the hatred at present directed against the aggressor ; that the spirit would burst forth in insults and in quarrels ; blood would be shed, and the extent of the subsequent catastrophe incalculable.

I beg, my lord, to state my conviction, that by giving this perilous character of defence to the war you do place the troops of Her Majesty beside those of the Emperor of Russia in this contest, and that Russia will hereafter place them as principals in that contest, withdrawing to play her separate game, as may best suit her interest hereafter.

I beg to record my estimate of the power of the Turkish nation (not the opinions of its Government), by stating that they will not be put down by the forces you are sending, or can send in conjunction with those which France is sending, or can send, even in addition to those which Russia can bring into the field if she were prepared to cooperate with you in the adventure in which she has involved you. Lord Clarendon has observed that "the national spirit of Turkey which might have been so useful against the aggressor, has now become dangerous to its own government." It has become so, because that government has yielded to foreign counsels. It will become so no less to the troops of those foreign governments coming to the aid of that Turkish Government now dependent on foreign protection.

There is, my lord, only one means by which the army under your lordship's orders can have a chance of revisiting its native shores, and it is by being directed to operate against Russia, and not employed to defend Turkey. To operate against Russia, it is indeed superfluous, but I speak now simply in the interest of its preservation, which your lordship must above all things have at heart, even above your military reputation. But it is not on the Danube that it can be so employed with safety. For the expedition to the Crimea, supposing that plan to be carried into effect (which it will not be), it is Turks that are required—the population there being Tartar. The least objectionable field is that which remains of Asia, and in Asia, Georgia.

I am perfectly aware, my lord, that the conditions laid down by England and France are, that the territorial adjustments of Europe and Asia shall not be disturbed, and I see

in this fact the precaution taken by Russia, that the military operations of England and France *which she has provoked*, and therefore designed, shall serve no less for her protection than for Turkey's destruction; and it is precisely on this account that I make these observations to your lordship, as one who can and must admit responsibilities and fear consequences, and who is able, by the mere adoption of precautions requisite for the safety of your army, to rescue your country, Turkey, and Europe, from convulsion, leading to war—a war with France, and ending in ruin.

In the month of January 1851—on the occasion of the measures then being taken by the Porte to obtain the evacuation of these very Provinces, by that Russian army, which two years later re-entered them—I took the liberty of stating to the Sultan, not less decidedly than I make my present statement to your lordship, that “unless a body of 25,000 men was advanced to the Pruth, the effect of that Russian evacuation would only be the return of the Russian forces alone, with no counterbalancing Turkish army, and no Turkish commissioner.”

The scheme commenced by keeping back 25,000 Turkish, will be completed by sending forward 25,000 British troops.

I have the honour to remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient and most humble servant,

DAVID URQUHART.

VISCOUNT PONSONBY TO MR. URQUHART.

(EXTRACT.)

Brighton, March 27th, 1845.

I am no soldier, and I will not criticise military operations; *but I am* able to discern the difference between defensive and aggressive warfare. I do not think the Turks will have reason to be grateful to us for doing that which they have been able to do for themselves, and abstaining from measures that would be effective—the direction of our force to the attack of the enemy on those points on which rest *his* means of successful operation. If it proved to be the fact, that *defence* is the *end* of our intervention, I shall consider the present policy of our Government to be as imbecile *as* that

which they have pursued during the whole progress of this Eastern question. The result of mismanagement by England of these affairs will, I fear, be most mischievous to our country in particular, and be also the main cause of a convulsion in Europe.

EXTRACTS FROM A LETTER OF LORD PONSONBY, IN THE
'DAILY NEWS,' OCT. 1854.

"I recommend the most decisive and extensive action. The expulsion of Russia from every spot where she now has power, and which has been obtained by force or fraud from the Turks or the Persians, and the restoration of those territories to their former owners. I recommend this on the *ground of policy*, of security against future attacks of any sort from Russia; but *I particularly recommend it as affording a guard against disputes between the European powers, by thus leaving them nothing to be obtained or demanded by any one of them.*"

"The European powers, having destroyed Russian interference in Turkey, ought, for their own interest, to withdraw entirely from the design of influencing the conduct of the Turks within their own territories. All the plans that have been spoken of for the amelioration of internal affairs, either religious or governmental, in Turkey, resemble what Mr. Busybody would do in a private family; but with this difference, that there being many Busybodies, they will quarrel amongst themselves, and make confusion more confused. If let alone, Turkey will work out in her internal state every thing necessary for foreigners."

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VOL. II.—No. I.

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NEW HOPE FOR POLAND.

ON THE DEATH OF THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.

March 6th, 1855.

THE demise of the Emperor of Russia is an occasion on which I may be expected to speak, and on which I also am desirous of claiming a portion of your space.

The intelligence has fallen upon me as a blow—a blow by the fact, and a blow by its suddenness. The first is a personal suffering. The second is a public fear.

The Emperor Nicholas has been to me almost a portion of existence. He, through the system of which he was the chief, has been to me the spring of thought and the source of action—the mover of that great drama which the world feels, but does not behold; he was everywhere and everything in all that had to be examined, known, counteracted, combated, or suffered from, whether opinions at home, designs abroad, whether in England, or in France, or in Germany, or in Italy, or in Denmark, or in Spain, or in Turkey. But still neither to Europe nor the western confines of Asia were restricted the limits of his action; on the Madawaska, the Oregon, the La Plata, the Amoor, wherever human design was seen or fathomed, there still was present the Emperor Nicholas.

A career commencing with a usurpation and a revolution, close followed by a victorious war beyond the Caspian, close followed again by a triumph in a struggle for life and death on the plains of the Danube, instantly succeeded by a similar daring and achievement on those of Sarmatia, a revulsion of Europe by a mechanism, the springs of which were forged at St. Petersburg—such were the first five years of his illustrious career, when circumstances arose which seemed to bar him from the fruits of success, and displace Russia from her high position among nations—the commencement of the reconstruction of Turkey, and the political union of England and France.

Cautious now, as hitherto daring, four-and-twenty years of

peace succeed, in the course of which once he convulses Europe from end to end, converts Hungary for Austria into another Poland and his, secures the succession of Denmark, sets up an Emperor in France, and ruling all the nations and courts of the West through his ambassadors, and making use of their cabinets and statesmen as the tools with which he worked, finally accumulates the armies of Europe on the soil of his secular enemy, the old Ottoman Lion, to crush him by their weight and friendship; then draws them upon the soil of Russia, not only to defy the Western world, but to annihilate its armies. Vanishing from the scene after bringing the power of Russia to the highest point that it ever has attained, or ever can attain, that in which, by combining the two great nations of Europe against Russia, he has insured between them an internecine strife which must make his country mistress, not of Constantinople and Calcutta alone, but of Europe and the world. Let the Russians inscribe this epitaph upon his tomb—"He has accomplished the will of Peter."

It has ever been understood that this great accomplishment was not to take place in his day. He was not qualified to command armies. *There was blood between him and the Poles, who could not be left behind to be watched, and whose five hundred thousand warriors would be required. The restoration of the white double-headed eagle—the symbol of that reunion of the Slavonic races announced in the cathedral of Moscow by his predecessor Alexander, was not to take place in his day. If, then, his death be not a natural one, the preparations are already completed.*

I do not require to hear with the ears of the body the stupid exultation and the maniac jests in which this people will indulge.

There are strange parallelisms in history. Nicholas had his antetype, and so have we. There is only Philip to put beside Nicholas. The Athenians did say Philip was mad—the English did say Nicholas was mad. The Athenians did say "Philip is dead." The English are saying "Nicholas is dead." Philip was all Macedon, Nicholas in Russia was but emperor. Though Philip was all Macedon and did die, and although the Athenians did rejoice, Athens and Greece did perish. Philip was only a barbarian; Greece was civilised.

THE RESTORATION OF POLAND.

April 14th, 1855.

THE coincident removal of Nicholas I from the office of Emperor, and the elevation of Viscount Palmerston to that of Premier, may not be a mere synechronism, and if not, they portend an event wherein the one individual was an obstacle which had to be removed, and the other an instrument on which entire freedom of action had to be conferred. That a negative value in the displacement of the one, and a positive value in the accession of the other, did for me exist, on the several occurrence of each, will be seen by reference to my Letter on the accession of Lord Palmerston, and my Letter on the death of Nicholas. Since then the link is supplied in the words dropped by Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, in explanation of the speech of Sir Robert Peel. The meaning of which is that, in 1855, Poland is to be restored in the same manner that, in 1854, Turkey was protected.

This was not the only act that the death of Lord Dudley Stuart was made use of to put in requisition the machinery of the Polish Association. Under the presidentship of the Earl of Shaftesbury, a meeting was held, nominally for the commemoration of the services of Lord Dudley Stuart, where resolutions were passed to the effect that there could be no peace without the restoration of Poland, moved and seconded by the Queen's Lord Chamberlain and a Cabinet Minister, with whom would have figured M. Kossuth, had he not declined to associate himself with a movement, of which he perceived the incoherence, but could not fathom the purpose.

A few days ago one of your correspondents called my attention to a defence of Lord Palmerston, in the *Morning Post*, as requiring an answer, by the strangeness of the occurrence, and the force of its contents. I have only this day obtained the paper in question, and find it to be another evidence of the same purpose. I enclose it, and I entreat the insertion of it in your columns; it contains a value against which you may place years of leaders in all the press of Europe. Its connection with Poland is the endeavour to present Lord Palmerston as the standing enemy of Russia, and could have been only furnished by himself,—no other man could have brought the points to-

gether ; no other man could have been trusted with looking into the matters in question. I will notice but one, the bringing into evidence of the dissevering Lord Palmerston from the secret and confidential communications both in 1844 and in 1853 (implicating every one but him in the Russian connection), which I have repeatedly dwelt upon, but which is a matter wholly imperceptible, except to those in the secret of Russian actions.

The preparation for strangling Turkey was made by exciting the fervour of England against Russia and in favour of Turkey. We are at the beginning of a similar process with respect to Poland. It was necessary to keep down the Polish feeling until Turkey had been mastered ; this was effected by placing in office the forty years' friend of the Czar. In England such words as we have lately heard would have had their effect in giving popularity to the Government, but they would not have been trusted by the Poles. Lord Aberdeen is therefore removed, and with him the obloquy of friendship for the Czar. Lord Palmerston comes in upon his own old credit—"friend to Poland."

Between the Poles and Nicholas there was blood. In my Letter on the death of that Emperor, I said that his death, if natural, opened a new combination with Poland ; and if not natural, showed that the period for that combination had arrived, and, in fact, the invention of a new and incongruous term for his malady was a pretty free representation of the state of the case. An excitation of Poland during his lifetime might have turned against Russia. Now, assuredly, will it turn against the Sewabs or Germans, and the period is reached, so emphatically pointed out by Napoleon, when the fate of Europe will be changed by the association of Poland with its Sclavonic brothers, an event which he stated was the first and necessary stride towards the conquest of India.

The Poles are divided into two factions—the Monarchists, led by Prince Czartoryski ; and the Republicans, associated with the Republicans of Europe. The first are in Russia's hands, through the personal connexion of their leaders with Lord Palmerston. The others are in her hands through their association with the Republicans of Europe. The whole are in her hands by the hatred which the conduct of the governments of Europe have inspired, and by the hopes of a *quasi* nationality which she can now safely hold out. She secures them by making them resume the usurped fragments from Prussia and Austria. All this I

have said nineteen years ago. It will be found at length in the *Portfolio* of 1836.

A movement of this description will be concurrent with a revolutionary one in Europe, each reacting on the other. Hitherto the mass of the Republicans were on principle opposed to Russia's despotic power. The guarantee treaty with Austria and the fact of war with Russia, now place them ostensibly on the same line with herself.

Those who are not deluded with respect to the past conduct of the present premier are the last to see in these matters indications of coming events, because they suppose that they are but a repetition of those habitual expedients to content the public mind and secure popularity. Lord Palmerston has no need for such expedients. The time has passed to toil at "leaders" for such an end, and to concert public meetings. Besides, he was not brought in, save for a great event, which was, at the same time, to place him on the summit of the so-to-be-created "opinion;" and on the accomplishment of the great catastrophe at Vienna. What is the next event for Russia, if not Poland?

It is, however, not an indication alone which we have here; it is the act itself. The few words already dropped in England, almost unheeded, are already working their results on the minds of millions of men—even as the unheeded sentence in which, in 1846, he introduced the Po and the Rhine, effected the confiscation of Cracow and the Spanish marriages. The uninitiated reader may be startled at the assumption of such boundless superiority of one man to his country and his age; but a pigmy, on a height, looks down on a world of giants. Those who work with Russia, walk upon her level.

I would here recal that, since the commencement of the Turkish matter, I have never spoken of the restoration of Poland in any other sense than that in which I have spoken of the aid to Turkey. I have been unceasing in giving warning of the meshes spread for our feet in the one case as in the other, and therefore I have been reviled as the enemy of Poland no less than I have been as the enemy of Turkey. You have now seen what has been the value of your judgments in the latter. I have no hope of anything short of dire disasters convincing you in the other. I have said that to speak rationally of the restoration of Poland is to demand the impeachment of these English ministers who have sacrificed Poland. There is no other course

by which to restore Poland, to rescue Turkey, or to save England; but this course requires leaders who are patriots, and a nation that is free.

Poland will now be resumed from the Government co-partitioners with Russia, but the warning will not be timely for the Government prospective co-partitioners of Turkey.

There is but one chance in our favour, a slender one indeed; it is that of Turkey's presenting an unanticipated resistance to the infliction of the Four Points. Nor was the new plan ventured with respect to Poland until the Porte had committed the fault of engaging to send a representative to the Congress at Vienna. They rely even yet upon the Allies not pushing matters to extremity, yet say, "If the Powers threaten us with war, we will have grounds for submission, because we cannot make war against them together with Russia."

LORD PONSONBY, shortly before his death, proposed presenting a memorial to the Queen, pointing out the "consecutive perfidies of England to Turkey," the period when he himself was Ambassador inclusive. The document was never completed, and at his death the draft remained in my hands. I endeavoured to have it laid before her Majesty, but was met by "constitutional objections" at every turn. It is now, however, of record in the Foreign Office, and I subjoin it, in the hope that it may open the eyes of the Turkish Government to the gulf which is preparing for them, and induce the Poles to pause before they trust their hopes to such guidance.

CONSECUTIVE PERFIDIES OF ENGLAND TO TURKEY.

In 1791, the English Cabinet had resolved to resist the encroachments of Russia in the Black Sea, and fitted out an armament to attack Russia in the Baltic. Mr. Fox encouraged the Empress in her schemes, and Mr. Pitt abandoned the course which he had considered it his duty to adopt.

In 1806, every difference between England and France having been adjusted, Russia required the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia to herself. England did make the demand, and in consequence of its rejection by France, the two countries and Europe were again plunged in war.

In consequence of this understanding, Russia entered the

Principalities, under pretence of saving them *from France*, and England being at peace with Turkey, sent a squadron to force the Dardanelles and bombard Constantinople, with the view of forcing Turkey to the above-specified cession to Russia, the Dardanelles to herself, and a declaration of war against France.

In 1812, on the occasion of the invasion of Russia by France, when Turkey might have resumed the Provinces already wrested from her, a treaty was signed, under the mediation of England, by which Russia got Bessarabia.

In 1814-15, at the Congress of Vienna, to restore the territories that had been abstracted during the war, Bessarabia was not restored, and Turkey was deliberately excluded from the "reparatory stipulations" and the general guarantee of that act.

In 1821, on the occasion of the Greek insurrection, and the rupture between Turkey and Russia, by reason of the perfidy of the latter, England undertook to be the mouthpiece of Russia at Constantinople.

In 1826, on the occasion of the Convention of Ackerman, obtained by Russia under the promise of not interfering further in the Greek affairs, a secret protocol was signed between England and Russia for that interference, but without contemplating coercive measures.

The following year, the English squadron, supported by the Russian and the French, destroyed the Turkish marine force at Navarino.

In 1828, the English Government called upon the Pacha of Egypt to make himself independent.

In 1829, Lord Aberdeen expressed to the Russian Ambassadors his desires for the success of the Russian arms, and acted accordingly.

The same year the Treaty of Adrianople was forced upon the Porte by the English Ambassador, when a few weeks would have brought the annihilation of the remnants of the Russian forces. That treaty contained cessions of influence and of territory, in violation of the original compact with England.

In 1831, on the occasion of the Polish insurrection, Turkey, moved by a common feeling with Persia, Sweden, France, and Austria, sought and prepared to maintain that country. In common with that of the rest, the action of Turkey was restrained by England.

In 1833, when Mehemet Ali invaded the Ottoman Empire, the

Sultan appealed to England for protection, which was refused, Russia being invited by her to afford it. The following year, England menaced Turkey, on account of the treaty which she had been forced to sign with Russia, as the price of this assistance.

In 1838, a treaty of commerce was imposed on the Porte, which carried a high export duty on all those articles of Turkish growth which competed with the produce of Russia.

In 1840, again, on the occasion of an invasion by Mehemet Ali, England signed a treaty with Russia, stipulating for the defence of Constantinople and the Sultan by Russian arms.

In 1841, she signed a treaty for the exclusion of her own vessels from the Black Sea, and depriving the Sultan of the sovereignty of those waters.

In 1843, on the occasion of a revolution in Servia, the English Government admitted the Treaty of Adrianople as valid, and declared that Russia might interpret it as she pleased.

In 1844, the English Minister accepted a memorandum from Count Nesselrode, of verbal communications, having reference to the ultimate disposal of Turkey, and kept it secret.

In 1849, England refused its support to the Porte against a treaty imposed upon it by Russia for a joint occupation of the Danubian Principalities for eight years.

In 1852, England refused its support to Turkey against the outrage of forcing the displacement of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Servia.

In 1853, it refused its support against the invasion of the Danubian Principalities by Russia.

In the same year, it endeavoured to make the Porte acquiesce in the invasion of its territory by Russia and the claims she put forth to justify that invasion.

In the same year, she obtained a passage into the close waters of Turkey, for a naval force so powerful as to place in peril the independence of the Ottoman Empire.

During this whole course of time, the English Government professed the deepest anxiety for the well-being of the Ottoman Empire, holding its independence to be the gravest of the interests of England beyond her shores.

[The following letter from Mr. CHARLES ATTWOOD appeared some days later in the *Morning Advertiser*.]

You will see in the *Morning Advertiser* of yesterday's date (the 14th of April), perhaps the most remarkable and significant letter which Mr. Urquhart has ever written. I am quite sure myself of the point, that Palmerston is going to make a successful party—aye, of the cause and name of Poland; and as certain as of my existence that he does not mean to serve her more, or to betray her less, than when using her cause and name to the same end, he has done twice before, or more or less than he means to serve or to betray the cause of Turkey. But I did not see so clearly as I have done after just glancing through that letter, how grand and how complete may be the triumph over Europe and mankind, which, by working the mode of this betrayal, in the fashion which it indicates, he has now the opportunity to give to Russia; although when once presented to the mind, it is impossible to fail to see that it is such an opportunity, and one which gives him the power to stab the nation's life by one sure blow!

It can be only with a mind half-stunned by that consideration that one asks one's self the question, whether having that tremendous opportunity, he is about to use it; and on that point also I am terribly afraid that Mr. Urquhart hits the true nail on the head, when to those—and I am one of them—who doubted the extremity of danger through doubting the equality of Lord Palmerston's capacity to such a grandeur of design, he answers by suggesting that the intellect of Russia, at any rate, is equal to it, and that it needs no more from him than to supply the hand of the assassin with the will. To me the consideration of the subject, in this point of view, is absolutely overwhelming. Instead of looking on the Minister as the merely cunning trickster, who was only aiming to befool us for the vulgar ends of your mere daily politician, in dealing with the daily difficulties belonging to the hour, he rises into the dignity of an essential agent in the prosecution of a gigantic conspiracy, which has been organised for centuries, and is now ripe for striking for the empire of the world.

It is a phenomenon the most replete with wonder and dismay that has probably ever occurred in human history, that a whole people, making thirty millions, and, to an extraordinary extent,

of highly cultivated knowledge and general ability, appears not to have ten men amongst them who can, even in those affairs which fatally concern the possibility of preserving even a very short period of national existence, either see or be made to see any one of the very numerous and obvious indications of the character of this our condition, and the aims of those who use it fearlessly and safely in order to betray them. I used for a long time to think there must be at least a hundred men—though hard to find in such a multitude—who could both see and act, and so, by their co-operation, enable the best two or three to clear the public vision, and cure this terrible disease. I stand, like you, astonished at the fact that it appears alike incurable amongst the many and the few; and it presents itself at once to one's perception as a judgment from above, as palpably and clearly as the plague of darkness upon Egypt.

RUPTURE OF THE CONFERENCES OF VIENNA.

April 28th, 1855.

I reserve myself on this subject, until Lord John Russell has made his explanation; but I ask for room in your columns for a simple statement, before that explanation is made.

Time is now Russia's object; I explained at the moment, the Roebuck Committee, the expulsion of Lord Aberdeen, and the throwing a-back of everything by the Ministerial changes, on that hypothesis. I offered the same explanation for the Conference itself, equally attained by granting, or not granting the "Four Points," as the warlike operations were not suspended. The Conference was opened on the grounds that Russia yielded everything, which should have rendered a conference superfluous. The conference closes, because Russia objects to something, but will not make a counter-proposition. Can anything be more clear, that it was time she wanted; that it was time she gained up to the point of wanting it no longer? That gain amounts to *three months*.

She might have accepted the "Four Points" without suspending hostilities, for at any hour or on any spot new difficulties can be created. Lord Clarendon tells us even now that the Government "desires to consult Russia's dignity," not feelings—

not interest even, but—*dignity* ! The “Four Points” have, however, not made their fortune in Europe, and the Turkish Government were still stubborn. The summer fevers of the Crimea had to be added to its winter frosts. The French batteries had to bristle over Constantinople. The Emperor of the French had to supersede Omar Pacha, to let in the “Four Points;” and Turkey, she had to be broken under the Allies first; and so the Conferences are broken up, whilst the Polish game and the European revolution were to come off on that lay. The grand scheme of operations is Poland inaugurating its new nationality, by recovering Constantinople from those Western tyrants by whom she was betrayed, and the profound Polish mind will clearly perceive that in the fraternisation of Poles with Turks and Hungarians, it will be impossible for the despotic and Muscovite element to predominate in the new Imperial confederacy.

Meanwhile Englishmen stupidly deplore the prostration of their character and the inefficiency of their system, and see not that this great historical drama, which they believe themselves only privileged to witness, is the creation of their thoughts, and of those thoughts which they esteem the most humble and insignificant.

THE CONFERENCE AT VIENNA.

I repeat for the fiftieth time that Russia tells the truth. The annex A to Protocol 12 does truthfully show that it is not Turkey who is endangered from the maritime positions of the Russians, and allows it to be perceived, though not with the distinctness of the Emperor Alexander, that it is Russia who is at the mercy of the Power holding the keys of that sea, and thereby the keys of the House of the Czars:

There was a time when Russia was not so truthful—the time of the Menschikoff mission—when she told you that she had 150,000 men ready to march, and a fleet ready to sail—a Rayah population ready to insurgé, and a Sultan ready to banish to Iconium. But then it was necessary to drive you into action; then you had to be moved to support Turkey; you acted, accepting the falsehood. Now her part is to tell you the truth. That rôle began from the moment you were committed to what you call the war, as the natural consequence of your fall. Immediately she forced you into publishing the secret and confidential communications, with hot haste she informed Turkey that her *sovereignty* was menaced by the Allies who had occupied her territories, her strong positions, her straits, and internal seas, and had deprived her of the right of making peace or war, except with her concurrence. After that she published the fact, that she had no intention of making war on Turkey, as proved by the absence of any military preparations for such an end, and now at last she tells you that Sebastopol does not menace the Ottoman Empire.

In publishing these documents, the *Times* says:—

“The attempt to show that the Ottoman Empire is not exposed to danger from the Russian fleet is a barefaced imposition on the credulity of Europe; and if the Russian vessels had sailed for Constantinople with 20,000 men on the day after Prince Menschikoff’s return from his mission, the Emperor Nicholas would have realised his prediction, If ever Europe again leaves Russia in a condition to strike such a blow, the opportunity will not be a second time thrown away.”

This barefaced imposition I am guilty of quite as much as

Russia; indeed, far more so, for I command, Russia only follows. I did not confine myself to the attempt to show that the Ottoman Empire was not exposed to danger from the Russian fleet; I attempted to show that the Russian Empire was exposed to the most imminent hazard from the Turkish arms ashore and afloat, were the belligerents left to themselves; and I did so at the time that Russia was parading her 150,000 men and her fleet. And if the Russian vessels, with 20,000 men on board, could have realised for the Emperor Nicholas his predictions, I have not the remotest doubt that they would have sailed on the day, if not before, indicated by the *Times*.

As to the negotiations on which I promised you a letter, I have really nothing to say. When a conference of full-grown men discuss the conditions of treaties not extant, and when a nation of adults endures the farce and ignores the perfidy it covers, all attempt at exposure is worse than vain. What could you say to people, who, not being surgeons, would discuss aneurisms and tumours, and set about operations? What else can you say of a nation, which, not containing a single diplomatic man, debates terms of diplomacy, and which is so utterly insane as to carry on negotiations for peace at the very instant it is in the midst of the operations of war.

No more does the treaty of Adrianople exist, than did the treaty of Utrecht when England and France were on the point of plunging into war on account of a violation of it, which would have been no violation had the treaty been in existence.

The negotiations have simply given Russia four months. You may recollect that when they began, I stated that the object of them was to gain time. Time to accumulate more English, more French, more Turkish troops in the Crimea, to bring thither the befooled Piedmontese, and the doomed Indian army. Time to allow Mr. Roebuck to place the preliminary basis of distrust of France and revolution at home. Time for preparing the new nationality of Poland and the Danubian Provinces. Time for aggravating the discontents of France to prepare for the redemption of her honour against England. Time, in a word, for working out the great catastrophe for which time alone is now required; which I need not now particularize, having so often whispered amidst sneers, and now latterly denounced amid stupid trepidation.

Are there not yet two or three men who will venture to look into the causes of the war?

The above letter appeared in the *Morning Advertiser* of May 14th. On the following day the same journal had the subjoined extract from the *Constitutionnel*.

The *Constitutionnel* begins a speculative article on the war in these words:—"The war that we are carrying on against Russia is not as yet a great war. The great war will only commence on the day when, negotiations being definitively abandoned, we shall operate in concert with Austria. Then our onslaught upon Russia will not be restricted to the extremities of her dominions; it is the centre of her empire, that is to say her most vulnerable point, that we shall attack. The battle-field will be transported to Poland. Not a single town, but the fate of the entire Russian empire, will be the stake to be played for."

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